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FRANCE 

and   OURSELVES 


HERBERT  ADAMS  GIBBONS 


: 

FRANCE  AND  OURSELVES 


OTHER  BOOKS 
BY  HERBERT  ADAMS  GIBBONS 

THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 
THE  NEW  MAP  OF  AFRICA 
THE  NEW  MAP  OF  ASIA 
THE     FOUNDATION    OF    THE     OTTOMAN 
EMPIRE 

PARIS  REBORN 

THE  LITTLE  CHILDREN  OF  THE  LUXEM- 
BOURG 

THE  BLACKEST  PAGE  IN  MODERN  HIS- 
TORY 

THE  RECONSTRUCTION  OF  POLAND  AND 

THE  NEAR  EAST 
SONGS  FROM  THE  TRENCHES 
RIVIERA  TOWNS 


FRANCE  AND  OURSELVES 

INTERPRETATIVE  STUDIES: 
1917-1919 


BY 
HERBERT  ADAMS  GIBBONS 

Author  of  "Paris  Reborn,"  "The  Reconstruction 
of  Poland  and  the  Near  East,"  etc. 


NEW  YORK 

THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1920 


T 


"Tl^ 


Copyright,  1917,  1918,  1919,  1920,  by 
The  Century  Co. 


Copyright,  1919,  by 
Harpbr  and  Brothers 


Copyright,  1919,  by 
The  Ridgway  Co. 


Published,  February,  1920 


•  •    •  •«  •  •    • 

•  •  ••  •    •  • 


*    «  »    * 


<A 


TO 

EMILE  HOVELAQUE 

CASPAR  WHITNEY 

WILL  IRWIN 

in  memory  of  the  constant  silver  lining  in  the 

cloud.     They  never  lost  sight  of  it— and 

God  bless  them  for  the  work  they 

did    in     keeping    together 

France  and  ourselves ! 


41547S 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

Microsoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/franceourselvesiOOgibbrich 


ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

The  author  thanks  the  editors  of  the  Century, 
Harper's,  Everybody's,  Fortnightly  Review,  and 
Revue  Hebdomadaire  for  permission  to  republish 
matter  contributed  to  their  pages.  Most  of  the 
chapters  of  this  book  appeared  originally  as  staff 
contributions  to  the  Century  from  France. 
"The  Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  the 
War"  and  "The  Reconstruction  of  Northern 
France"  appeared  in  Harper's,  "Human  Cur- 
rents of  the  War"  in  Everybody's,  "The  Recon- 
struction of  Northern  France"  in  the  Fort- 
nightly, and  "The  Attitude  of  France  Towards 
Peace"  in  Revue  Hebdomadaire. 

H.  A.  G. 

Princeton,  February,  1920 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I     How  We  Can  Help  France     ....       3 

II     The  Tiger  of  France 23 

III     World  Justice  for  France     ....      34 

IV     The  Industrial  Effort  of  France  Dur- 
ing the  War 76 

V     Human  Currents  of  the  War     .      .      .111 

VI     The  Attitude  of  France  toward  Peace  148 

VII     The      Reconstruction      of      Northern 

France 187 

VIII     The  Case  against  Caillaux     ....   220 

IX     What  Confronts  France  .      .      .      .      .   251 


FRANCE 
AND  OURSELVES 


FRANCE 
AND  OURSELVES 

CHAPTER  I 

HOW  WE  CAN   HELP  FRANCE1 

F>  EFORE  the  United  States  entered  the  war 
*-*  a  few  Americans  were  helping  a  few 
French.  The  French  as  a  people  were  apprecia- 
tive of  the  aid  that  came  from  America,  and  there 
were  remarkable  testimonials  of  this  apprecia- 
tion. Our  ambulances  were  seen  on  the  French 
front,  and  Americans  in  Red  Cross  work  lost 
their  lives  on  the  field  of  battle.  In  many  places 
American  hospitals,  served  by  American  doctors 
and  nurses,  cared  for  the  French  wounded.  Or- 
ganizations for  relief -work  were  engaged  in  a 
multitude  of  activities,  and  the  American  Relief 

i  June,  1917. 


4  France  and  Ourselves 

Clearing  House  in  Paris  dispensed  money  by 
the  millions  and  sent  out  boxes  by  the  thousands. 
Other  Americans  were  not  content  to  work  for 
France.  They  fought  for  France  in  the  Foreign 
Legion  and  in  the  Aviation  Corps. 

But  all  this  was  the  effort  of  individual  men 
and  women.  The  United  States  was  neutral, 
and  so  long  as  the  United  States  remained  neu- 
tral, the  American  nation  could  not  help  the 
French  nation  in  the  death  struggle.  The  hero- 
ism and  the  self-sacrifice  and  the  warm  partizan- 
ship  of  individual  Americans  did  not  atone  for 
American  neutrality.  Whether  the  French 
should  have  understood  our  neutrality  and  have 
acknowledged  our  right  and  reason  to  remain 
neutral  is  not  to  the  point.  The  fact  is  that  we 
were  neutral. 

Only  Americans  who  knew  how  France  felt 
about  America  could  realize  how  France  felt 
about  American  neutrality.  The  feeling  about 
America  may  have  been  erroneous ;  but  only  if  it 
were  erroneous  (which  God  forbid!)  could  the 
feeling  about  American  neutrality  be  unreason- 


How  We  Can  Help  France  5 

able.  Have  we  ever  understood  the  French  con- 
ception of  America?  Far  deeper  than  the  im- 
pression, gained  from  contact  with  American 
tourists,  of  America  as  the  land  of  dollars  and 
dollar-chasing,  lay  the  belief  in  America  as  the 
land  of  liberty,  the  defender  of  right  and  justice 
in  the  relations  between  man  and  man  and  be- 
tween nation  and  nation.  The  French  have 
idealized  American  history  in  much  the  same  way 
that  they  have  idealized  their  own  history.  Our 
national  heroes — Washington,  Franklin,  Jeffer- 
son, and  Lincoln — are  as  real  to  the  French  as 
they  are  to  us,  and  the  connection  of  Lafayette 
and  Rochambeau  with  the  birth  of  the  United 
States  is  taught  in  French  schools  as  it  is  taught 
in  our  schools.  This  feeling  has  been  specially 
true  under  the  Third  Republic.  We  have  been 
regarded  as  the  sister  democracy,  different  in 
manner  of  life  and  thought,  different  even  in  civi- 
lization, but  alike  in  ideals.  It  was  not  yesterday 
that  a  portrait,  a  bust  of  Franklin  or  Washing- 
ton was  placed  in  French  mairies;  and  other 
cities  besides  Paris  long  ago  gave  the  names  of  the 


6  France  and  Ourselves 

fathers  of  the  American  Revolution  to  streets 
and  squares. 

In  a  spirit  of  historical  detachment,  far  from 
the  fray  and  unaffected  by  it,  one  may  be  success- 
ful in  studying  the  causes  leading  up  to  the 
war  and  in  pointing  out  their  complexity  and 
multiplicity.  But  the  French  did  not  do  this. 
They  could  not  do  it.  The  storm  broke,  and 
broke  upon  them.  The  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality brought  the  Germanic  hordes  into  France. 
Civilians  suffered,  provinces  were  devastated,  and 
through  their  initial  unfair  advantage  the  Ger- 
mans were  able  to  seize  and  hold  northern 
France.  The  instinct  of  self-preservation  called 
France  to  arms,  but  very  quickly  the  defenders 
of  their  homes  came  to  identify  the  national  cause 
with  that  of  human  liberty  and  twentieth-century 
civilization.  Before  they  had  been  in  the  war  a 
week  the  Germans  aroused  in  their  opponents  a 
feeling  of  moral  revolt,  dictated  by  international 
reasons  fully  as  much  as  by  national  ones. 
Hence  France  looked  to  the  United  States  not  to 
help  France  in  her  own  defense,  the  success  of 


How  We  Can  Help  France  7S 

which  was  assured  by  the  Battle  of  the  Marne, 
but  in  the  defense  of  the  principles  which  all 
Frenchmen  believed  were  as  dear  to  Americans 
as  to  them.  We  Americans  who  lived  in  France 
during  the  first  thirty  tragic  months  of  the  war 
knew  full  well  that  our  humanitarian  efforts  were 
of  no  avail  in  the  face  of  the  fact  of  American 
neutrality.  We  spoke  of  American  sympathy, 
proved  by  relief  contributions  and  by  editorials 
of  New  York  newspapers.  But  the  French  ideal 
of  the  United  States  demanded  official  action  by 
Washington.  I  believe  I  am  right  in  stating 
that,  despite  the  sore  need  of  our  material  aid, 
France  would  gladly  have  forgone  all  that  Amer- 
icans were  doing  and  could  do  for  an  official  con- 
demnation by  the  American  Government  of  the 
policy  and  the  acts  of  Germany. 

At  last  the  change — or  was  it  the  awakening? 
— came.  Now  we  are  allies  of  France.  In  time 
of  war  friends  are  synonymous  with  allies.  Neu- 
trality may  be  natural,  reasonable,  explicable, 
just;  but  what  logic  can  be  opposed  to  the 
thought,  "He  that  is  not  with  me  is  against  me"? 


8  France  and  Ourselves 

Bygones  are  bygones.  We  have  come  into  the 
war,  and  we  have  come  in  at  the  critical  moment. 
We  have  come  in  whole-heartedly.  Perhaps  our 
aid  is  more  appreciated  for  the  timeliness  of  it 
and  the  unexpectedness  of  it.  If  we  do  not  fall 
into  the  error  of  assuming  that  we  are  the  deus 
ex  machina  and  of  adopting  the  attitude  of  sav- 
iors, all  will  be  well. 

We  made  a  good  beginning.  Marshal  Joff re 
was  greeted  in  the  United  States  with  an  outburst 
of  enthusiasm  and  affection  that  put  heart  into 
the  French  nation  at  a  moment  of  widespread 
discouragement.  The  April  offensive  had  failed, 
the  submarine  menace  was  becoming  alarming, 
and  the  state  of  anarchy  in  Russia  was  causing 
apprehension.  The  adoption  of  a  series  of  prac- 
tical measures  at  Washington,  coinciding  with 
the  reception  of  the  French  mission,  proved  that 
American  cooperation  was  not  going  to  be  con- 
fined to  manifestations  of  sentimental  hysteria. 
No  ally  of  France  has  acted  more  promptly  and 
more  advisedly.  We  voted  conscription,  placed 
immediately  enormous  sums  at  the  disposal  of 


How  We  Can  Help  France  9 

our  allies,  gave  the  President  control  over  the 
export  of  food-stuffs,  passed  the  espionage  bill, 
promised  active  participation  on  the  battle-fields 
of  France,  and  sent  a  fleet  of  destroyers  to  Eu- 
rope as  an  earnest  of  our  intention  to  sacrifice 
life  as  well  as  treasure  in  combating  Germany. 

Efficient  and  decisive  aid,  however,  cannot  be 
given  by  us  if  we  go  to  France  with  an  imperfect 
or  incorrect  conception  of  the  essential  conditions 
of  our  cooperation.  We  must  see  problems  as 
France  sees  them,  and  we  must  help  to  solve  them 
in  the  French  way  and  not  in  the  American  way, 
remembering  that  the  war  is  being  fought  on 
French  soil.  Otherwise  we  shall  fail,  and  gener- 
ous impulses  will  come  to  naught.  Instead  of  a 
permanent  understanding  with  France,  there  will 
be  mutual  disillusionment.  Then  the  French  will 
dislike  us,  and  we  shall  dislike  them.  What  calls 
more  insistently  for  the  rarest  qualities  and  tact 
and  delicacy  than  helping  a  friend? 

We  are  accustomed  to  regard  France  as  a  na- 
tion that  has  broken  with  traditions  of  the  past 
and  has  evolved  a  democracy  similar  to  our  own. 


10  France  and  Ourselves 

We  contrast  French  individualism  with  Ger- 
man conformity,  and  think  that  the  French  are 
freed  from  the  shackles  of  convention  by  the 
democracy  they  have  constituted.  We  contrast 
French  gaiety  with  English  dourness,  and  think 
that  the  French  are  hail-fellow-well-met  like  our- 
selves. Let  us  correct  immediately  and  entirely 
these  notions.  And  since  we  are  going  to  France, 
and  France  is  not  coming  to  us,  let  us  remember 
that  we  must  try  to  understand  their  point  of 
view  without  insisting  upon  their  understanding 
ours. 

The  French  are  bound  by  their  past.  De- 
spite revolutions  and  republics,  they  are  hostile  to 
new  ideas  and  attach  a  tremendous  importance  to 
form.  Both  in  thought  and  action  they  are  less 
individualistic  than  the  English.  They  are 
proud  and  sensitive  and  reserved.  Then,  too, 
the  French  have  been  keyed  to  the  breaking- 
point  of  nervous  tension  during  three  years  of 
war.  We  cannot  expect  them  to  be  calm  and  pa- 
tient and  grateful.  If  they  need  help  badly,  it  is 
because  they  have  borne  the  brunt  of  the  German 


How  We  Can  Help  France  11 

aggression.  France  has  given  everything,  suf- 
fered everything,  and  sacrificed  everything 
where  her  allies  have  given  and  suffered  and  sac- 
rificed only  in  part.  Russia,  like  France,  has 
had  enormous  losses  in  fighting,  and  portions  of 
her  territory  are  now  occupied  by  the  enemy ;  but 
Russia  has  more  than  twice  the  population  of 
France,  and  the  territories  that  the  Germans  hold 
are  not  an  integral  part  of  the  Russian  Empire 
or  a  vital  part  of  Russia's  economic  life.  Eng- 
land and  Italy  are  not  invaded,  and  their  indus- 
tries have  not  been  paralyzed  by  the  mobiliza- 
tion and  the  maintenance  on  the  front  through 
years  of  their  manhood  population. 

We  are  going  into  a  country  the  soil  of  which  is 
consecrated  by  the  life-blood  of  a  million  soldiers 
and  desecrated  by  the  German  occupation.  We 
are  going  among  a  people  who  have  been  and  are 
still  living  in  hell,  and  who  stand  undaunted  and 
glorious  in  the  midst  of  bereavement  and  desola- 
tion. It  is  the  holy  of  holies  that  we  are  privi- 
leged to  enter,  and  we  must  go  in  with  bowed 
heads.     We  go  to  learn,  not  to  teach,  and  the 


12  France  and  Ourselves 

man  of  us  who  says,  "You  ought  never  to  have 
done  it  this  way,"  or  "I  '11  show  you  how  to  do  it," 
ought  to  be  taken  out  and  shot. 

Yes,  I  mean  what  I  say.  Lack  of  considera- 
tion, thoughtlessness,  bluntness,  impatience  to  re- 
form things,  are  qualities  that  have  no  place  in  the 
house  of  grief  and  suffering.  Our  opportunity 
to  walk  into  the  heart  of  France  and  to  win  the 
most  precious  national  friendship  on  earth  is 
unique ;  but,  oh,  how  we  need  insight  and  gentle- 
ness! The  problems  are  open,  bleeding  war 
wounds,  every  single  one — military,  political, 
economic,  social.  Of  course  one  recognizes  that 
many  of  them  existed  before  the  war  or  have  been 
born  of  seed  sown  before  the  war.  Many  of 
them  are  due  in  part  to  defects  in  French  charac- 
ter and  French  institutions.  But  the  aggrava- 
tion and  seriousness  of  the  problems  have  one 
cause — the  war.  And  if  the  problems  do  not  ex- 
ist in  England  and  Italy  as  they  exist  in  France, 
it  is  because  France  is  on  the  cross  and  the  others 
are  not.  Congestion  of  ports,  scarcity  of  ships, 
difficulties  of  railway  transportation,  bad  repair 


How  We  Can  Help  France  13 

of  rolling-stock,  caring  for  the  refugees,  meeting 
the  needs  of  the  widows  and  orphans  and  muti- 
lated, fighting  tuberculosis  and  prostitution,  min- 
istering to  the  wounded,  distributing  food-stuffs 
and  fuel  to  civilians,  finding  money,  regulating 
the  economic  life  of  the  country,  moving  troops, 
provisioning  the  front — -all  these  are  the  prob- 
lems that  are  confronting  France  and  in  the  solu- 
tion of  which  our  help  is  needed. 

Insight  and  gentleness.  Can  we  have  the  in- 
sight unless  we  appreciate  what  France  has  been 
through,  how  these  problems  have  arisen,  and 
what  the  French  think  about  them?  Can  we  use 
the  gentleness  unless  we  put  ourselves  in  the  place 
of  the  dwellers  in  the  house  of  grief  and  suffering 
and  view  the  problems  through  their  eyes?  Let 
me  cite  only  one  illustration.  An  admirable 
movement  was  put  on  foot  in  the  United  States 
to  raise  a  substantial  fund  for  French  war  or- 
phans. It  was  a  great  idea,  and  an  appeal  could 
be  made  with  peculiar  force  for  the  children  of 
France  who  were  deprived  of  their  fathers.  Had 
not  the  French  fathers  died  for  us,  for  the  world, 


14  France  and  Ourselves 

as  well  as  for  their  own  children?  But  while  an 
American  committee  could  fittingly  raise  money 
for  French  orphans,  it  could  not  fittingly  dis- 
tribute this  money.  No  outsider,  no  matter  how 
good  a  friend,  could  enter  and  exercise  authority 
in  French  homes.  He  would  encroach  upon  and 
influence  religion  and  education,  the  precious  pre- 
rogatives of  the  family  and  the  state.  An  Amer- 
ican committee  could  not  give  money  to  sectarian 
organizations  in  France  for  the  bringing  up  of 
orphans.  No  matter  how  perfect  the  good  faith 
and  intention  of  the  givers,  the  nation  would  re- 
sent the  money  coming  from  abroad  for  this 
sacred  purpose  if  it  had  a  string  attached  to  it. 
To  distribute  money  is  harder  than  to  beg  it;  to 
give  it  away  is  harder  than  to  make  it.  In  the 
case  of  the  orphans,  intelligent  friends  of  France 
will  keep  their  money  in  their  pockets  unless  it  is 
to  be  handed  over  unostentatiously  to  a  French 
committee,  representative  of  and  designated  by 
the  nation. 

We  must  be  careful  how  we  do  things.     We 
have  to  curb  and  keep  in  leash  a  natural  instinct. 


How  We  Can  Help  France  15 

The  typical  American  has  his  mind  upon  the 
goal.  He  is  after  results,  and  the  way  in  which 
he  accomplishes  what  is  set  before  him  he  does 
not  consider  of  much  importance.  The  French- 
man, on  the  other  hand,  is  hedged  in  from  birth 
by  form.  There  is  a  right  and  proper  way  to  do 
everything,  and  one  would  rather  not  have  it 
done  at  all  than  not  do  it  in  that  way.  The 
French  pride  themselves  upon  their  individual- 
ism and  their  personal  independence.  They 
make  fun  of  their  governmental  institutions  and 
are  remorseless  critics  of  the  bureaucracy  and  the 
police.  But  if  you  watch  a  Frenchman  in  discus- 
sion with  a  public  official,  a  rare  occurrence,  you 
will  notice  that  the  crowd  is  invariably  on  the  side 
of  the  representative  of  authority.  The  unfor- 
givable sin  in  France  is  not  being  en  regie. 
Hence,  however  much  one  may  protest,  he  con- 
forms; and  established  institutions  and  estab- 
lished procedure  persist  through  revolutions  and 
reactions  just  as  they  were  in  the  olden  days. 
When  Bergson  set  forth  his  "philosophy  of 
form,"  which  was  hailed  as  a  novelty  in  Anglo- 


16  France  and  Ourselves 

Saxon  countries,  he  was  reflecting  the  Latin 
civilization  to  which  he  belonged. 

President  Wilson,  in  the  face  of  adverse  criti- 
cism and  pressure  from  all  sides,  declined  Mr. 
Roosevelt's  offer  to  lead  a  volunteer  army  to 
France.  He  showed  remarkable  perspicacity. 
I  have  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  Mr.  Roosevelt 
and  his  friends  were  actuated  by  the  sole  motive 
of  wanting  to  serve  France ;  but  their  love  of  the 
French  was  greater  than  their  knowledge  of  the 
French.  Whatever  their  newspapers  may  have 
said,  in  the  desire  to  avoid  looking  a  gift-horse  in 
the  mouth,  the  people  of  France  did  not  under- 
stand the  Roosevelt  scheme.  It  perplexed  and 
worried  them.  They  would  have  interpreted  its 
adoption  as  a  sign  that  our  Government  did  not 
have  sufficient  prestige  among  the  American  peo- 
ple to  help  France  in  the  regular  way,  or  that  the 
American  people  were  so  opposed  to  the  war  that 
President  Wilson  was  compelled  to  fall  back 
upon  private  initiative  and  enterprise  for  mili- 
tary cooperation  with  the  Entente  powers.  It 
was  only  when  telegrams  from  Washington  an- 


How  We  Can  Help  France  17 

nounced  that  General  Pershing  would  command 
the  first  troops  sent  to  France,  and  that  these 
troops  would  be  an  official  American  army,  that 
the  French  realized  the  significance  of  America's 
entry  into  the  war.  Now  they  know  that  the 
American  nation,  represented  by  the  Government 
at  Washington,  is  helping  France. 

The  primary  and  obvious  form  of  aid  to 
France  is  the  sending  of  an  army.  Yet  here  also 
we  have  to  exercise  an  unusual  degree  of  self- 
restraint.  The  most  spectacular  help  is  always 
the  easiest  to  give.  While  our  flag  on  the  French 
front  is  a  sine  qua  non  of  the  alliance,  and  while 
its  moral  effect  cannot  be  overestimated  in  rela- 
tion to  American  public  opinion,  the  extent  of 
our  military  cooperation  must  not  be  determined 
by  the  longing  for  excitement  and  adventure  and 
glory  that  is  being  awakened  among  our  young 
men.  If  the  French  and  American  Govern- 
ments, working  together  in  perfect  harmony,  de- 
cide that  a  large  American  army  should  be  sent 
to  France,  well  and  good.  But  if  other  means 
of  serving  the  common  cause  are  pointed  out  to 


18  France  and  Ourselves 

us  as  more  pressing  and  more  vital,  we  must  be 
ready  to  subordinate  our  generous  impulses  to 
the  exigencies  of  the  situation  as  it  develops. 

It  is  probable  that  France  is  going  to  need 
ships  and  fuel  and  war  material  before  she  needs 
fighting  men,  and  our  factories  and  our  granaries 
may  continue  to  be,  as  they  have  been  in  the  past, 
more  essential  than  our  armies.  In  every  kind 
of  human  endeavor,  where  cooperation  is  neces- 
sary, directors  of  concerted  effort  find  that  ineffi- 
ciency in  helpers  is  due  to  inability  or  unwilling- 
ness to  perform  the  service  required.  The  diffi- 
culty is  not  in  getting  the  workers,  but  in  getting 
workers  who  will  take  positions  they  can  fill  and 
which  need  to  be  filled.  This  is  the  prime — if 
not  the  sole — reason  for  unemployment.  In  this 
war  France  looks  to  the  American  nation  for  aid. 
Our  Government  at  Washington  directs  the  en- 
terprise of  aiding  France.  There  will  be  unem- 
ployment, lack  of  opportunity  to  serve,  only  for 
those  who  want  to  dictate  how  they  shall  serve. 
The  test  of  love  for  our  own  country  as  well  as 
for  France,  of  desire  to  help  the  world  to  a  better 


How  We  Can  Help  France  19 

life  after  the  cataclysm  through  which  we  are 
passing,  comes  right  here. 

Whatever  combinazione  French  statesmen  and 
diplomats  may  have  dreamed  of,  whatever  impe- 
rialistic aspirations  may  have  received  sanction 
in  secret  treaties  between  France  and  the  other 
powers  of  the  Entente,  the  voice  of  the  people 
will  count  when  it  comes  to  the  making  of  peace, 
and  the  people  are  not  fighting  for  the  advance- 
ment of  selfish  national  interests.  Only  if  Ger- 
many comes  to  the  peace  conference  crushed  and 
powerless,  can  the  French  public  be  seduced  by 
the  imperialists  and  led  by  the  diplomats.  There 
is  an  overwhelming  sentiment  in  France  that  the 
objects  of  this  war  are  the  return  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  and  the  restoration  of  the  invaded  de- 
partments, with  an  indemnity  for  rehabilitation. 
For  more  than  that  France  will  not  prolong  the 
war,  and  France  is  not  counting  on  American 
support  to  attain  objects  that  are  in  conflict  with 
French  and  American  principles.  We  have  a 
right,  then,  to  believe  and  hope  that  comradeship 
in  arms  will  lead  to  a  durable  entente  between 


20  France  and  Ourselves 

France  and  the  United  States.  That  belief  and 
hope  form  the  basis  of  cooperation  now.  For 
otherwise,  harmonious  cooperation,  even  at  this 
critical  moment  when  our  aid  is  so  precious, 
would  be  impossible. 

We  must  guard  ourselves  against  the  perni- 
cious and  illogical  notion,  advanced  by  the  un- 
thinking, that  our  aid  is  disinterested,  and  that 
we  are  giving  it  freely.  There  is  a  big  difference 
between  assuring  our  enemies  that  we  covet  noth- 
ing of  theirs  and  assuring  our  friends  that  we  look 
for  no  return  for  the  help  we  give  them.  Bene- 
factors bestow  largess  upon  inferiors:  between 
equals  there  can  be  only  a  quid  pro  quo.  With- 
out the  idea  of  reciprocity  our  aid  would  be  an 
insult  to  France.  If  we  do  not  go  to  France 
with  the  idea  that  we  are  going  to  discharge  an 
obligation  that  we  have  incurred,  and  are  going 
for  our  own  benefit  fully  as  much  as  for  the 
benefit  of  France,  it  would  be  wiser  to  stay  at 
home.  May  we  not  have  a  false  conception  of 
our  role  in  this  war!  We  go  not  to  save  France, 
but  to  assist  France  to  save  the  world. 


How  We  Can  Help  France  21 

I  started  with  the  question,  How  can  we  help 
France?  I  cannot  end  without  the  question, 
How  can  France  help  us?  For  it  would  be  a 
waste  of  time  to  consider  the  former  without  hav- 
ing simultaneously  in  mind  the  latter.  Long 
ago,  at  the  beginning  of  our  national  lif  e,  France 
did  for  us  what  we  in  small  measure  are  trying  to 
pay  back  now.  But  we  have  not  grown  beyond 
the  need  of  what  France  can  still  give.  Far 
from  it.  Over  against  our  New  World  energy, 
our  proud  progress  in  science  and  in  things  mate- 
rial, stands  France's  Old  World  refinement  and 
proud  progress  in  thought  and  things  spiritual. 
France  can  be  our  gateway  to  the  Europe  that 
we  do  not  know,  the  Europe  whose  moderation 
and  modesty  are  needed  to  temper  our  neophy- 
tism  and  self -consciousness. 

We  are  of  mixed  ancestry,  but  our  political 
and  social  institutions,  our  literature  and  lan- 
guage, have  stamped  us  in  the  Anglo-Saxon 
mold.  With  the  good  we  have  inherited  the  bad, 
and  the  bad  has  become  accentuated  in  the  un- 
formed, expansive  life  of  our  vast  continent. 


22  France  and  Ourselves 

We  have  taken  from  England  her  two  disagree- 
able Teutonic  traits,  race  superiority  and  cant, 
which  have  been  fostered  in  the  British  Empire 
and  in  the  United  States,  as  they  have  been  in 
Prussia,  by  Protestantism.  The  Germans  have 
waked  up  late  to  the  philosophy  of  the  Ueber- 
mensch  and  the  dream  of  world  supremacy. 
Anglo- Saxondom  has  long  practised  the  one  and 
tried  to  realize  the  other.  Alliance  with  the  Brit- 
ish Empire  would  tend  to  increase  our  self- 
esteem  and  our  arrogance  and  stimulate  our  be- 
lief in  a  world  mission,  had  we  not  the  splendid 
anchor  to  windward  of  the  alliance  with  France, 
virile  exponent  of  the  undying  Latin  civilization. 
Germany  of  the  Tugendbund  might  have  grasped 
this  anchor,  and  not  have  broken  from  her  moor- 
ings. The  anchor  is  strong  enough  to  hold  us; 
but  we  must  realize  that  it  is  an  anchor,  and  we 
must  be  willing  to  use  it. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  TIGER  OF  FRANCE1 


EMPEROR  FRANCIS  JOSEPH  did  not 
live  long  enough  to  enter  Italy  at  the  head 
of  his  army;  but  the  next  in  order  among  un- 
dreamed-of events  has  actually  happened  with 
the  return  of  Georges-Eugene-Benjamin  Cle- 
menceau  to  the  helm  in  France.  Up  to  the  last 
minute  the  wiseacres  of  the  Palais-Bourbon, 
where  sits  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  persisted  in 
their  belief  that  France's  veteran  politician  and 
journalist  could  not  become  premier.  They  had 
every  kind  of  good  reason  to  give  you.  As  if  the 
ante-bellum  record  of  "the  Tiger"  were  not  suf- 
ficiently damning  from  the  politician's  point  of 
view,  there  could  be  added  the  three  years  of  edi- 
torship of  UHomme  Libre,  UHomme  Moins 

i  November,  1917. 


23 


24  France  and  Ourselves 

Libre,  and  UHomme  Enchaine.  Only  the  men 
too  insignificant  to  waste  ink  upon  had  escaped 
the  trenchant  pen  of  "the  Tiger."  President 
Poincare;  Premiers  Viviani,  Briand;  Ribot,  and 
Painleve;  their  coadjutors;  ministers  of  foreign 
affairs  and  of  war;  generals  of  the  armies;  am- 
bassadors and  ministers;  Allied  statesmen;  the 
pope;  President  Wilson  and  the  rulers  of  all 
other  neutral  nations  had  received  special  atten- 
tion in  the  famous  "leaders"  of  the  newspaper 
held  in  abhorrence  and  suspicion  by  the  French 
censorship.  Political  parties — all  of  them — were 
treated  as  unsparingly  as  their  chiefs. 

To  whom,  then,  especially  in  a  country  where 
political  animosity  is  strong,  especially  at  a  time 
when  international  relations  are  "delicate,"  would 
Georges  Clemenceau  be  persona  grata?  It  was 
the  duty  of  the  President  of  France  to  choose  the 
successor  to  the  premiership.  The  choice  would 
have  to  be  approved  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies. 
If  Clemenceau  were  picked  to  succeed  Painleve 
— and  the  hypothesis  was  incredible — would  the 
magnanimity  of  Monsieur  le  President  be  shared 


The  Tiger  of  France  25 

by  Messieurs  les  Deputes?  And  what  about  the 
opposition  of  the  Unified  Socialists,  who  had  sol- 
emnly pronounced  in  anticipation  the  exclusion 
of  Clemenceau  as  a  candidate  for  premiership? 
When  Ribot  tried  to  reform  his  cabinet,  he  failed 
because  Painleve  declared  that  no  cabinet  could 
succeed  when  presented  to  the  Chamber  without 
the  participation  of  the  Unified  Socialists. 
Later  Painleve  attempted  to  do  what  he  felt 
Ribot  could  not  do,  and  he  found  that  his  first 
opinion  was  true. 

The  prophets  were  wrong.  President  Poin- 
care,  overlooking  his  own  personal  reasons  for 
disliking  Clemenceau  and  the  veto  of  the  Unified 
Socialists,  invited  Clemenceau  to  form  a  ministry. 
"The  Tiger"  did  not  hesitate  to  accept  the  man- 
date from  the  hands  of  the  man  whom  he  had 
been  holding  up  to  scorn  and  ridicule  ever  since 
the  war  started.  He  had  little  difficulty  in  get- 
ting eminent  men  to  serve  with  him,  and  secured 
a  vote  of  confidence  with  the  overwhelming  ma- 
jority of  418  against  65.  Only  Unified  Socialists 
voted  against  him.     Of  the  forty  deputies  who 


26  France  and  Ourselves 

refrained  from  voting,  twenty-five  were  Unified 
Socialists.  This  means  that  all  the  Radicals  and 
Radical  Socialists  except  fifteen,  all  the  Center 
and  all  the  Right,  gave  their  confidence  to  the 
Clemenecau  cabinet. 

Why  were  the  prophets  wrong?  Simply  be- 
cause they  had  grown  accustomed  to  look  upon 
the  formation  of  ministries  as  a  matter  of  politi- 
cal bargaining  and  manceuvering,  the  premier- 
elect  choosing  his  ministers  and  setting  forth  his 
program  with  an  eye  to  the  likes  and  dislikes  of 
parties  and  party  leaders.  Viviani  adopted  this 
plan  a  month  after  the  war  began.  Briand  and 
Ribot  and  Painleve  followed  in  the  same  path. 
The  politicians  had  forgotten  the  country,  or  at 
least  they  persisted  in  regarding  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  as  representing  the  country.  Perhaps 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies  did  represent  France 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  but  during  this  long 
struggle  parliament  and  people  have  drifted 
apart.  Clemenceau  realized  this.  He  did  not 
have  to  depend  upon  securing  collaborators  who 
could  carry  the  votes  of  his  particular  group,  or 


The  Tiger  of  France  27 

upon  sweeping  the  deputies  off  their  feet  by  an 
unexpectedly  moving  and  virile  setting  forth  of 
his  program.  He  knew  that  the  representatives 
of  the  people  would  not  dare  to  refuse  him  their 
confidence.  For  France  wanted  Clemenceau, 
and  president  and  parliament  were  not  willing 
to  oppose  the  country.  Considerations  of  pa- 
triotism and  of  bowing  before  necessity  dictated 
the  choice  of  Clemenceau. 

Some  telegrams  to  American  and  British  news- 
papers stated  that  the  remarkable  speech  of  the 
new  premier  when  he  presented  his  ministry  to 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies  on  November  20th  won 
him  the  support  of  the  country  and  instilled  new 
life  and  determination  to  continue  the  war  to  the 
bitter  end.  This  is  the  opinion  of  superficial  ob- 
servers, who  reversed  the  roles.  The  nation  ap- 
pealed to  Clemenceau  before  Clemenceau  ap- 
pealed to  the  nation.  Support  and  confidence 
were  offered  to  him  before  he  spoke.  Clemen- 
ceau as  premier,  despite  the  inclination  of  presi- 
dent and  parliament,  is  the  result,  not  the  cause, 
of  the  remarkable  war  spirit  in  France,  which, 


28  France  and  Ourselves 

deep  down  in  the  hearts  of  the  people,  has  never 
flagged. 

During  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1917  I  en- 
joyed the  privilege  of  traveling  in  every  part  of 
France.  I  found  the  people  in  a  state  of  high 
nervous  tension.  The  defection  of  Russia  and 
the  crushing  defeat  of  Italy,  coming  in  the  fourth 
year  of  the  war,  would  have  been  enough  to  dis- 
courage any  nation  that  had  suffered  as  France 
has  suffered.  But  added  to  these  outside  disap- 
pointments were  four  grave  facts  of  internal 
order,  for  which,  rightly  or  wrongly,  the  French 
held  their  own  Government  and  parliament  re- 
sponsible: the  fiasco  of  the  Saloniki  Expedition; 
the  failure  to  put  through  any  large  offensive 
movement  on  the  Western  front ;  general  lack  of 
confidence  in  the  measures  taken  to  provide  agri- 
cultural laborers  and  to  prevent  a  fuel  and  food 
famine  for  the  coming  winter;  the  half-hearted 
and  inconclusive  way  in  which  the  scandals  affect- 
ing a  former  premier,  a  former  minister  of  the 
interior,  a  former  chief  of  secret  police,  a  senator 
and  editor  of  a  prominent  newspaper,  a  deputy, 


The  Tiger  of  France  29 

and  a  president  of  a  high  court  were  being  han- 
dled. 

The  French  were  sick  of  speeches  containing 
explanations  of  the  past  and  promises  for  the 
future.  They  were  sick  of  the  censorship,  which 
continued  to  keep  them  in  ignorance  about  what 
was  going  on  abroad  and  at  home.  They  were 
willing  to  continue  their  appalling  sacrifices  in 
blood  and  treasure,  but  they  wanted  to  be  sure 
that  these  sacrifices  were  not  being  prolonged  in 
vain. 

This  state  of  the  public  mind  was  well  known 
to  President  Poincare  and  the  leaders  of  different 
political  parties  whom  he  called  into  consultation. 
When  the  Painleve  ministry  fell,  Clemenceau  be- 
came the  man  of  the  hour,  because  he  was  popu- 
larly supposed  to  be  the  embodiment  of  the 
growing  spirit  of  protest  against  the  way  the  war 
and  internal  affairs  have  been  managed.  He 
had  denounced  the  placing  of  party  above  na- 
tional interests,  the  blind  attachment  of  parlia- 
mentarians to  old  methods,  the  formation  of  min- 
istries through  political  deals,  the  criminal  stu- 


30  France  and  Ourselves 

pidity  of  the  censorship,  the  tendency  to  go  off  at 
a  tangent  in  military  operations  (witness  the  Sa- 
loniki  Epedition,  which  he  bitterly  opposed  from 
the  moment  of  its  conception),  the  lack  of  deci- 
sion and  concerted  policy  in  the  whole  conduct  of 
the  war,  the  improvidence  in  national  fuel  and 
food  supplies,  the  inability  of  administrative  bu- 
reaucrats to  face  and  solve  the  transportation 
crisis,  and  the  unwillingness  of  successive  pre- 
miers and  cabinet  ministers  to  punish  persons  and 
groups  in  France  who  consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously were  playing  Germany's  game. 

In  asking  Clemenceau  to  form  a  ministry, 
President  Poincare  heeded  the  insistent  and 
warning  cry  of  the  nation:  "Give  us  a  premier 
who  will  use  all  the  energies  and  resources  of 
France  to  defeat  Germany,  who  will  see  that  we 
have  fuel  and  food,  and  who  will  not  allow  our 
armies  to  be  assailed  from  the  rear  through  paci- 
fist propaganda  and  through  strikes  inspired  by 
German  money  I" 

What  France  expects  of  Clemenceau  is  to  play 
the  role  of  a  Moses  and  a  Joshua  combined.     No 


The  Tiger  of  France  31 

Frenchman  since  Thiers  has  undertaken  a  task  so 
difficult,  so  delicate,  so  splendid.  Like  Thiers, 
Clemenceau  brings  to  the  task  half  a  century  of 
public  life.  He  celebrated  his  seventy-third 
birthday  shortly  after  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 
His  active  political  career  began  with  the  Sep- 
tember Revolution  of  1870,  and  covers  the  entire 
period  between  two  wars.  At  no  time  during  the 
Third  Republic  has  Premier  Clemenceau  been  a 
negligible  factor  in  French  politics.  After  in- 
teresting experiences  in  the  United  States,  where 
he  saw  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  and  the  early 
years  of  Reconstruction  (he  remembers  as  vividly 
as  if  it  were  yesterday  being  present  at  the  open- 
ing of  Virginia's  negro  legislature) ,  he  returned 
to  Paris  to  complete  his  medical  studies.  The 
year  after  he  received  his  degree  the  Second  Em- 
pire fell,  and  Clemenceau  entered  political  life  as 
Mayor  of  Montmartre.  He  represented  Paris 
in  the  National  Assembly  of  1871.  From  1875 
to  1893  he  sat  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  on  the 
extreme  Left.  Since  1902  he  has  been  a  senator. 
From  1906  to  1909  he  was  premier.     During  his 


32  France  and  Ourselves 

long  parliamentary  career  those  three  years  were 
his  only  opportunity  to  participate  in  the  govern- 
ment of  France.  The  rest  of  the  time  he  was  a 
member  of  the  opposition,  and  as  deputy  and 
senator  and  journalist  he  enjoyed  the  reputation 
of  having  caused  the  overthrow  of  more  minis- 
tries than  any  other  Frenchman  since  France  has 
had  representative  government. 

Never  has  Clemenceau  shown  more  violent  op- 
position to  "the  powers  that  be"  than  during  the 
present  war,  and  that  is  saying  a  great  deal. 
How  strange  it  is  that  the  man  who  is  unani- 
mously considered  the  greatest  destructive  politi- 
cal force  of  the  Third  Republic  is  now  called 
upon  to  save  France ! 

Strange,  illogical  perhaps,  but  altogether  natu- 
ral. When  heroic  measures  are  needed,  unusual 
men  are  called  for.  The  instinct  of  a  nation  in 
danger  can  be  trusted.  France  is  in  danger  now. 
She  is  not  apt  to  choose  wrongly.  At  crises  the 
man  of  the  moment  comes  forth.  Clemenceau 
has  the  keen  wisdom  of  old  age  without  having 
lost  the  ardor  and  energy  and  power  of  decision 


The  Tiger  of  France  33 

of  youth.  He  is  absolutely  without  fear.  He 
has  no  political  future  to  think  about,  no  obliga- 
tions to  bind  him,  no  friends  to  spare. 

In  estimating  the  chances  of  success  of  the  new 
premier,  the  most  important  factor  is  that  he  is 
the  nation's  choice.  Politicians  who  listen  to 
their  personal  feelings  and  their  personal  in- 
terests and  try  to  make  life  difficult  or  impos- 
sible for  the  Clemenceau  ministry  will  have 
the  nation  against  them  and  will  assume  a 
terrible  responsibility.  If  Georges  Clemenceau, 
with  the  inspiration  of  the  knowledge  that 
France  stands  behind  him,  knows  how  to  lead  to 
victory,  he  need  not  fear  parliamentary  obstruc- 
tion. For  the  sake  of  our  common  victory,  let  us 
hope  that  he  does  know  how  to  lead  and  that  the 
people  know  how  to  follow. 


CHAPTER  III 


WORLD   JUSTICE  FOR  FRANCE1 


BEFORE  August  1,  1914,  the  leaders  in  the 
political  and  intellectual  life  of  France  had 
given  up  hope  of  the  return  of  the  lost  provinces. 
Most  of  them  deplored  the  propaganda  of  a  few 
eocaltes,  in  which  they  saw  a  menace  to  the  rela- 
tions between  France  and  Germany.  The  Peace 
of  Frankfort  was  regarded  as  having  definitely 
settled  the  status  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  Even 
after  Agadir,  France  remained  profoundly  paci- 
fist. The  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  realized  this. 
They  saw  clearly  that  France  did  noA'ntend  to 
become  the  aggressor  in  a  European  war.  Ger- 
many had  proved  herself  stronger  than  France 
in  1870,  and  every  decade  since  then  had  seen 
Germany  grow  more  rapidly  than  France  in  pop- 
ulation and  in  wealth.     To  offset  this  increasing 

i  January,  1918. 

34 


World  Justice  for  France  35 

inferiority,  France  made  an  alliance  with  Russia 
and  an  entente  with  Great  Britain.  But  both 
these  arrangements  were  purely  defensive. 
Whatever  German  apologists  may  write  about 
the  ante-bellum  encircling  policy  of  their  present 
enemies,  they  are  unable  to  cite  a  single  text  in 
the  arrangements  between  France  on  the  one 
hand,  and  Russia  and  Great  Britain  on  the  other, 
to  justify  the  inference,  let  alone  the  fact,  of  an 
aggressive  coalition.  France  devoted  her  ener- 
gies to  extra-European  expansion.  If  her  diplo- 
macy can  be  said  to  have  been  detrimental  to 
German  interests  or  to  have  hampered  Germany, 
the  conflict  of  interests  was  in  Africa  and  not 
in  Europe.  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  Peace  of 
Frankfort  were  not  in  question. 

Those  who  were  most  interested  in  the  attitude 
of  France  toward  Alsace  and  Lorraine  were 
naturally  the  inhabitants  of  the  lost  provinces. 
If  any  could  be  expected  and  relied  upon  to  inter- 
pret accurately  French  public  opinion  and  the 
aims  of  French  diplomacy,  they  were  the  Alsa- 
tian leaders.     Despite  the  many  incidents  that 


36  France  and  Ourselves 

followed  the  granting  of  a  wholly  inadequate 
constitution  in  1910,  despite  the  false  interpreta- 
tion that  might  have  been  given  to  the  Agadir 
crisis  in  1911,  the  Alsatian  irreconcilables  did  not 
look  to  France  for  aid.  Quite  the  contrary. 
Instead  of  asking  for  a  revision  of  the  Peace  of 
Frankfort,  they  made  autonomy  their  program, 
and  insisted  that  their  anti-Prussian  agitation 
had  as  its  aim  only,  to  quote  the  words  of  Herr 
Wolff,  "the  elevation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  the 
rank  of  an  independent  and  federated  state,  like 
the  other  twenty-five  component  parts  of  the 
German  Empire."  On  May  6,  1912,  the  follow- 
ing motion,  presented  by  leaders  of  four  of  the 
political  groups  in  the  Reichsland,  was  voted 
without  discussion  by  the  Landtag: 

The  Chamber  invites  the  Staathalter  to  instruct  the 
representatives  of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  the  Bundesrath 
to  use  all  the  force  they  possess  against  the  idea  of  a 
war  between  Germany  and  France,  and  to  influence  the 
Bundesrath  to  examine  the  ways  which  might  possibly 
lead  to  a  rapprochement  between  France  and  Germany, 
which  rapprochement  will  furnish  the  means  of  putting 
an  end  to  the  race  of  armaments. 


World  Justice  for  France  37 

What  more  striking,  more  conclusive  proof  of  the 
contention,  first,  that  the  French  Government 
was  not  a  party,  even  indirectly,  to  the  agitation 
for  self-government  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  and,  sec- 
ondly, that  the  inhabitants  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
had  no  reason  to  believe  that  France  intended  to 
be  drawn  into  a  war  for  their  liberation  and  re- 
turn to  the  status  of  French  provinces? * 

Germany  cannot  reproach  France  with  not 
having  stood  loyally  by  the  treaty  she  was  com- 
pelled to  sign  at  Frankfort.  Nor  can  Germany 
reproach  the  people  that  she  took  forcibly  from 
France  with  not  having  done  their  best  to  adapt 
themselves  to  the  changed  political  allegiance 
rather  than  have  Europe  once  more  plunged  into 
a  bloody  war  on  their  account.  Germany  had 
her  chance  during  forty-three  years  to  assimi- 
late Alsace-Lorraine  without  interference  from 
France  or  France's  friends.  Europe,  the  whole 
world,  accepted  the  Peace  of  Frankfort.  Alsa- 
tians and  Lorrainers,  although  they  could  not 

i  For  a  fuller  discussion  of  this  important  question,  see  my 
"New  Map  of  Europe"   (9th  American  edition),  pp.  1-20. 


38  France  and  Ourselves 

acquiesce  in  the  treaty  of  which  they  were  the  vic- 
tims, submitted  to  force,  and  as  time  passed  with 
no  attempt  on  the  part  of  France  to  win  them 
back,  they  tried  to  make  the  best  of  the  terrible 
situation  in  which  they  were  placed.  If  in  1914 
there  was  still  an  Alsace-Lorraine  question,  the 
fault  was  entirely  Germany's.  No  fair-minded 
man  who  reads  the  history  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine under  German  rule  can  possibly  arrive  at 
any  other  opinion  than  this. 

When  on  the  morning  of  August  2,  1914,  the 
Germans  crossed  the  frontier  of  France  near 
Longwy,  they  annulled  by  their  own  act  the 
Peace  of  Frankfort.  They  themselves  brought 
up  again,  for  decision  by  the  test  of  arms,  the  fate 
of  the  lost  provinces.  France  had  to  accept  the 
challenge.  This  time,  however,  the  war  delib- 
erately entered  upon  did  not  turn  out  to  be  a  duel 
between  two  unequally  matched  nations  and  did 
not  end  quickly,  as  the  Germans  confidently  ex- 
pected, in  the  crushing  of  France.  Great  Brit- 
ain entered  the  war  on  the  side  of  France. 
Other  nations,  forced  into  the  struggle  by  Ger- 


World  Justice  for  France  39 

many's  disregard  of  treaty  obligations  and  their 
own  sovereignty  and  interests,  joined  what  has 
come  to  be  virtually  a  world  coalition.  Only  if 
Germany  is  successful  in  dictating  her  own  terms 
of  peace  at  the  point  of  the  sword  will  she  be  able 
to  prevent  many  questions,  among  which  that  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  is  one  of  the  most  important, 
from  coming  before  the  Areopagus  of  nations. 
Sensing  the  impossibility  of  victory  by  arms,  Ger- 
many is  already  preparing  throughout  the  world 
a  propaganda  to  confuse  and  mislead  the  jury,  if 
she  fails  to  prevent  the  meeting  of  the  jury  by 
corrupting  the  jurors. 

The  Central  powers,  during  the  year  1917,  by 
skilful  manipulation  and  leadership  of  their 
armies,  were  able  to  gain  new  victories.  But  the 
odds  against  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary, 
from  the  purely  military  point  of  view,  are  too 
great  to  secure  their  final  triumph  on  the  field  of 
battle.  With  the  lesson  of  what  has  happened  in 
Russia  and  Italy  before  us,  however,  we  should 
be  fools  to  believe  that  their  chances  are  equally 
poor  of  winning  by  diplomacy  what  is  denied 


40  France  and  Ourselves 

them  by  arms.  Even  if  the  powers  of  the  En- 
tente coalition  hold  together  long  enough  to  de- 
feat Germany  and  her  allies  and  assume  to  pass 
judgment  upon  the  vanquished,  there  remains  the 
hope  of  confusing,  of  tricking,  the  jurors.  De- 
mocracies are  inherently  weak  in  waging  war. 
Each  one  of  Germany's  enemies  has  been  handi- 
capped by  the  difficulty  of  securing  and  main- 
taining unity  in  the  internal  body  politic. 
Unity  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  has  so  far  proved 
impossible  of  attainment.  Unless  there  is  a  de- 
termined effort  in  each  of  the  Allied  countries  to 
educate  public  opinion  on  leading  questions  that 
must  be  met  and  solved,  the  weakness  of  the  coali- 
tion in  war  will  be  found  to  have  been  a  less 
important  disaster  than  the  weakness  of  the  coa- 
lition in  making  peace.  For,  since  the  war  has 
become  a  war  in  which  every  family  in  the  bellig- 
erent nations  is  called  upon  to  contribute  blood 
and  treasure,  the  people  will  inevitably  decide  for 
themselves  the  objects  for  which  they  are  fight- 
ing. For  the  first  time  in  history  the  public 
opinion  of  nations,  not  the  private  opinion  of 


World  Justice  for  France  41 

statesmen,  will  indicate  the  solutions  to  give  to 
the  questions  before  the  peace  conference. 

Public  opinion  plays  a  more  immediate  role, 
in  fact.  Stupendous  sacrifices  in  human  lives, 
unprecedented  financial  demands  upon  the  pres- 
ent and  the  future  generations,  have  not  enabled 
all  of  us  together  to  bring  Germany  to  her  knees. 
It  is  mathematically  sure  that  if  we  stick  it  out 
we  shall  have  the  victory.  But  the  people  who 
are  paying  the  price  want  to  understand  clearly 
what  the  objectives  are  and  what  the  objectives 
signify  for  each  of  the  nations  at  war  and  for  the 
world  as  a  whole.  Our  statesmen  cannot  be  too 
clearly  warned  that  none  of  the  belligerents  in- 
tends to  pull  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire  for  another, 
and  that  those  who  have  borne  the  brunt  of  the 
burden  must  not  be  kept  indefinitely  in  uncer- 
tainty concerning  our  ideas  of  the  terms  of  peace. 
All  the  Allied  leaders  are  facing  a  situation 
where  the  exact  objects  for  which  the  armies  are 
fighting  must  be  kept  before  the  people  clearly 
and  unequivocally.  These  governmental  aims 
must  be  satisfactory  to  the  people.     The  differ- 


42  France  and  Ourselves 

ent  Allied  peoples  will  have  to  satisfy  one  an- 
other. 

Alsace-Lorraine  is  a  concrete  illustration  of  the 
vital  importance  of  our  taking  a  stand  on  Euro- 
pean problems.  Competent  observers  of  Ameri- 
can thought  tell  me  that  in  America  there  is  no 
widespread,  clearly  pronounced  national  senti- 
ment which  insists  upon  the  return  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  France.  If  the  American  Govern- 
ment is  committed  to  back  France  to  the  bitter 
end  in  this  question,  the  Americans  do  not  seem 
to  know  it.  The  French  certainly  do  not.  And 
yet  winning  back  Alsace-Lorraine  has  become  to 
the  French  the  principal  object  of  the  war.  I 
say  this  without  hesitation.  France  would  not 
have  gone  to  war  to  win  back  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine, but  the  moment  Germany  attacked  France 
the  pent-up  feelings  of  forty-three  years  broke 
loose.  By  those  who  did  not  know  France,  Mar- 
shal Joffre  has  been  criticized  for  the  initial,  ill- 
fated  expedition  to  Mulhouse  and  his  proclama- 
tion to  the  Alsatians.  The  criticism  is  absurd. 
Joffre  could  not  help  himself.     The  Mulhouse 


World  Justice  for  France  43 

expedition  was  France's  answer  to  German  ag- 
gression. Heart,  not  mind,  rules  in  the  great 
moments  of  life. 

In  the  middle  of  August,  1914,  before  the  years 
of  sorrow  began,  France's  first  fortnight  of  the 
war  was  summed  up  in  a  sketch  Georges  Scott 
made  for  U  Illustration.  An  Alsatian  girl  was 
clasped  in  the  arms  of  a  French  soldier.  A 
fallen  frontier  post  marked  Deutsches  Reich  lay- 
on  the  ground  beside  them.  Under  the  sketch 
was  one  simple  word,  "En/in!"  The  sketch  was 
reprinted  by  the  hundreds  of  thousands.  I  have 
seen  it  in  the  trenches  and  in  the  rest  camps 
everywhere  along  the  French  front,  and  I  have 
seen  it  in  the  homes  of  patrician  and  bourgeois 
and  peasant  all  over  France.  For  a  few  months 
unpleasant  experiences  of  the  French  troops  in 
the  retreat  from  Mulhouse  and  the  discovery  of 
false  Alsatians  domiciled  in  France  caused  a  cer- 
tain reaction  in  the  attitude  of  the  French  toward 
the  lost  provinces.  As  the  French  came  to  real- 
ize that  they  had  confused  the  German  immigres 
with  real  Alsatians,  the  feeling  quickly  passed. 


44  France  and  Ourselves 

Far  from  being  a  sign  of  lack  of  sympathy,  mis- 
understanding and  coolness  at  the  beginning 
showed  how  deeply  the  French  felt  about  Alsace 
and  Lorraine.  One  is  most  sensitive  about  what 
is  most  precious.  In  the  declarations  of  succes- 
sive ministries  and  in  the  press  since  the  early 
months  of  1915,  the  return  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine has  been  a  subject  upon  which  difference  of 
opinion  does  not  exist  among  Frenchmen. 

Before  the  war,  also,  there  was  no  difference  of 
opinion  about  what  would  happen  if  a  European 
war  did  break  out.  Frenchmen  of  the  present 
generation  have  been  brought  up  from  infancy  to 
regard  Alsace  and  Lorraine  as  French.  The 
French  mind,  however,  with  its  admirable  quality 
of  seeing  and  facing  facts,  believed  the  stolen 
goods  recoverable  only  by  a  miracle.  The 
French  did  not  labor  under  the  delusion  that  they 
would  be  able  to  win  back  the  lost  provinces  in  a 
war  in  which  they  stood  alone  against  Germany, 
and  they  realized  that  no  other  nation  would  join 
them  in  attacking  Germany  for  the  purpose  of 
Tvrestlng  Alsace  and  Lorraine  from  the  German 


World  Justice  for  France  45 

Confederation.  To  understand  the  paradox  of 
those  who  prayed  for  the  miracle  to  happen  and 
yet  shrank  from  the  ordeal  of  a  European  war, 
we  must  realize  that  France  since  1870  has  lived 
in  Gethsemane.  The  cross  was  always  there,  but 
— "let  this  cup  pass  from  me."  I  feel  as  if  I 
were  trying  to  analyze  something  too  sacred  for 
words.  The  analysis,  however,  has  to  be  made. 
We  Americans  simply  must  understand. 

It  wounds  Frenchmen  to  hear  Englishmen  and 
Americans  interpret  the  demand  for  the  return 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  as  a  question  of  revenge 
or  of  winning  back  territory.  Our  comrades-in- 
arms regard  Alsace  and  Lorraine  in  a  different 
light.  To  them  the  return  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine is  a  question  of  honor,  of  justice,  of  patri- 
otism. 

It  is  a  question  of  honor.  When  the  declara- 
tion of  the  deputies  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  was 
read  at  Bordeaux,  and  no  answer  could  be  given, 
shame  and  humiliation  entered  the  soul  of  the 
French  nation.  The  inhabitants  of  the  eastern 
departments  had  fought  loyally  during  the  war 


46  France  and  Ourselves 

of  1870.  France,  having  failed  to  defend  them, 
purchased  peace  from  the  victor  at  the  price  of 
their  slavery.  After  the  transfer  was  made  the 
inhabitants  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  continued  to 
call  to  France.  France  was  powerless  to  listen 
to  their  cry.  The  white-haired  Frenchmen  of 
to-day  have  never  been  allowed  to  forget  the  dis- 
honor of  their  youth,  and  their  children  have  in- 
herited the  shame  and  humiliation.  Now  France 
is  fighting  to  wipe  out  the  stain,  to  redeem  the 
honor  of  the  nation.  There  is  joy  in  the  cruci- 
fixion. But  if  it  be  not  for  redemption,  the  sacri- 
fices of  France  are  irreparable,  and  there  will  be 
death  to  this  people,  not  resurrection. 

It  is  a  question  of  justice.  The  French  are 
chivalrous  by  nature.  They  are  keen  about  the 
wrongs  of  all  subject  races,  and  are  as  thoroughly 
imbued  with  the  ideal  of  "the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned" as  are  Anglo-Saxons.  The  determina- 
tion to  continue  to  fight  for  the  attainment  of 
this  ideal  is  enhanced  in  the  particular  case  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  by  the  fact  that  the  people 
of  the  lost  provinces  have  suffered  for  nearly  half 


World  Justice  for  France  47 

a  century  through  France's  own  fault.  The  dip- 
lomatic blunders  of  Napoleon  III  and  his  minis- 
ters, the  incompetent  management  and  leadership 
of  French  generals,  the  hasty  proclamation  of 
the  republic,  made  it  possible  for  Germany  to 
oppress  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  If  the  war  does 
not  end  in  undoing  the  wrongs  nearest  home,  for 
what  reason  has  France  been  fighting?  There 
are  obligations  to  Belgium  and  Serbia  and  other 
allies,  but  France  rightly  puts  first  the  obligation 
to  those  of  her  own  household. 

It  is  a  question  of  patriotism.  The  increase 
of  wealth  and  population  and  territory  through 
the  return  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  the  mother 
country  is  no  small  stake  to  fight  for,  and  it  is  a 
justifiable  one,  since  it  means  taking  back  what 
has  been  stolen.  But  material  considerations 
have  little  weight  in  this  war,  the  prolonging  of 
which  is  costing  France  far  more  than  what  Al- 
sace and  Lorraine  could  mean  in  compensation. 
It  would  be  folly,  not  patriotism,  to  continue  to 
fight  for  material  gain  where  the  outlay  is  greater 
than  the  stake.     France  did  not  fully  realize  how 


48  France  and  Ourselves 

essential  a  part  of  the  nation  were  the  eastern  de- 
partments until  she  lost  them.  The  Third  Re- 
public has  suffered  more  than  can  be  measured 
by  the  amputation  of  a  member  of  the  national 
body.  Like  the  populations  of  the  Pas-de-Calais 
and  the  other  northern  and  northeastern  depart- 
ments, the  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  are  an  in- 
dispensable element  of  equilibrium  in  the  political 
and  economic  and  social  structure  of  France. 
Patriotism,  quite  as  much  as  honor  and  a  sense  of 
justice,  cries  out  against  the  conclusion  of  a  peace 
that  does  not  stipulate  the  return,  pure  and  sim- 
ple, of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  For  Frenchmen 
believe  that  the  maintenance  of  the  frontier  along 
the  Vosges  would  mean  political  and  social  injury 
of  a  mortal  character. 

So  much  for  the  sentiment  and  for  the  interest 
of  France.  The  coalition  against  the  Central 
powers  is  also  interested  in  the  return  of  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  to  France. 

We  are  fighting  for  a  durable  peace,  we  say. 
Can  this  durable  peace  be  secured  otherwise  than 
by  the  substitution  of  right  for  force  in  interna- 


World  Justice  for  France  49 

tional  relations,  by  the  removal  of  historic  causes 
of  conflict  between  nations,  and  by  the  reestab- 
lishment  of  all  the  belligerents  within  their  legiti- 
mate boundaries?  If  we  envisage  peace  solely 
as  the  forcing  of  the  will  of  the  conquerors  upon 
the  conquered,  where,  then,  is  the  substitution  of 
right  for  force?  In  every  belligerent  country 
the  violent  partizans,  the  cynics,  and  the  reac- 
tionaries are  banded  together  to  combat  the  idea 
of  the  society  of  nations,  and  those  who  have 
taken  at  face-value  the  declared  principles  of  the 
belligerents  are  called  dreamers  and  dangerous 
fools.  The  great  error  of  this  war  is  the  tend- 
ency to  confuse  the  two  terms,  victory  and  peace. 
We  must  fight  poison  with  poison,  is  the  argu- 
ment. Ergo,  we  shall  have  the  victory  only  by 
doing  as  the  Prussians  do.  All  well  and  good. 
But  if  we  go  on  to  the  next  step  and  maintain 
that  we  must  make  peace  as  the  Prussians  would 
make  it,  we  mock  our  dead.  Are  we  crying  out 
against  the  horror  of  a  German  peace,  and  in  the 
same  breath  preparing  to  imitate  what  we  con- 
sider no  sacrifice  too  great  to  prevent  our  arch- 


50  France  and  Ourselves 

enemy  from  doing?  If  we  are  not  idealists,  we 
are  realists.  If  we  are  realists,  what  is  the  differ- 
ence between  ourselves  and  our  enemies?  The 
defeat  of  Germany  is  not  an  end.  It  is  a  means 
to  an  end.  The  end  is  the  establishment  of  the 
principle  that  right  makes  might. 

It  is  a  pity  that  polemicists  frequently  fall  into 
the  trap  of  putting  together  clear  and  debatable 
issues.  When  they  fail  to  see  distinctions  and 
when  they  make  analogies  where  there  is  no  anal- 
ogy, they  do  not  serve  the  cause  in  which  their 
pens  are  enlisted.  "Going  the  whole  hog"  is  dan- 
gerous. Absurd  exaggerations  of  Polish  claims 
and  the  attempt  to  put  the  aspirations  of  Italian 
irredentism  on  the  same  footing  as  France's  title 
to  Alsace-Lorraine  are  examples  of  this.  The 
successful  pleader  is  he  who  knows  what  to  leave 
out  of  his  brief.  Irredentist  arguments,  based 
on  historical  and  ethnological  considerations,  can 
be  met  by  exactly  the  same  sort  of  reasoning  on 
the  other  side.  The  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
is  unique  among  the  issues  of  the  war.  It  must 
not  be  confused  with  certain  aims  of  Italy,  or 


World  Justice  for  France  51 

with  the  revival  of  medieval  states,  some  of  which 
never  existed  as  we  conceive  national  organisms 
to-day. 

The  programs  of  partizans  for  remaking  the 
map  of  Europe  reveal  the  ignorance  and  incon- 
sistency of  those  who  present  them.  They  are 
conceived  not  with  the  idea  of  rendering  justice, 
but  with  the  thought  of  breaking  the  power  of 
the  enemy.  There  is  no  effort  to  distinguish  be- 
tween territories  incorporated  in  their  present  po- 
litical jurisdiction  before  the  inhabitants  as  a 
whole  had  developed  national  consciousness  and 
territories  whose  present  political  status  was  a 
violation  of  the  will  of  the  people  concerned  at 
the  moment  it  was  established,  and  has  remained 
a  violation  of  their  will  ever  since.  Of  the  latter 
category,  Alsace-Lorraine  stands  out  as  the  one 
clear  case  against  Germany. 

Hence  the  members  of  the  coalition  against  the 
Central  powers  have  a  common  interest  in  insist- 
ing upon  the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to 
France.  Restoration  to  their  rightful  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  provinces  wrested  from  France  by 


52  France  and  Ourselves 

force  in  1870  will  be  the  tangible  symbol  of  our 
victory.  It  will  mean  the  triumph  of  the  princi- 
ple for  which  we  are  fighting.  It  will  prove  to 
our  enemies  that  we  have  been  able  to  succeed  in 
what  we  have  set  before  us,  the  refutation  of  the 
doctrine  that  national  expansion  secured  and 
maintained  by  force  can  receive  the  assent  of  the 
world.  For  a  new  order  in  international  rela- 
tions will  be  born  of  this  war  only  by  the  aban- 
donment of  the  doctrine  of  Cain  that  has  hereto- 
fore been  the  basis  of  international  polity.  Un- 
less our  own  national  interests  have  dictated  to  us 
the  wisdom  of  opposing  a  neighbor's  title  by  force 
of  arms,  we  have  invariably  accepted  de  facto 
extensions  and  changes  of  sovereignty.  There 
never  has  been  an  international  conscience. 
When  we  thought  our  own  interests  were  at 
stake,  we  howled  and  sometimes  backed  our  pro- 
tests by  force.  Otherwise,  we  shrugged  our 
shoulders,  and  said,  " Laissez-faire !" 

The  future  of  Alsace-Lorraine  is  not  a  ques- 
tion between  France  and  Germany.  It  is  a 
question  between  the  world  and  Germany,  and 


World  Justice  for  France  53 

we  must  see  it  that  way.  If  Europe  has  been  an 
armed  camp  since  1870,  if  the  theft  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  the  beginning  of  a  long  prepara- 
tion that  visited  upon  the  world  its  present  calam- 
ities, is  Germany  alone  to  blame?  What  nation 
went  to  the  aid  of  France  at  that  time?  What 
nation  listened  to  the  cry  of  distress  of  Alsatians 
and  Lorrainers?  What  nation  refused  to  accept 
the  Peace  of  Frankfort?  Because  we  tolerated 
this  crime  against  civilization  we  all  have  our  di- 
rect responsibility.  Only  those  who  strike  their 
own  breasts,  with  a  sincere  repetition  of  mea 
culpa,  are  successful  in  leading  sinners  to  repent- 
ance. 

But  we  cannot  treat  the  question  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  solely  from  the  French  and  interna- 
tional point  of  view.  The  reader  who  is  far  away 
from  the  bitterness  and  passion  of  the  war  and 
who  is  not  impregnated  with  the  feeling  of 
France  about  Alsace-Lorraine  will  ask  pointedly, 
"Is  the  milk  spilt?"  He  will  not  be  satisfied 
with  assertions  of  the  continued  loyalty  of  Alsa- 
tians and  Lorrainers  to  France  unless  these  as- 


54  France  and  Ourselves 

sertions  are  supported  by  facts.  Forty-seven 
years  is  a  long  time,  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  world 
is  not  ready  to  accept  the  French  contention, 
voiced  by  Monsieur  Ribot,  that  "a  title  based  on 
right  cannot  be  outlawed."  Whatever  the  basis 
of  the  title,  time  does  outlaw.  The  world  has 
moved  forward  rapidly,  and  the  economic  and 
social  changes  of  the  last  half  century  are  of  a 
sweeping  character.  Because  of  the  political 
evolution  of  nations,  through  universal  education 
and  universal  suffrage,  we  have  no  right  to  as- 
sume that  the  children  are  bound  by  the  action  of 
their  fathers  or  that  they  accept  the  judgments 
of  their  fathers.  None  can  deny  that  the  forcible 
incorporation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  into  the  Ger- 
man Confederation  was  a  violation  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  "the  consent  of  the  governed"  in  1870. 
It  does  not  follow  per  se,  however,  that  the  re- 
tention of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  the  German  Con- 
federation is  a  violation  of  that  principle  in 
1918. 

France's  reasons  for  demanding  the  return  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  are  convincing  to  her  friends 


World  Justice  for  France  55 

and  allies.  It  is  clear,  also,  that  their  interests 
— destroying  German  militarism  and  vindicating 
international  morality — dictate  a  support  of 
France's  demand.  But  unless  we  are  sure  that 
the  present  generation  wants  to  become  French, 
the  right  and  the  wisdom  of  the  restoration  are 
open  to  question. 

Now  we  have  come  to  the  very  heart  of  the 
problem.  Two  questions  arise.  Are  the  lost 
provinces  in  the  German  Confederation  against 
their  will?  Do  they  want  to  be  reincorporated 
in  France?  Polemicists  make  these  questions 
one  and  the  same  thing,  and  try  to  give  a  com- 
mon answer.  The  result  is  that  what  they  advo- 
cate lacks  conviction  to  the  impartial  reader.  In 
the  eyes  of  the  seeker  after  the  truth,  who  does 
not  intend  to  be  misled  or  fooled,  the  case  for 
France  is  not  helped  by  briefs  in  which  strong 
points  and  weak  points,  statements  based  on 
fact  and  inferences,  are  presented  together  as 
of  equal  value.  A  study  of  the  polemical  lit- 
erature of  the  Alsace-Lorraine  question  shows 
how  cleverly  the  Germans  have  attempted  to 


56  France  and  Ourselves 

strengthen  their  case  by  attacking  the  debatable 
arguments  of  their  opponent. 

Are  the  lost  provinces  in  the  German  Confed- 
eration against  their  will?  Yes.  The  proofs? 
Here  they  are:  (1)  proceedings  of  the  Reichs- 
tag from  1871  to  1914  inclusive;  (2)  editorials 
and  news  columns  of  the  papers  of  Strasbourg, 
Mulhouse,  Colmar,  and  Metz,  which  fairly  rep- 
resent the  whole  of  Alsace-Lorraine;  (3)  the 
testimony  of  ecclesiastics,  Catholic  and  Protes- 
tant alike,  who  know  the  feeling  of  the  people; 
(4)  the  attitude  of  the  land-owning  and  indus- 
trial bourgeois  classes;  (5)  the  widespread  re- 
fusal of  young  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  of  all 
classes,  in  the  face  of  exile,  confiscation  of  prop- 
erty, and  death,  to  serve  in  the  German  armies. 

(1)  The  official  reports  of  the  sessions  of  the 
Reichstag  show  that  the  deputies  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine have  never  ceased  to  protest  against  their 
political  status.  These  deputies  were  elected  by 
universal  suffrage,  and  their  sentiments  were 
known  to  their  constituents.  In  the  course  of 
debates  members  of  the  Reichstag  from  other 


World  Justice  for  France  57 

parts  of  Germany  have  frequently  admitted  that 
the  Alsace-Lorraine  members  were  interpreting 
accurately  the  opinion  of  those  whom  they  rep- 
resented. Most  striking  is  the  evidence  afforded 
by  the  official  proceedings  in  1910,  1911,  and 
1913.  When  the  present  war  broke  out  the  most 
prominent  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  in  the 
Reichstag  fled  from  Germany  and  have  carried 
on  ever  since  their  campaign  of  protest  in  France, 
Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States.  I  know 
some  of  these  men.  Their  record  is  clear.  Fear- 
less and  of  unquestioned  integrity,  they  have  sac- 
rificed everything  to  represent  their  constituents 
before  the  public  opinion  of  the  world. 

(2)  Fortunately,  just  as  members  of  the 
Reichstag  were  elected  by  universal  suffrage  and 
could  speak  freely,  there  was  also  liberty  of  the 
press  in  Germany.  Newspaper  editors,  writers, 
and  cartoonists  were  sometimes  prosecuted  and 
always  persecuted  by  the  German  authorities. 
But  there  was  no  preventive  censorship.  In  the 
newspaper  files,  which  give  the  history  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  during  the  forty-three  years  between 


58  France  and  Ourselves 

the  two  wars,  written  from  day  to  day  by  people 
on  the  spot,  we  have  not  only  the  opinion  of  edi- 
torial writers  and  cartoonists,  but  also  the  freshly 
recorded  facts  concerning  events  as  they  took 
place.  The  year  1913  shows  no  change  from  the 
year  1872.  I  was  personally  interested  in  the 
question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  before  the  present 
war,  and  between  the  years  of  1910  and  1914 
I  have  corroborated  the  statements  of  outside 
writers  by  consulting  the  newspapers  of  the  lo- 
cality where  these  events  occurred.  So  there  is 
no  doubt  in  my  mind  about  the  accuracy  of 
what  has  been  written  to  show  the  hostility  of 
Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  of  the  present  gen- 
eration to  Germany  and  to  their  position  in  the 
German  Confederation.  The  facts  are  against 
German  polemicists  who  assert  that  this  hostil- 
ity is  shown  by  a  few  irreconcilables. 

(3)  German  supporters  among  the  ecclesi- 
astics of  Alsace-Lorraine  are  almost  without  ex- 
ception immigres.  In  talking  to  priests  and  pas- 
tors of  Alsatian  birth  I  have  not  found  one  who 
does  not  tell  me  that  the  members  of  his  flock 


World  Justice  for  France  59 

are  anti-German.  Since  1870,  even  when  Ger- 
man menaces  came  in  the  form  of  orders  from 
ecclesiastical  superiors  and  meant  the  sacrifice  of 
preferment,  the  clergy  and  the  religious  orders 
remained  obdurate.  During  the  decade  before 
the  present  war  the  Catholic  Church  had  just 
grievances  against  France.  In  1914,  however, 
wherever  the  French  returned  into  Alsatian  ter- 
ritory, they  were  received  with  open  arms  by  the 
local  clergy.  Contrast  this  attitude  with  that  of 
the  Belgian  clergy  in  face  of  the  German  inva- 
sion. The  religious  orders  dropped  with  alacrity 
German  teaching  in  the  schools  and,  although 
French  was  to  many  of  them  a  less  familiar  lan- 
guage, they  started  to  use  it  at  once.  No  pres- 
sure was  brought  to  bear  by  the  French  military 
authorities  inside  or  outside  the  schools.  In 
view  of  the  pro-Germanism  of  many  Catholic 
prelates  and  priests  in  Spain  and  Italy,  these 
facts  are  most  significant.  Most  of  the  immigres 
are  Protestant;  but  the  aristocracy  of  landed 
proprietors  and  the  wealthy  industrial  bour- 
geoisie, the  strongest  elements  of  undying  hos- 


60  France  and  Ourselves 

tility  to  Germany,  are  also  Protestant.  Pastors 
have  proved  themselves  as  implacable  enemies  of 
Germanism  as  are  the  priests.  The  religious 
question,  then,  does  not  enter  in. 

(4)   In  "The  New  Map  of  Africa"  I  wrote: 

Personal  observation  on  the  ground  has  taught  me 
that  in  the  countries  of  whose  nationalist  and  irreden- 
tist movements  we  hear  so  much,  the  prime  movers  and 
agitators  are  college  professors  and  professional  men 
and  students  who  have  little  or  nothing  to  risk  or  lose 
by  a  change  of  government.  Landowners  and  manu- 
facturers and  business  men  rarely  allow  their  heart  to 
run  away  with  their  head.  They  know  which  side  their 
bread  is  buttered  on.  They  worship  the  golden  calf  of 
a  status  quo.1 

It  is  precisely  because  this  statement  is  not  true 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  that  Alsace-Lorraine  is 
unique  among  the  questions  of  territorial  change 
for  which  the  belligerents  are  righting.  The  lost 
provinces  of  France  have  benefited  materially 
with  the  rest  of  Germany  in  the  marvelous  eco- 
nomic prosperity  of  the  last  few  decades.  We 
might  argue  that  this  prosperity  would  have 
come   anyway,   had   Alsace-Lorraine   remained 

i  See  "The  New  Map  of  Africa"  (3d  American  edition),  p.  430. 


World  Justice  for  France  61 

French.  But  the  fact  of  material  benefit  re- 
mains. Hence  the  failure  of  Germany  to  as- 
similate Alsace-Lorraine  is  all  the  more  striking. 
The  undying  protest  of  those  who  have  seen  their 
lands  increase  in  value  and  their  factories  in  out- 
put is  eloquent  testimony  of  the  truth  that  man 
does  not  live  by  bread  alone. 

I  have  resided  in  Turkey  among  the  Armen- 
ians, and  have  been  eye-witness  of  massacres. 
And  yet  I  say  that  contemporary  history  records 
no  more  pitiful,  no  more  heartrending  martyrdom 
than  that  of  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine  un- 
der German  rule.  For  they  have  had  to  will  to 
suffer.  I  wish  it  were  in  my  power  to  forget 
some  of  the  stories  told  me  by  all  classes  of  Al- 
satians, the  simple  record  of  their  family  life. 
If  one  wants  to  realize  the  heinousness  of  the 
Peace  of  Frankfort,  the  absence  of  the  quality 
of  mercy  in  German  official  classes,  the  perver- 
sion of  natural  instincts  of  German  imperialists, 
let  him  talk  to  fathers  and  mothers  and  wives 
and  children  among  cultivated  Alsatians  and 
Lorrainers.     Let  him  listen  to  the  young  men 


62  France  and  Ourselves 

who  have  not  been  able  to  escape  wearing  the  hel- 
met that  is  at  the  same  time  the  brand  of  shame 
and  the  badge  of  slavery.  Those  whose  memory 
goes  back  before  1870  may  say: 

"Nessun  maggior  dolore 
Che  ricordarsi  del  tempo  felice 
Nella  miseria." 

But  the  younger  generation  has  never  known 
one  day  of  happiness,  and  does  not  agree  with 
Dante.  To  the  boys,  as  they  grew  to  adoles- 
cence, German  rule  meant  either  wearing  the 
uniform  of  the  hated  conqueror  or  a  life  of  exile 
far  from  loved  ones.  The  girls  had  no  choice. 
Born  and  raised  in  an  atmosphere  of  grief,  if 
they  have  married,  it  has  been  with  the  prayer 
that  God  would  spare  them  the  anguish  of  hav- 
ing sons. 

I  am  not  exaggerating.  Any  Alsatian  whose 
family  believed  that  the  higher  patriotism  was 
staying  in  the  country  and  submitting  to  the 
Germans  would  assure  you  that  "hell"  is  not 
too  strong  a  word  to  describe  his  life.  One 
mother  told  me  that  she  gave  up  all  her  sons 


World  Justice  for  France  63 

when  they  reached  the  age  of  thirteen  and  has 
never  had  them  in  her  home  since;  another,  in 
the  presence  of  her  young  daughters,  said  she 
would  rather  see  them  prostitutes  than  married 
to  Germans;  another,  that,  when  her  husband 
was  dying,  her  son,  on  the  French  side  of  the 
frontier,  climbed  a  high  tree  in  the  Vosges  to 
try  to  look  down  into  the  valley  of  his  home 
town.  He  knew,  and  in  the  mad  frenzy  of  his 
grief  tried  to  slip  by  the  German  guards.  But 
they  turned  him  back. 

Who  would  dare  to  say  that  the  martyrdom, 
because  it  was  self-imposed,  has  no  claim  to  sym- 
pathy? A  proud  race  does  not  submit  to  the 
yoke  of  the  conqueror,  and  only  those  call  the 
vanquished  fools  who  are  themselves  without 
honor  and  without  traditions.  If  the  Alsatians 
have  been  fools  to  choose  during  all  these  years 
to  refuse  to  become  reconciled  to  a  government 
maintained  by  force  of  arms,  then  Washington 
and  his  companions  were  fools  to  suffer  at  Valley 
Forge;  all  who  have  cried,  "Give  me  liberty  or 
give  me  death,"  have  been  fools. 


64  France  and  Ourselves 

(5)  At  the  time  of  the  cession  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine to  Germany  it  was  difficult  for  the  victims 
to  decide  what  was  best  to  do.  Hundreds  of 
thousands,  immediately  or  during  the  period  of 
transition  that  followed,  chose  France  and  went 
into  exile.  Others  felt  that  it  was  their  duty  to 
stay  and  keep  alive  the  protest.  They  believed 
that  the  fortune  of  arms  might  soon  bring  them 
back  to  France,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  they 
moved  out  and  let  the  Germans  have  their  will, 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  would  be  permanently  lost 
to  France.  So  they  chose  the  harder  part.  In 
the  course  of  time,  when  the  situation  seemed  to 
become  permanent  and  a  new  generation  was 
born  and  came  to  manhood,  the  younger  Alsa- 
tians had  to  face  obligatory  military  service. 
This  was  too  great  a  humiliation  for  the  culti- 
vated classes.  They  did  not  oppose,  but  rather 
encouraged,  their  sons  to  leave. 

It  is  impossible  to  give  exact  figures  of  Alsa- 
tians and  Lorrainers  who  chose  exile  rather  than 
service  in  the  German  army.  We  do  know,  how- 
ever, that  the  stream  of  young  men  from  Alsace- 


World  Justice  for  France  65 

Lorraine  to  the  other  side  of  the  Vosges  never 
ceased.  Even  those  who  did  their  service  in  Ger- 
many could  not  bring  themselves  to  fight  with 
Germany.  During  the  mobilization  there  were 
desertions  by  the  thousands,  and  since  1914,  Al- 
satians and  Lorrainers  have  deserted  on  the  East- 
ern as  well  as  on  the  Western  front  whenever 
there  was  an  opportunity.  More  than  twenty 
thousand  young  men  under  thirty,  who  completed 
their  military  training  in  Germany,  are  serving 
to-day  in  the  French  Army.  More  than  a  hun- 
dred thousand  others  who  were  born  in  the  lost 
provinces  are  wearing  the  French  uniform.  This 
refutes  the  German  calumny  that  the  motive  of 
Alsatian  desertion  has  been  to  shirk  military 
duties. 

Words  count  for  little.  If  Alsatians  and  Lor- 
rainers limited  their  protests  against  belonging 
to  Germany  to  talk,  we  might  well  question  their 
sincerity.  But  when  they  back  up  their  protests 
by  willingness  to  sacrifice  life  and  property,  do 
we  want  other  proof  of  their  attitude?  It  seems 
incredible  that  Herr  von  Kuhlmann  should  have 


66  France  and  Ourselves 

dared  recently  to  pay  a  tribute  to  "the  loyalty  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  to  the  German  fatherland"  in 
face  of  the  following  facts  which  deal  with  the 
year  of  our  Lord  1917.  (1)  There  are  two  Al- 
satian officers  of  pure  blood  in  the  German 
Army,  while  France  has  generals  Maud'huy, 
d'Urbal,  Micheler,  Dubail,  Mangin,  Hirschauer, 
Lardemelle,  Sibille,  Levi,  Leblois,  Heyman, 
Blondin,  Andlauer,  Schwartz,  de  Metz,  and 
Poudraguin,  one  hundred  and  forty-five  other 
superior  officers,  and  thousands  of  captains  and 
lieutenants;  (2)  army  orders  show  that  the  au- 
thorities dare  not  employ  the  regiments  from  Al- 
sace-Lorraine in  the  Germany  Army  against 
France  and  that  they  hold  them  under  strict 
surveillance  everywhere;  (3)  tens  of  thousands  of 
deserters  are  posted,  and  measures  taken  for  the 
confiscation  of  their  property  in  the  German  Em- 
pire; (4)  the  courts  martial  and  the  civil  tribunals 
of  the  Reichsland,  although  they  work  under 
pressure,  are  at  this  writing — January,  1918 — 
several  months  behind  in  trying  the  cases  of 


World  Justice  for  France  67 

civilians  accused  of  high  treason  and  showing 
open  sympathy  with  the  enemy. 

We  pass  to  the  second  question.  Do  the  lost 
provinces  want  to  be  reincorporated  in  France? 
An  unqualified  affirmative  answer,  supported  by 
proofs,  is  impossible  to  give.  We  might  argue 
that  since  most  of  the  evidence  I  have  cited  to 
prove  the  hostility  of  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers 
to  Germany  implies  affection  for  France,  the  pre- 
sumption is  strong  in  favor  of  the  desire  of  the 
large  majority  to  return  to  the  old  allegiance. 
But  we  must  make  an  honest  effort  to  take  into 
account  the  law  that  seems  to  be  almost  univer- 
sal in  the  working  out  of  nationalist  movements 
in  border  provinces.  Small  nations  have  a  habit 
of  playing  off  one  big  neighbor  against  another. 
Frequently  the  power  that  covets  a  province  be- 
yond its  confines  is  encouraged  by  the  growth 
of  an  irredentism  that  gives  birth  to  false  hopes. 
The  irredentism  is  found  to  have  been  almost 
wholly  on  the  side  of  the  mother-land.  For  the 
border  people  too  often  receive  favorably  over- 


68  France  and  Ourselves 

tures  from  outside,  and  nourish  at  home  a  senti- 
ment of  affection  for  a  neighboring  power,  only 
as  the  means  of  wringing  concessions  and  secur- 
ing an  amelioration  of  their  lot,  politically  and 
economically,  from  the  Government  to  which  they 
are  subject.  There  is  no  real  desire  to  change  al- 
legiance. If  it  came  to  the  point  of  decision, 
might  not  the  economic  and  social  advantages 
of  continuing  to  be  a  part  of  the  state  to  which 
the  province  actually  belonged  be  considered 
more  precious  than  a  better  political  status 
through  union  with  another  state? 

We  cannot  ignore  this  point.  The  Germans 
have  raised  it,  and  their  polemicists  declare  that 
the  great  bulk  of  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
who  have  used  the  old  sentiment  for  France  to 
secure  autonomy  and  the  banishment  of  Prus- 
sian functionaries,  in  the  bottom  of  their  hearts, 
prefer  to  remain  in  the  German  Confederation. 
For,  like  the  Poles  of  Posen,  they  would  not 
want  to  give  up  what  they  have  enjoyed  and  have 
become  accustomed  to  under  German  rule :  a  well 
organized,  smoothly  running,  efficient  adminis- 


World  Justice  for  France  69 

tration;  enlightened  social  legislation  for  the 
working-classes;  participation  of  the  church  in 
secular  education;  good  pay  and  good  pensions 
for  functionaries  and  school-teachers;  and,  above 
all,  economic  prosperity  through  union  with  the 
greatest  industrial  state  in  the  world. 

Unfortunately  for  Germany,  however,  Alsa- 
tians and  Lorrainers,  like  Poles  and  Danes,  have 
not  been  allowed  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  belong- 
ing to  the  German  Confederation  under  the  same 
conditions  as  the  German  states.  Posnania  and 
Schleswig  were  incorporated  into  Prussia,  and 
lost  their  identity.  Constituted  as  a  Reichsland, 
Alsace-Lorraine  has  always  remained  a  Reichs- 
land. From  1871  until  the  present  time — and 
never  more  than  since  the  beginning  of  this  war 
— the  people  of  the  lost  provinces  have  been 
made  to  feel  that  they  are  a  conquered  race. 
There  was  no  serious  attempt  to  assimilate  or 
reconcile  them.  They  were  not  left  to  themselves 
with  the  dignity  and  privileges  of  membership  in 
the  German  Confederation.  Their  governors, 
their   functionaries,   their   school-masters,   their 


70  France  and  Ourselves 

railway  and  municipal  officials,  have  always  been 
foreigners  enforced  upon  them  by  Berlin.  The 
Germans  chose  the  role  of  conquerors  and  ex- 
ploiters. Perhaps  they  could  play  no  other  role. 
Perhaps  they  did  not  want  to  play  another  role. 
The  consequences  have  been  disastrous  for 
Germany,  favorable  for  France.  Different  in 
race,  antipathetic  in  culture,  always  mindful  of 
the  fact  that  they  were  made  German  subjects 
against  their  consent,  the  people  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, even  if  they  have  misgivings  in  the  purely 
material  sense  about  returning  to  France,  as 
France  has  evolved  since  1870,  certainly  prefer 
France  unknown  to  Germany  known.  In  1872, 
when  the  last  days  of  choice  between  exile  and 
German  allegiance  drew  to  a  close,  thousands  of 
Alsatians  who  had  hesitated  for  a  year,  rich  and 
poor  alike,  emigrated  to  France.  When  asked 
why  they  were  leaving  for  France  without  knowl- 
edge of  where  they  were  going  or  what  they  were 
going  to  do,  simple  peasants  responded,  "We 
shall  not  die  Prussians."  The  spirit  of  1918  is 
that  of  1872. 


World  Justice  for  France  71 

If  the  French  and  the  Alsatian  leaders  who 
are  advocating  the  return  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine to  France  without  conditions  are  sure  of 
the  sentiments  of  the  people  of  the  lost  provinces, 
why  not  a  plebiscite?  Would  not  that  be  the 
simplest  and  the  easiest  and  the  surest  way  of 
finding  out  the  real  sentiments  of  the  people  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine,  and  at  the  same  time  of 
maintaining  in  the  peace  conference  the  prin- 
ciple of  deciding  the  political  status  of  debat- 
able territories  on  the  basis  of  "the  consent  of 
the  governed"? 

The  plebiscite  idea  has  been  mooted  by  ad- 
vanced thinkers  and  by  socialists,  and  was 
adopted  officially  by  the  Russian  revolutionists. 
But  an  ante-f actum  plebiscite,  nowhere  easy  to 
arrange,  is  not  at  all  feasible  in  Alsace-Lorraine. 
The  arguments  in  its  favor  are  wholly  theoretical. 
The  arguments  against  it  are  practical  and,  to 
those  who  know  local  conditions  or  take  the 
trouble  to  study  them,  convincing.  History  has 
demonstrated  that  an  occupying  army  can  carry 
a  plebiscite  if  it  will.     Even  were  both  armies 


72  France  and  Ourselves 

withdrawn,  and  the  plebiscite  conducted  under 
neutral  or  indigenous  auspices,  Germany's  fa- 
cilities for  espionage,  perfected  as  they  are  in 
the  Reichsland,  would  remain.  With  the  future 
uncertain,  fear  of  reprisals  would  prevent  a  free 
vote.  Would  it  be  fair  to  deprive  exiles,  driven 
from  their  native  land  by  the  consequences  of 
the  Peace  of  Frankfort,  of  their  votes,  and  allow 
immigres,  nine  tenths  of  them  German  function- 
aries or  children  of  functionaries,  to  have  a  part 
in  deciding  the  destiny  of  a  land  of  which  they 
are  not  natives  and  to  which  they  are  attached 
by  no  traditional  or  cultural  bonds? 

The  proposition  of  a  buffer  state  is  inadmis- 
sible. Not  only  would  it  mean  the  economic  ruin 
of  the  country  between  the  Vosges  and  the  Rhine, 
but  it  would  also  be  planting  the  seed  for  a  fu- 
ture war.  Alsace-Lorraine  could  not  live  alone. 
No  greater  misfortune  could  come  to  the  inhabi- 
tants of  this  border-land,  to  Germany  and 
France,  to  the  whole  world,  than  the  neutraliza- 
tion of  the  rich  provinces.  They  would  remain 
a  bone  of  contention  as  they  have  in  the  past. 


World  Justice  for  France  73 

Only  if  Alsace-Lorraine  is  given  back  to 
France  will  the  balance  of  power  be  restored  in 
Europe.  Only  this  solution  of  the  problem  will 
assure  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  the  opportunity 
to  speak  for  themselves — an  opportunity  they 
have  lacked  since  1870.  When  they  become 
again  an  integral  part  of  France,  the  election  of 
deputies  and  senators  to  the  French  parliament 
will  take  place.  It  will  be  a  genuine  plebiscite. 
France  does  not  fear  this  plebiscite.  Otherwise, 
it  would  be  folly  for  her  to  make  the  return  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  a  war  aim. 

Since  August,  1917,  in  the  fourth  year  of 
French  reoccupation,  I  have  had  the  privilege 
of  visiting  the  reconquered  portions  of  Alsace 
twice.  I  have  wandered  at  will  from  town  to 
town,  and  have  seen,  in  the  light  of  the  tragic  and 
uncertain  present,  manifold  evidences  of  loyalty 
and  affection  and  devotion  to  France.  In 
schools,  in  factories,  and  in  mairies,  I  have  ob- 
served the  results  of  French  administration.  Al- 
most all  of  the  French  authorities  are  Alsatian  by 
birth  and  tradition.     They  are  fully  alive  to  the 


74  France  and  Ourselves 

problems  they  have  to  face.  They  realize  that 
the  reassimilation  of  the  lost  provinces  in  the 
French  republic  will  necessitate  changes  in  the 
political  organism  of  France,  changes  in  law  and 
the  spirit  of  administering  law,  changes  that  are 
economic  and  social  fully  as  much  as  political. 
But  France  is  willing  to  accept  the  task  before 
her.  She  is  eager  to  receive  again  into  her  bosom 
the  provinces  over  the  loss  of  which  she  has  suf- 
fered. 

Answering  a  question  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, Mr.  Balfour  said  recently  that  since  Aug- 
ust 4,  1914,  the  return  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine 
to  France  has  been  one  of  Great  Britain's  war 
aims.  Since  April  4,  1917,  has  it  not  been  also 
one  of  our  war  aims?  Deep  down  in  the  heart 
of  every  American  is  a  passionate  love  for  France, 
a  firm  determination  to  see  that  the  wrongs  of 
France  at  the  hands  of  Germany  are  righted. 
France  cannot  be  herself  again  without  the  re- 
turn of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  At  this  critical 
moment  when  the  burden  of  France  is  immeasur- 
ably greater  than  ours  it  is  our  duty  to  give  her 


World  Justice  for  France  75 

renewed  inspiration  for  the  struggle.  It  will 
come  only  from  an  official  declaration  of  the 
American  Government  that  we  are  fighting  for 
the  return  of  the  lost  provinces  to  the  mother 
country. 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE  INDUSTRIAL  EFFORT  OF   FRANCE  DURING 
THE   WAR  * 


ON  the  last  day  of  August,  1914,  the  super- 
intendent of  a  steel-plant  said  to  me : 
"You  have  heard  that  the  government  is  prepar- 
ing to  go  to  Bordeaux.  Since  Charleroi,  it  is 
not  surprising  news." 

"Yes,"  I  answered,  "the  panic  seems  to  be  on. 
But  you  have  confidence,  have  you  not,  that  you 
can  hold  your  people?" 

"Oh,  the  Parisian  working-man  does  not  think 
of  flight.  He  has  nowhere  to  go,  and  no  money 
to  go  with.  Anyway  he  has  much  more  sang 
froid  than  the  bourgeois." 

Three  weeks  later,  while  we  were  still  rejoic- 
ing over  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  I  met  the  steel- 

i  February,  1919. 

76 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War    77 

manufacturer  in  a  restaurant,  eating  sauerkraut 
and  sausage.  Beside  his  plate  stood  a  big  mug  of 
beer.  It  was  just  as  if  there  were  no  German 
invasion. 

"Back  from  Bordeaux?"  I  asked,  jokingly,  for 
that  was  the  teasing  question  of  the  moment.  To 
my  astonishment,  he  answered  affirmatively. 

"I  must  explain,"  he  added,  "though  you  know 
I  am  not  the  froussard  type.  But  the  explana- 
tion is  confidential.  You  must  say  nothing  about 
it  until  after  the  war.  I  was  summoned  to 
Bordeaux  by  the  Government  with  other  metal- 
lurgists and  members  of  the  Comite  des  Forges. 
What  we  were  told  down  there  in  Bordeaux 
would  have  been  a  real  tragedy  if  we  had  taken 
it  as  a  tragedy.  Thank  God,  there  wasn't  a 
man  of  us  who  lost  his  nerve.  We  French  are  a 
happy-go-lucky  people,  perhaps,  but  we  do  know 
how  to  rise  to  emergencies." 

When  the  waiter  had  taken  the  order,  the  steel 
man  told  me  about  the  munitions  situation  in 
France.  The  war  is  over.  Now — for  the  glory 
of  French  industry — I  can  write  about  what  I 


78  France  and  Ourselves 

learned  that  night,  and  what  I  have  heard  and 
seen  since. 

A  few  weeks  of  fighting  had  upset  the  theories 
and  calculations  of  strategists,  publicists,  econo- 
mists, military  critics,  and  statesmen.  It  had 
been  an  axiom  that  the  next  European  war  would 
be  very  short.  The  decisive  battles  would  take 
place  within  the  month  after  war  was  declared, 
and  the  decisive  factors  would  be  speed  of  mo- 
bilization and  ability  to  use  to  the  greatest  effect 
the  means  of  destruction  amassed  beforehand. 
Consequently,  military  authorities  had  concen- 
trated their  attention  upon  mobilization  and 
transportation.  France  and  Germany  had  both 
worked  out  their  plans  for  "the  next  war"  with 
the  idea  of  giving  quickly  the  decisive  blow  or 
stopping  once  for  all  the  enemy's  offensive. 
Germany's  preparations  were  more  thorough 
than  those  of  France,  and  on  a  larger  scale. 
But  no  more  than  the  French  did  the  Germans 
conceive  the  possibility  of  continuous  fighting, 
with  artillery  preparation  and  support,  extend- 
ing over  hundreds   of  kilometers   and   lasting 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War    79 

through  weeks.  The  war  had  not  been  on  a 
month  before  it  was  realized — on  both  sides,  luck- 
ily!— that  the  amount  of  artillery  and  the  sup- 
ply of  ammunition  were  woefully  inadequate  to 
the  new  necessities  of  offensive  and  defensive 
fighting.  Ammunition  was  being  used  ten  times 
as  fast  as  was  anticipated. 

When  Monsieur  Millerand,  the  Minister  of 
War,  summoned  to  Bordeaux  the  leading  steel 
and  iron  men  of  France,  it  was  to  tell  them  that 
the  fate  of  the  country  was  in  their  hands.  The 
75-cm.  field-artillery  cannon  was  proving  itself, 
as  had  been  foreseen  by  the  Balkan  Wars,  the 
weapon  par  excellence  of  armies  in  the  field. 
But  the  consumption  of  shells  was  far  beyond 
what  had  been  provided  for.  If  France  was  go- 
ing to  make  full  use  of  this  one  source  of  superi- 
ority over  the  Germans,  a  supply  of  shells  would 
have  to  be  furnished  without  delay  a  thousand 
per  cent,  in  excess  of  the  capacity  of  the  state 
arsenals.  Unless  private  firms  could  produce 
these  shells  the  cause  of  France  was  hopeless. 

The  estimates  given  by  Monsieur  Millerand 


80  France  and  Ourselves 

to  the  steel  men  staggered  them.  State  arsenals 
were  producing  twelve  thousand  shells  a  day. 
Before  the  Germans  resumed  their  offensive,  the 
armies  must  have  at  least  one  hundred  thousand 
75-cm.  shells  a  day.  And  along  with  this  mam- 
moth increase  in  shell  production,  the  War  De- 
partment would  look  to  French  factories  for 
cannon,  auto-trucks,  shells  of  larger  caliber,  ex- 
plosives on  a  scale  never  dreamed  of,  and  a  be- 
wildering amount  and  variety  of  railway  mate- 
rial. Steps  were  being  taken,  of  course,  to  im- 
port, especially  from  the  United  States.  But 
in  the  final  analysis  France  would  have  to  rely 
upon  her  own  industrial  resources. 

The  little  group  to  whom  Monsieur  Millerand 
outlined  his  demand  could  have  given  many  rea- 
sons to  prove  the  impossibility  of  executing  it. 
General  Joffre's  forced  retreat  abandoned  to  the 
enemy  the  industrial  regions  of  the  north  and 
east,  which  contained  the  greater  part  of  France's 
plants  for  the  production  of  steel,  and  most  of 
her  iron  and  coal.  In  the  invaded  regions  were 
70  per  cent,  of  France's  coal  and  80  per  cent,  of 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War    81 

her  iron  ore.  The  north  and  east  had  contributed 
four  fifths  of  France's  coke  and  four  fifths  of 
her  cast-iron  and  steel.  Not  only  had  these  re- 
sources been  lost  to  France.  They  had  been 
added  to  the  enemy's  producing  capacity.  Be- 
fore the  war,  France  imported  annually  twenty 
million  tons  of  coal  and  three  million  tons  of  coke. 
Most  of  the  coke  came  from  Germany,  and  was 
destined  to  the  steel-plants  of  central  France 
and  Normandy.  Even  could  foreign  supplies  of 
coal  and  iron  be  drawn  upon,  transportation  was 
lacking. 

The  problem  of  labor  was  not  less  formidable 
than  that  of  raw  materials.  Since  the  possibility 
of  a  long  war  had  not  entered  into  France's  cal- 
culations, the  mobilization  of  industry  was  not 
foreseen.  The  military  arsenals  were  called 
upon  to  send  an  important  part  of  their  person- 
nel to  the  front.  Exemption  was  not  granted 
to  superintendents,  engineers,  and  working-men 
of  private  establishments.  Every  plant  repre- 
sented at  the  Bordeaux  conference  was  crippled 
by  the  mobilization  of  its  staff  and  hands,  as  well 


82  France  and  Ourselves 

as  paralyzed  by  the  commandeering  of  transpor- 
tation facilities  for  military  purposes.  To  call 
back  at  that  critical  moment  the  men  who  had 
gone  to  the  front  was  a  delicate  matter.  Na- 
tional sentiment  was  against  it,  and  could  not 
be  enlightened  as  to  the  necessity  of  such  a  meas- 
ure without  revealing  France's  weakness  to  the 
enemy.  It  was  the  nation's  instinct  that  the 
armies  were  all  too  small  to  stem  the  German 
onslaught.  Feeling  was  bitter  against  embus- 
ques. 

There  were  also  technical  difficulties.  Before 
the  war,  the  French  Government  manufactured 
its  artillery  and  shells.  Private  industry  was 
called  upon  only  for  raw  materials.  Steel  was 
delivered  in  raw  state  according  to  serial  specifi- 
cations, and  had  to  pass  the  most  rigid  inspection. 
The  Government  made  cannon  at  Bourges  and 
Puteaux;  munitions  at  Lyons,  Tarbes,  and 
Rheims;  rifles  at  St.-Etienne,  Chatellerault,  and 
Tulle.  For  accessories,  each  corps  d'armee  had 
its  arsenal.  The  specifications  for  the  75-cm. 
shell     demanded     manufacture     by     hydraulic 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War     83 

presses.  As  the  shell  was  a  bottle  with  thin  sides, 
the  steel  had  to  be  highly  tempered.  Then  there 
were  the  copper  cases,  and  the  fuses,  with  seven- 
teen parts  to  think  about.  The  manufacturers 
at  Bordeaux  knew  they  could  not  improvise  hy- 
draulic machines  and  produce  an  unlimited  quan- 
tity of  high-tension  steel. 

Doctor  Schroeder  assured  the  German  Iron- 
masters' Association  on  January  31,  1915,  that 
the  French  metallurgical  industry  was  paralyzed 
by  the  invasion  of  the  northern  and  eastern  indus- 
trial regions  to  the  point  of  hopelessly  compromis- 
ing the  national  defense.  But  the  Herr  Doktor 
knew  nothing  of  the  Bordeaux  meeting,  and  of 
how  Monsieur  Millerand's  appeal  was  being  an- 
swered at  the  very  moment  he  announced  com- 
placently the  ruin  of  French  competitors.  One 
of  the  most  damning  indictments  of  contempo- 
rary Germany  is  to  be  found  in  just  such  speeches 
as  this,  which  reveal  a  lack  of  moral  sense  in  the 
industrial  leaders  of  the  German  people.  But 
we  owe  much  to  the  tendency  of  these  Herren 
Doktoren  to  believe  that  the  fatherland  has  a 


84  France  and  Ourselves 

monopoly  of  organizing  ability  and  scientific 
knowledge,  of  power  to  mobilize  and  utilize  ma- 
terial forces.  Victims  of  their  own  conceit,  the 
Germans  discounted  the  possibility  of  France 
mustering  an  army  in  the  rear,  with  captains  of 
industry  in  command,  to  put  into  the  hands  of 
the  army  at  the  front  the  means  of  saving  the 
world  from  Deutschland  iiber  alles.  On  our 
side,  when  we  come  to  write  the  history  of  the 
war,  let  us  not  look  for  the  effort  and  the  genius, 
which  brought  the  victory,  in  generals  and  com- 
batant troops  alone. 

During  the  winter  of  1914-15,  when  the  arm- 
ies were  digging  themselves  in  from  the  North 
Sea  to  Switzerland,  the  steel  and  iron  manufac- 
turers started  to  make  up  for  the  formidable 
diminution  in  raw-steel  production  caused  by  the 
loss  of  the  northern  and  eastern  regions.  Long- 
neglected  coal  and  iron  deposits  were  utilized. 
Mines  in  uninvaded  departments,  from  the  Pyr- 
enees to  the  Pas-de-Calais,  were  developed  to 
the  limit  of  production.  Coke-ovens  were  set 
up.    A  new  system  of  transportation  was  organ- 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War     85 

ized,  and  the  rolling-stock  found  somewhere. 
Plants  that  had  never  competed  with  the  north 
in  raw  steel  were  equipped  with  blast-fur- 
naces and  converters.  Labor-recruiting  agents 
scoured  Italy,  Spain,  and  North  Africa.  New 
methods  and  new  machinery  were  devised  so  that 
women  could  be  used  as  manual  laborers.  No 
foundry  or  machine-shop  was  too  small  to  be 
overlooked  in  the  inventory  of  shell-producing 
possibilities.  Factories  got  their  steel  and  expert 
instructors.  In  quantities  ranging  from  ten  to 
a  thousand  per  day,  75-cm.  shells  were  turned 
out.  In  April,  1915,  the  French  armies  were 
receiving  nearly  a  million  shells  a  week  for  the 
precious  soixante-quinze. 

This  was  only  the  beginning.  The  soiocante- 
quinze  cannon  had  to  be  replaced  and  increased 
in  number.  Trench  warfare  called  for  heavier 
cannon  and  shells.  Larger  shells  cannot  be 
manufactured,  like  the  75-cm„  from  cut-steel 
bars  turned  and  drilled  on  lathes.  They  must 
be  forged.  This  required  new  installation  of 
machinery  in  factories,  and  an  enormous  increase 


86  France  and  Ourselves 

in  consumption  of  raw  material.  Since  tempered 
steel  in  sufficient  quantity  could  not  be  furnished, 
the  big  shells  had  to  be  cast  in  foundries. 

The  ingenious  makeshifts  applied  to  shell  pro- 
duction, however,  did  not  work  when  it  was  a 
question  of  cannon.  Fortunately  for  France,  the 
navy  had  not  followed  the  example  of  the  army 
in  manufacturing  its  own  equipment.  Fortu- 
nately, too,  the  old  law  which  forbade  French 
industry  to  accept  foreign  orders  and  to  export 
war  material  was  repealed  in  1885.  For  thirty 
years  the  big  establishments  of  central  France — 
Le  Creusot,  Montlucon,  St.-Chamond,  St.-Eti- 
enne,  and  Firminy — had  been  working  for  the 
French  navy,  and  for  the  armies  and  navies  of  a 
dozen  foreign  countries.  They  were  equipped 
with  open-hearth  furnaces,  and  produced  fine 
steel  in  ingots.  In  competition  with  Vickers  and 
Krupp,  their  export  business  had  demanded  the 
most  delicate  and  powerful  steel  products.  The 
resources  and  capacity  of  these  plants,  constantly 
increased  during  the  war  under  the  stimulus  of 
danger,  saved  France  and  her  allies  from  defeat. 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War     87 

By  the  time  we  Americans  made  up  our  minds 
to  enter  the  war,  French  industry  was  in  a  posi- 
tion to  give  us,  also,  the  artillery  without  which 
our  armies  would  have  cut  a  sorry  figure  at  the 
front. 

Throughout  the  war  France  received  less  than 
10  per  cent,  of  her  artillery  and  shells  from 
abroad.  The  exact  figures  will  not  be  available 
for  a  long  time  yet,  but  in  saying  "less  than  10 
per  cent."  I  am  certainly  on  the  safe  side.1  This 
is  an  illustration  of  how  French  metallurgical  in- 
dustry responded  to  Monsieur  Millerand's  ap- 
peal at  Bordeaux.  It  should  correct  the  curious 
impression  of  many  of  my  compatriots  that 
France's  needs  were  supplied  by  the  United 
States.  One  remembers  with  amusement  the 
campaign  of  pro-Germans  and  pacifists  in  the  un- 
happy days  of  our  neutrality  "to  stop  the  war  in 

iThe  last  tables,  published  in  February,  1919,  show  percentage 
of  increases  only  as  far  as  the  beginning  of  October,  1916.  These 
are  sufficiently  eloquent  to  indicate  France's  effort  in  the  manu- 
facture of  cannon  and  ammunition.  Taking  100  as  a  basis  on 
August  1,  1914,  the  Ministry  of  Armament  shows  the  following 
stupendous  results  for  the  first  two  years  after  the  meeting  at 
Bordeaux:  machine-guns,  16,430;  rifles,  29,570;  explosives,  3,750; 
75-cm.  shells,  3,940;  other  shells  of  larger  caliber,  8,900;  75-cm. 
cannon,  3,220;  heavy  camion,  2,300. 


88  France  and  Ourselves 

Europe"  by  an  embargo  on  the  export  of  can- 
non and  ammunition.  Up  to  the  day  the  armis- 
tice was  signed,  France's  industrial  attitude  was 
that  of  the  little  boy  who  was  told  by  the  old 
gentleman  that  he  could  not  capture  a  ground- 
hog by  digging  in  his  hole.  "Can't  catch  him? 
Got  to  catch  him!  The  family's  out  of  meat," 
answered  the  little  boy. 

In  every  corner  of  France,  superintendents  and 
engineers  and  foremen  and  laborers  knew  that 
France  was  out  of  meat.  But  one  did  not  need 
to  go  from  Paris  to  find  concrete  examples  of 
industrial  effort.  On  the  banks  of  the  Seine, 
under  the  shadow  of  the  Eiffel  Tower,  were  two 
men  who  seemed  to  possess  Aladdin's  lamp. 

At  Billancourt,  twenty  years  ago,  Louis  Re- 
nault passed  his  play  hours  experimenting  with 
gas-engines  in  his  mother's  carriage-house.  The 
old  suburban  home  and  the  carriage-house  are 
still  there.  Around  them  have  been  built  acres 
of  shops  to  keep  pace  with  the  development  of 
Renault's  gas-engine.  At  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  the  Renault  plant  was  sending  automobiles 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War     89 

all  over  the  world.  Louis  Renault  did  not  go  to 
the  Ministry  of  War  with  the  proposition  of 
supplying  his  product.  He  simply  asked  what 
was  the  need  of  the  moment.  He  undertook  to 
fill  that  need.  Seventy-five-centimeter  shells, 
of  course,  came  first.  There  was  no  hesitation 
about  a  radical  transformation  of  his  plant  for 
this  purpose.  When  there  were  enough  shells, 
aeroplane  motors  were  in  demand.  Renault 
made  them.     He  developed  his  own  models. 

After  the  surprise  at  Cambrai,  in  the  autumn 
of  1917,  France  saw  the  possibility  of  the  use  of 
small  armored  tanks.  In  June,  1918,  when  the 
Germans  were  threatening  Paris  for  the  second 
time,  I  went  out  to  the  Renault  factory  to  speak 
to  the  hands.  Monsieur  Renault  was  not  a  bit 
depressed,  and  he  showed  me  why.  One  of  his 
tanks  was  ready.  He  ordered  it  out  into  the 
street.  It  slid  down  the  embankment  of  the 
quay  to  the  Seine,  climbed  up  again,  went 
through  a  hedge,  rode  over  a  big  tree,  and 
knocked  down  the  walls  of  a  building  that  was 
being  demolished.     Then,  turning  a  half-somer- 


90  France  and  Ourselves 

sault  to  shake  off  bricks  and  plaster,  the  tank 
crawled  back  to  the  factory. 

"I  am  making  as  many  of  these  as  I  can  get 
the  material  for,"  said  Monsieur  Renault.  A 
month  later,  the  Renault  tanks  entered  into  ac- 
tion between  the  Marne  and  the  Vesle.  Ask  any 
American  who  took  part  in  those  glorious  July 
days,  and  he  will  tell  you  what  happened. 

Andre  Citroen  was  one  of  the  engineers  with 
special  training  released  from  service  at  the  front 
when  public  opinion  finally  realized  that  the  in- 
dustrial effort  of  the  rear  must  have  technically 
trained  men  in  the  prime  of  life.  Citroen  dis- 
liked to  leave  his  artillery  regiment,  but  he  knew 
the  gravity  of  the  situation  and  had  one  idea 
in  his  head — shells,  shells,  and  more  shells. 
Shells  without  limit  alone  could  bring  the  victory. 
Unlike  Renault,  Citroen  had  no  established  busi- 
ness with  a  large  plant  and  thousands  of  hands. 
In  the  summer  of  1915,  when  the  Ministry  of 
Armament  told  him  to  go  ahead  and  make  shells, 
he  possessed  only  a  plot  of  land  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Seine  beyond  the  Pont  de  Grenelle. 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War     91 

Business  enterprises  had  not  prospered  along  the 
Quai  de  Javel.  The  land  was  used  for  growing 
cabbages  and  cauliflower.  But  the  quarter  was 
a  populous  one,  and  Citroen  was  looking  for 
labor.  He  started  with  one  building  and  a  hun- 
dred 75-cm.  shells  a  day.  Three  years  later  his 
plant  covered  acres.  He  was  turning  out  in 
Paris  over  ten  thousand  shells  a  day,  and  direct- 
ing another  large  plant,  almost  as  important  as 
the  Paris  one,  at  Roanne. 

In  1918,  nearly  five  thousand  people  were 
working  on  the  cabbage-patch  of  1915.  When 
I  spoke  at  the  Citroen  factory  at  the  time  of 
the  last  German  thrust  toward  Paris,  I  lunched 
in  a  great  hall  with  the  three  thousand  working- 
men  and  working-women  of  the  day  shift.  We 
were  served  by  white-garbed  girls  who  brought 
piping-hot  food  to  the  tables  in  motor-driven 
wagonettes.  Monsieur  Citroen  has  cooperative 
stores  for  his  hands,  and  a  model  creche  where 
hundreds  of  babies  are  cared  for  from  Monday 
morning  until  Saturday  night. 

"All  this  created  out  of  nothing,  in  the  midst 


92  France  and  Ourselves 

of  the  war,  with  the  Germans  fifty  miles  away! 
How  did  you  do  it?"  I  exclaimed. 

"Had  to,"  answered  Monsieur  Citroen. 

The  metallurgical  industry  had  other  burdens 
than  those  of  munitions  and  cannon  imposed 
upon  it.  Rifles  were  never  before  manufactured 
except  in  arsenals  of  the  state.  They  were  now 
called  for  by  the  million  from  private  industry. 
Bayonets  and  trench  daggers  required  tempered 
steel.  The  thousandfold  increase  in  aviation  and 
in  automobile  transport  was  possible  only  if  steel 
and  iron  parts  were  delivered  promptly.  Ma- 
chinery for  shops  was  imported,  but  most  of  it 
had  to  be  made  in  France.  The  armies  could 
never  get  enough  barbed  wire,  picks,  shovels, 
crowbars.  As  trench  warfare  developed,  light 
railways  for  feeding  ammunition  to  the  batter- 
ies all  along  the  front  were  needed.  Steel-plants 
had  to  furnish  the  rails.  Later,  heavy  artillery 
could  not  be  handled  without  wide-gage  railways 
and  special  trucks.  Then  came  the  idea  of  ar- 
mored trains  and  automobiles.  At  the  very  time 
the  steel-plants  were  working  to  the  limit  to  turn 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War     93 

out  heavy  artillery,  the  General  Staff  realized 
that  the  defensive,  much  less  the  offensive,  could 
not  be  successful  without  machine-guns  and 
armored  machine-gun  emplacements.  Even 
with  labor  assured  and  factories  expanding  and 
machines  installed  to  keep  pace  with  the  insatiable 
demands,  steel  and  iron  men  were  not  free  from 
the  constant  fear  of  running  out  of  raw  material 
and  coal.  Iron  ore,  pig-iron,  and  steel — the 
figures  mounted  from  month  to  month  like  the 
figures  of  the  budget  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance. 
But  steel  could  not  be  multiplied,  like  money,  by 
paper  and  loans. 

France  imported  pig-iron  and  brought  ore 
from  the  Pyrenees.  Up  to  the  end  of  1916  much 
coal  came  from  England.  The  intensification 
of  submarine  warfare  necessitated  the  recall  from 
their  regiments  of  all  the  miners.  This  did  not 
remove  the  miners  from  danger.  They  were  put 
to  a  greater  test  than  when  fighting.  Right  up 
to  the  front  lines  in  Flanders  and  the  Artois,  the 
precious  coal-mines  were  exploited.  During 
1917  France  succeeded  in  mining  thirty  million 


94  France  and  Ourselves 

tons  of  coal — three  fourths  of  her  ante-bellum 
output !  When  imports  in  pig-iron  fell  off,  blast- 
furnaces in  the  Gironde,  the  Loire  Inf  erieure  and 
Normandy,  enabled  France  to  increase  her  pro- 
duction 210  per  cent,  between  July,  1915,  and 
July,  1917.  Before  the  war  there  was  no  fire- 
brick industry  in  France.  All  the  supply  came 
from  Euboea  in  Greece.  This  was  cut  off  en- 
tirely. To  keep  blast  and  open-hearth  furnaces, 
coke-ovens  and  converters  lined,  a  new  industry 
was  created. 

Next  in  importance  to  the  metallurgical  ef- 
fort of  France,  and  not  less  difficult  to  succeed  in, 
was  the  chemical  effort.  This  was  a  field  in 
which  Germany  had  excelled  in  time  of  peace. 
Her  doctors  of  philosophy,  engaged  wholesale 
by  huge  industrial  enterprises,  gave  their  em- 
ployers the  benefit  of  tireless  and  systematic  ex- 
perimental laboratory  work.  Since  the  war  we 
have  heard  much  of  aniline  dyes.  The  per- 
sonal experience  of  each  of  us  has  taught  the  les- 
son of  our  dependence  upon  Germany.  Aniline 
dyes  were  only  one  field  of  superiority.     Ger- 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War    95 

man  chemical  products  of  every  kind  competed 
successfully  with  French  products  in  French 
markets.  The  Ministry  of  War,  in  spite  of  the 
loss  of  the  iron  and  coal  of  the  north  and  east, 
had  something  to  fall  back  upon  in  metallurgy. 
In  chemistry,  there  was  practically  nothing  to 
supplement  government  provisions  for  manu- 
facturing explosives.  It  was  impossible  to  di- 
vert to  the  production  of  explosives  the  plants 
that  were  struggling  to  meet  a  tenfold  increase 
of  demand  for  drugs.  Other  plants  were  built. 
And  when  the  Germans  started  to  use  asphyxiat- 
ing gases,  an  unexplored  field  of  chemical  effort 
was  entered  upon  on  a  large  scale.  Observation 
balloons  alone  were  overtaxing  the  existing  gas- 
producing  capacity  of  the  nation. 

But  one  never  finds  the  French  at  their  wits' 
end.  By  a  superhuman  effort,  raw  materials 
were  found.  Of  coal,  however,  adequate  sup- 
plies could  not  be  diverted  to  the  chemical  fac- 
tories. The  chemical  manufacturers  concen- 
trated their  plants  in  the  departments  near  the 
Alps  and  Pyrenees,  and  used  electricity  gener- 


96  France  and  Ourselves 

ated  by  water-power.  For  decades  economists 
and  scientists  urged  the  harnessing  of  mountain 
watercourses  fed  by  the  perennial  mountain  snow. 
It  required  the  pressure  of  the  German  invasion 
to  secure  widespread  use  of  what  the  French  call 
houille  blanche. 

I  am  often  asked  what  scene  of  war  made  the 
deepest  impression  upon  me  during  the  ten  years 
I  have  been  following  armies.  I  know  that  I 
am  expected  to  speak  of  a  battle,  a  massacre, 
an  air  raid,  refugees,  or  the  havoc  of  destruction. 
For  there  is  surprise  when  I  answer,  "An  endless 
chain  of  auto-trucks  passing  by  night  along  the 
Verdun-Bar-le-Duc  road  in  March,  1916."  The 
Germans  had  concentrated  their  artillery  and 
best  troops  for  the  final  battle  of  the  war.  The 
railway  behind  the  French  was  destroyed.  In 
spite  of  the  heroism  of  the  defenders  of  the  forts 
of  Verdun,  they  could  not  have  held  back  the 
Germans  without  food  and  ammunition.  Those 
auto-trucks  saved  France  from  the  fate  that  has 
finally  been  meted  out  to  the  aggressor.  The 
ammunition  they  carried  enabled  the  French  to 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War    97 

hurl  back  shell  for  shell.  As  I  watched  them 
pass  toward  the  thunder  and  lightning  of  the 
valley  of  the  Meuse,  I  realized  that  they  formed 
the  link  between  the  army  of  the  front  and  the 
army  of  the  rear.  France  was  resisting  victori- 
ously because  her  entire  population  was  work- 
ing night  and  day.  The  Herren  Doktoren  had 
made  a  false  calculation. 

A  few  figures,  to  illustrate  the  growth  of 
France's  army  in  the  rear,  show  how  wrongly 
Germany  reckoned  when  she  believed  that 
through  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  she 
was  going  to  strike  a  mortal  blow  at  France's 
industrial  life: 

Number  of  Workers: 

July  Aug.  Jan. 

1914,  191b  1918 

Food  products 93,775  50,469  80,557 

Chemical  products 78,893  35,470  93,667 

Rubber  and  paper 55,298  17,606  42,506 

Textile  industries 309,287  104,698  255,227 

Clothing 137,764  44,332  109,743 

Leather  and  skins 70,212  26,864  59,375 

Wood 84,790  19,315  72,581 

Metallurgy 371,300  122,356  642,539 


98  France  and  Ourselves 

The  second  column  gives  the  diminution 
through  mobilization.  In  September,  1914,  the 
figures  for  textiles  and  metallurgy  were  cut  in 
half — if  not  more — by  the  invasion  of  northern 
and  eastern  France.  The  third  column  was  es- 
tablished before  the  last  German  offensive.  In 
comparing  it  with  the  other  two  we  must  remem- 
ber that  only  workers  in  metallurgy  and  chem- 
ical products  had  been  returned  to  their  trades, 
and  that  the  figures  indicate  France  at  work  in 
the  fourth  year  of  the  war  and  without  her  rich- 
est industrial  provinces. 

The  textile,  leather,  and  rubber  industries  sup- 
plied the  armies  with  clothing,  shoes,  and  tires. 
In  every  department  of  France,  tailors  and  cob- 
blers, often  in  little  shops,  were  busy  on  piece 
work  for  the  Government.  I  have  lectured  in 
towns  of  from  fifty  to  eighty  thousand  inhabi- 
tants, all  of  whose  industries  were  engaged  ex- 
clusively in  army  work.  The  making  of  auto- 
mobiles and  aeroplanes  depended  as  much  upon 
workers  in  wood  as  upon  workers  in  metal. 
Weaving-mills,  also,  contributed  to  the  intensive 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War     99 

production  of  aeroplanes.  In  July,  1917,  after 
three  years  of  war,  fifteen  thousand  factories  were 
classed  as  usines  de  guerre.  They  employed  one 
million,  seven  hundred  thousand  hands,  of  whom 
only  six  hundred  thousand  were  mobilized. 
Four  hundred  thousand  of  the  civilian  hands  were 
women.  In  factories  other  than  usines  de  guerre, 
nearly  half  a  million  workers  were  employed. 

The  president  of  a  chamber  of  commerce  told 
me  shortly  before  the  armistice  that  French  in- 
dustry, without  counting  the  mobilized  soldiers 
in  the  usines  de  guerre,  was  employing  more 
labor  than  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  "When 
you  consider  that  in  making  this  statement  I  am 
comparing  the  figures  of  all  of  France,  'before  the 
war'  with  those  of  France,  deprived  of  her  rich- 
est industrial  regions,  in  the  autumn  of  1918,  you 
will  realize  the  miracle  we  have  performed  and 
its  significance  for  the  future." 

Writing  about  the  industrial  effort  of  France 
during  the  war  has  not  for  its  purpose  simply  to 
glorify  the  army  of  the  rear  and  emphasize  a 
chapter  of  war  history  that  has  escaped  notice. 


100  France  and  Ourselves 

What  French  manufacturers  have  done  for  na- 
tional defense  has  wrought  a  profound  change 
in  the  internal  and  international  situation  of 
France.  Ante-bellum  economic  conditions  will 
not  be  reestablished  with  peace.  The  reconstruc- 
tion of  northern  France,  in  industry  and  agricul- 
ture, is  no  more  of  a  problem  than  the  utilization 
of  the  new  equipments  for  manufacturing  called 
into  being  during  the  last  four  years  in  other 
parts  of  France.  Capacity  for  production  has 
increased  several-fold.  Industrial  centers  have 
a  labor  supply  that  has  kept  pace  with  this  in- 
creased capacity.  Now  that  the  war  work  is  fin- 
ished, what  will  these  plants  produce?  Where 
will  they  sell  their  products?  Without  the  aid  of 
a  government  vitally  interested  in  supplying 
them,  will  the  flow  of  raw  materials  be  uninter- 
rupted? When  the  factories  of  the  North  get 
back  to  work  and  the  products  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine pour  into  France,  there  is  danger  of  over- 
production at  home  and  keen  competition  for 
exporting  facilities.  France  lacks  shipping — 
which  means  high  overseas  freights — and  fears 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War    101 

meeting  the  prices  of  other  nations  in  the  world 
markets.  When  the  armies  are  demobilized, 
work  must  be  found  for  two  million  artisans  and 
two  million  unskilled  laborers. 

French  manufacturers  and  labor  leaders  do 
not  view  the  prdblems  of  peace  and  reconstruction 
from  the  angle  of  politicians  and  journalists. 
The  speeches  of  our  peacemakers  and  the  edi- 
torials of  newspapers  fill  with  uneasiness  those 
who  have  actually  to  confront  questions  of  re- 
construction. Although  the  theories  of  manu- 
facturers and  labor  leaders  are  radically  differ- 
ent, they  agree  in  being  less  interested  in  preserv- 
ing France's  amour  propre  than  in  assuring 
France's  bien-etre.  One  cannot  live  on  pride. 
Where  patriotism  is  not  tempered  by  common 
sense,  it  is  not  patriotism  at  all,  but  blind  and 
dangerous  sentimentality.  As  for  the  idea- 
logues,  did  not  Christ  tell  His  disciples  to  begin 
spreading  the  gospel  at  Jerusalem?  A  French- 
man, whom  we  would  call  in  America  a  captain  of 
industry,  said  to  me  recently:  "Most  of  the 
propositions  aired  in  the  press  fly  in  the  face  of 


t     t    «   « « 


102  France  and  Ourselves 

economic  laws.  Among  Allied  statesmen  I  have 
found  only  one  who  has  had  the  courage  to  tell 
people  the  truth.  Pasted  over  my  desk  there 
you  see  the  speech  delivered  by  Sir  Eric  Geddes 
at  Cambridge  on  November  28th."  I  looked  at 
the  newspaper  clipping.  One  sentence,  under- 
lined with  blue  pencil,  read,  "The  indemnity  ques- 
tion must  not  be  allowed  to  become  a  fetish  to 
lead  to  the  ruin  of  our  working  classes." 

The  war  lasted  too  long  in  Europe  for  polit- 
ical aspects  to  dominate  at  the  moment  of  final 
settlement.  By  agreements  between  statesmen 
or  by  the  application  of  force,  it  is  possible  to 
smooth  over  or  cause  to  disappear  political  diffi- 
culties. The  economic  situation  politicians  do 
not  control.  The  entire  population  of  belliger- 
ent countries  was  called  upon  to  make  an  indus- 
trial effort  which  changed  internal  social  and 
economic  conditions  more  than  armies  changed 
international  political  conditions.  In  making 
peace,  governments  have  to  take  into  considera- 
tion factors  which  never  before  appeared  in  a 
diplomatic  settlement. 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War     103 

Just  after  the  opening  of  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence, a  French  Cabinet  Minister  spoke  at  a  man- 
ufacturers' banquet.  He  felt  that  he  had  un- 
usually restless  and  impatient  listeners.  He 
asked  the  reason.  The  frank  question  brought 
forth  a  frank  response.  "Mr.  Minister,"  said 
the  toastmaster,  "we  may  be  divided  about  the 
League  of  Nations,  but  we  all  want  a  peace  that 
will  put  Germany  down  and  keep  her  down.  In 
themselves,  your  propositions  do  not  displease  us. 
But  it  is  evident  that  you  do  not  realize  the  neces- 
sity of  putting  the  economic  test  to  each  of  them. 
You  have  not  satisfied  us  that  in  establishing 
its  program,  the  members  of  the  Government 
have  asked  themselves  how,  simply  and  collect- 
ively, the  measures  are  going  to  affect  the  eco- 
nomic life  of  France.  You  did  not  need  to  em- 
phasize to  an  audience  of  Frenchmen  the  danger 
of  a  renewal  of  German  aggression.  But  you 
did  need  to  assure  an  audience  of  producers  of 
goods  and  hirers  of  labor  that  the  Government, 
in  peace  negotiations,  is  equally  alive  to  the  twin 
dangers  of  over-production  and  unemployment. 


104  France  and  Ourselves 

In  order  to  win  the  war,  you  stimulated  us  to  a 
miraculous  industrial  effort.  In  order  to  win 
the  peace,  do  not  ignore  the  revolutionized  indus- 
trial situation  of  France.  The  producing  capac- 
ity of  our  factories  is  greatly  increased.  The 
field  of  labor-recruiting  is  widely  extended." 

Since  the  armistice  American  business  men 
have  flocked  to  France.  Eager  to  help  in  the 
economic  rehabilitation  of  the  country,  they  want 
to  provide  France  with  building  materials,  agri- 
cultural machinery,  automobiles,  locomotives, 
rolling-stock,  and  steel  rails.  They  are  amazed 
at  the  difficulties  put  in  their  path,  especially  since 
they  thought  that  the  French  Goverment  would 
encourage  importation.  They  become  angry 
and  declare  that  the  French  are  blind  to  their 
own  interests.  The  inertia  of  the  Government 
and  the  Government's  fear  of  lowering  the  value 
of  the  franc  abroad  are  blamed  for  the  strict  bar- 
riers maintained  against  importations.  The 
president  of  the  American  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce in  Paris  has  issued  a  statement  criticizing 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War     105 

the  French  importation  regulations,  which  he 
attributes  to  exchange  considerations. 

The  Government's  policy,  however,  has  a 
deeper  and  more  significant  cause  which  has  es- 
caped the  Americans  who  are  anxious  to  do  busi- 
ness with  France.  France  makes  no  objection 
to  the  importation  of  raw  materials.  Machinery 
that  she  cannot  make  herself  she  is  as  eager  to 
get  as  during  the  war.  But  all  manufactured 
articles  that  can  be  made  by  French  facto- 
ries are  practically  prohibited  entry.  Nor  has 
France  shown  great  willingess  to  purchase  the 
equipment  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Force.  Is  it  a  mistake  in  policy  to  want  to  keep 
for  France  the  labor  cost  and  the  manufacturing 
and  selling  profit  of  merchandise  for  French  con- 
sumption ?  The  real  reason  why  Americans  and 
British  are  finding  business  difficult  in  France  is 
the  industrial  effort  of  France  during  the  war. 

French  captains  of  industry  were  not  short- 
sighted during  the  years  of  formidable  produc- 
tion of  war  material.     In  extending  their  plants 


106  France  and  Ourselves 

they  kept  constantly  in  mind  the  present  crisis. 
Schneider  &  Co.,  for  instance,  when  they  were 
putting  up  acres  of  new  shops  to  turn  out  can- 
non at  Le  Creusot  and  Honfleur,  had  already 
decided  to  become  locomotive-manufacturers 
after  the  war.  The  new  buildings  were  con- 
structed accordingly.  While  Andre  Citroen 
was  developing  from  hundreds  to  thousands  his 
daily  output  of  75-cm.  shells,  he  and  his  staff  did 
not  forget  that  shells  would  be  a  drug  on  the 
market  after  the  collapse  of  Germany.  When 
the  armistice  was  signed,  they  put  into  effect  the 
plans  they  had  conceived  while  they  were  making 
shells.  The  Citroen  plants  were  transformed  in 
a  few  weeks,  and  on  January  1,  1919,  Monsieur 
Citroen  offered  to  the  French  public  three  types 
of  low-priced  automobiles.  In  vain  the  Ford 
Motor  Company  protested  by  display  advertise- 
ments against  the  refusal  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment to  allow  the  French  market  to  be  flooded 
with  Ford  cars.  Citroen  cannot  compete  with 
Ford  in  cost  of  production.  But  even  if  the 
French  market  has  to  pay  a  little  more  and  wait 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War     107 

a  little  longer  for  deliveries,  the  manufacturers 
and  war  workers  who  saved  France  are  not  going 
to  be  without  a  means  of  earning  a  livelihood. 

The  war  has  not  changed  the  old  system  of 
international  trade  relations.  We  are  far  from 
the  era  of  free  trade  between  nations  and  the 
open  door  in  colonies.  Unless  reaction  goes  so 
far  as  to  cause  a  revolution,  and  if  economic  con- 
ditions in  other  countries  are  like  those  in  France, 
we  may  expect  the  third  decade  of  the  twentieth 
century  to  accentuate  the  tendency  to  high  pro- 
tective tariffs  and  to  governmental  backing  of 
large  enterprises  in  marketing  goods  in  second- 
ary states,  protectorates,  and  colonies.  The  in- 
dustrial effort  of  France  during  the  war  made 
victory  possible — but  at  the  price  of  a  commer- 
cial war  after  peace  is  signed.  And  if,  with 
peace,  the  world  secures  a  diminution  of  arma- 
ments, international  commercial  rivalry  will  be 
all  the  more  intense. 

While  manufacturers  are  reminding  the  Gov- 
ernment of  its  increased  responsibility  toward 
industry,    which    involves    protection    in    home 


108  France  and  Ourselves 

markets  and  aid  in  capturing  foreign  markets, 
the  laboring  classes  warn  the  Government  of  its 
increased  responsibility  toward  them,  which  in- 
volves radical  changes  in  the  conditions  and  com- 
pensation of  employment.  Employers  of  labor, 
they  say,  have  been  well  rewarded  for  their  ef- 
fort in  the  national  defense.  Here  are  two  ex- 
amples, taken  at  random,  of  profits  to  share- 
holders: 

ClE.      CoMMENTRY-FoURCHAMBAULT     ET     DeCAZEVILLE 

Francs 

1914  3,337,750 

1915  7,229,335 

1916 10,635,346 

1917 20,266,848 

SOCIETE    DES    AciEREES    DU    SaUT-DU-TaRN 

Francs 

1914    , 1,029,876 

1915    1,115,385 

1916    6,795,316 

1917 15,873,970 

Wages  increased,  but  in  most  cases  no  more  than 
the  cost  of  living. 

So  the  workers  are  questioning  to-day,  with 


Industrial  Effort  of  France  During  War     109 

more  boldness  and  insistence  than  at  any  time 
in  the  history  of  French  industry,  the  justice  of 
the  present  system  of  the  distribution  of  wealth. 
They  declare  that  increased  taxation  to  pay  for 
the  war  must  be  only  at  the  expense  of  capital. 
On  the  other  hand,  they  demand  shorter  hours 
of  work  and  higher  pay.  If  capitalists  do  not 
care  to  continue  to  manage  and  develop  enter- 
prises under  new  conditions,  they  advocate  the 
taking  over  of  industries  by  the  state.  A  So- 
cialist newspaper  expresses  the  feeling  common 
in  France,  now  that  the  soldiers  are  being  de- 
mobilized, in  these  words:  "While  poilus  were 
receiving  shells,  stock-holders  were  receiving  divi- 
dends." 

All  this  does  not  prevent  one  who  has  lived  in 
close  touch  with  French  industry  during  the  war 
from  being  optimistic  about  the  future.  The 
French  boil  over  easily.  It  is  in  the  Gallic  tem- 
perament to  be  extravagant  in  demands  and  to 
press  claims  with  violent  words.  But  it  is  also  in 
the  Gallic  temperament  to  cool  down  quickly 
and  to  let  reason  win  the  day.     Unless  he  has 


110  France  and  Ourselves 

a  long  time  been  removed  from  the  soil,  the 
French  working-man  retains  his  peasant  instinct 
of  respect  for  property  and  his  peasant  ambi- 
tion of  becoming  a  small  capitalist  himself.  In 
the  country  where  bureaucracy  has  been  car- 
ried to  an  extreme  and  where  the  enterprises 
controlled  by  the  state  are  so  badly  run,  the  doc- 
trine of  state  control  of  industries  has  little 
chance  of  taking  deep  root.  Its  loudest  advo- 
cates would  be  the  most  dismayed  if  they  saw  it 
gaining  ground.  In  spite  of  surface  indications, 
there  is  a  solidarity  between  employers  and  work- 
ing-men. They  know  that  their  interests  are 
bound  up  together,  and  serious  trouble  would 
come  only  if  the  captains  of  industry  were  to  find 
themselves  unable  to  carry  on  in  time  of  peace 
as  they  have  so  admirably  carried  on  in  time  of 
war. 


CHAPTER  V 

HUMAN    CURRENTS   OF  THE   WAR,1 

GOING  from  Menin  to  Ypres  we  were 
nearly  half  an  hour  in  "no  man's  land." 
The  name  will  stick.  Human  beings  could  not 
live  there  during  the  war.  Human  beings  will 
not  live  there  for  years  after  the  war.  Along 
the  road  on  the  ridge  of  the  hill  a  few  splintered 
trunks  of  trees  remain.  Stumps  torn  up  and 
turned  turtle,  sticking  in  the  mud,  offer  to  the 
wind  tendrils  of  roots  instead  of  branches.  The 
fields,  plowed  by  shells,  convulsed  by  mines,  bur- 
rowed in  all  directions  by  trenches,  are  pocked. 
The  pocks,  often  running  into  one  another,  are 
pools  of  water.  By  the  map  we  knew  that  vil- 
lages had  been  scattered  here  and  there  in  this 
once  populous  corner  of  Belgium.  Now  there 
were  not  even  traces  of  buildings.     In  Ypres 

i  March,  1919. 

Ill 


112  France  and  Ourselves 

some  walls  were  standing,  but  no  house  had  kept 
its  roof.  We  could  not  tell  where  the  streets 
had  been. 

We  passed  the  French  frontier  after  dark. 
Suddenly  the  auto  stopped.  We  got  out,  fear- 
ing engine  trouble,  and  found  ourselves  in  the 
main  street  of  a  deserted  city. 

"This  was  Armentieres,"  said  our  conducting 
officer.  "Before  the  last  German  offensive  forty 
thousand  people  lived  here." 

Thanks  to  the  moon,  we  received  a  ghostly  and 
ghastly  impression  as  we  wandered  through  the 
streets.  We  were  alone.  The  ruins  did  not 
give  up  a  cat.  Owls  and  lizards  had  not  yet 
come. 

From  the  Belgian  frontier  to  the  Vosges, 
straight  across  France,  we  traveled  by  one  road, 
and  back  by  another.  In  the  fighting  belt,  from 
twenty  to  sixty  miles  wide,  we  went  in  succes- 
sion through  Armentieres,  Lens,  Douai,  Cam- 
brai,  Arras,  Albert,  Bapaume,  Peronne,  Saint 
Quentin,  Ham,  Nesle,  Montdidier,  Lassigny, 
Noyon,    Soissons,    Chateau-Thierry,    Rheims — 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         113 

why  continue  the  list?  Take  the  map.  Look  at 
the  names  of  all  the  towns  and  cities  in  the  re- 
gions where  the  armies  fought  from  1914  to 
1918.  Draw  upon  your  imagination  for  the 
worst  that  earthquakes  and  fires  could  accom- 
plish. And  in  the  portions  of  northern  and 
northeastern  France  behind  the  German  lines 
picture  every  mine  flooded,  every  factory  looted, 
every  farm  robbed  of  live  stock  and  machinery, 
every  cross-roads  mined,  every  railway  bridge 
blown  up. 

The  Battle  of  Liberation  put  an  end  to  trench 
warfare.  Each  week  more  cities  and  regions 
were-  freed.  Three  days  after  the  armistice  was 
signed  the  last  of  the  invaders  had  recrossed  the 
frontiers  of  France.  From  those  who  did  not 
know  war  and  the  Germans,  the  bulletins  of 
victory  elicited  the  almost  universal  comment: 
"Now,  we  can  breathe  freely  again.  And  is  n't 
it  fine  that  the  refugees  can  go  home!"  The 
war  was  over.  We  could  wash  our  hands  of  re- 
sponsibility for  the  people  of  the  invaded  prov- 
inces.    We  did  not  need  to  have  them  on  our 


114  France  and  Ourselves 

minds  any  longer.  Let  every  one  get  back  to  the 
easy,  happy,  care-free  life  of  1914!  The  Ger- 
mans are  on  the  other  side  of  the  Rhine,  and  we 
all  did  our  bit  to  put  them  there.  By  the  terms 
of  the  treaty  of  peace  we  shall  tell  them  to  stay 
there.  France  has  lived  her  tragic  days.  We 
can  forget  what  we  have  suffered,  and  enter  into 
the  glorious  era  of  the  new  world. 

Most  people  with  a  bit  of  money  and  their 
position  intact  cherish  the  hope  of  having  the 
inverse  of  Rip  Van  Winkle's  experience.  With 
no  personal,  social,  and  financial  problems  to 
face,  or  at  least  unconscious  of  having  any,  they 
expect  to  wipe  the  past  four  years  off  the  slate. 
It  isn't  a  new  world  they  want,  at  all.  It  is 
the  old  world — the  world  of  the  days  before  the 
Germans  went  amuck.  They  grow  impatient — 
and  angry — when  the  conversation  is  led  around 
to  social  unrest  and  labor  crises.  Strikes  are  the 
result  of  Bolshevist  propaganda,  spread  in  the 
interest  of  Germany.  Socialists  and  labor  lead- 
ers are  unrepentant  pro-Germans.  With  so 
much  reconstruction  work  to  be  done,  and  Ger- 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         115 

man  money  to  put  it  through,  unemployment  is 
an  absurdity.  It  shows  a  lack  of  will  to  work  on 
the  part  of  the  proletariat,  combined,  perhaps, 
with  governmental  inefficiency.  The  refugee 
problem  no  longer  exists.  Why  do  not  the  refu- 
gees go  back  to  where  they  came  from? 

It  is  easy  enough  to  say  to  the  million  refugees 
and  to  the  three  hundred  thousand  soldiers  of 
the  North  who  are  being  released  from  military 
service:  "Go  home  now.  Your  country  is 
freed.  We  have  driven  the  Germans  out."  It 
is  easy  enough  to  say  to  the  four  million  French- 
men who  were  in  the  power  of  the  invaders: 
"Get  back  to  your  work,  and  resume  your  normal 
life.  Your  country  is  freed.  We  have  driven 
the  Germans  out."  Whether  they  are  city  folk, 
town  folk  or  country  folk,  the  problems  for  de- 
mobilized soldiers  of  the  invaded  regions,  for 
refugees,  for  inhabitants,  are  the  same.  To  be- 
gin with,  there  is  not  enough  food.  One  prefect 
told  me  that  in  his  department  the  relief  com- 
mission will  have  to  count  on  distributing  food 
for  a  year  and  a  half  longer.     Until  the  machin- 


116  France  and  Ourselves 

ery  is  replaced  there  will  be  no  work  in  mines 
and  factories.  The  factories,  moreover,  depend 
upon  the  mines  and  upon  raw  materials.  Coal 
and  raw  materials,  like  food-stuffs,  will  be  in- 
sufficient until  normal  transportation  conditions 
are  reestablished.  How  can  the  farmers  get 
along  without  stock,  poultry,  seed,  fertilizers, 
implements,  wagons,  horses?  In  the  destroyed 
zone  there  are  no  homes  to  go  to,  no  factories  to 
work  in,  no  trades  to  ply,  and  the  task  of  render- 
ing fertile  again  the  ground  over  which  the  arm- 
ies fought  is  dangerous  as  well  as  herculean. 

But  the  call  of  home  was  strong  to  some.  In 
spite  of  the  exile  of  years,  many  refugees  had 
kept  their  minds  fixed  upon  the  day  of  victory. 
They  were  willing  to  put  up  with  every  hardship 
and  to  give  themselves  without  stint  to  the  ap- 
palling work  of  reconstruction.  Others  were 
eager  to  return  for  the  same  reasons  that  had 
prompted  them  to  leave.  When  they  fled  before 
the  Germans,  they  had  felt  that  the  unknown 
could  not  be  worse  or  more  uncertain  than  the 
life  they  were  leading.     But  they  did  not  make 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         117 

good  in  a  new  place.  During  the  last  months  of 
1918  a  stream  of  northerners  homeward  bound 
flowed  constantly  into  Paris.  In  Paris  they 
stuck.  Places  on  trains  were  limited,  and  it  re- 
quired influence  or  an  extraordinary  amount  of 
persistence  to  get  a  pass  from  the  military  au- 
thorities. Those  who  managed  to  break  through 
official  barriers,  however,  regretted  their  success. 
They  had  gone  from  places  where  living  was  tol- 
erable into  conditions  worse  than  those  they  had 
become  refugees  to  escape. 

In  the  middle  of  December  a  woman  from  the 
Aisne  came  to  see  me.  Her  face  was  aglow. 
"My  husband  has  just  been  demobilized.  We 
have  a  laissez- passer  for  ourselves  and  for  my 
sister.  We  shall  spend  Christmas  at  home. 
But  our  house  was  looted.  I  must  have  sheets 
and  blankets  and  a  few  kitchen  utensils,  per- 
haps also  a  stove.  With  that  for  a  beginning 
we  can  get  along.  I  am  told  that  the  American 
Red  Cross  is  helping  returning  refugees  in  this 
way.  Would  you  mind  giving  me  a  letter  to 
them?" 


118  France  and  Ourselves 

A  few  days  later  the  woman  returned.  "I 
thought  you  would  be  interested  in  hearing  our 
experience,"  she  explained.  "The  American 
Red  Cross  in  Paris  told  me  that  distributions 
were  being  made  from  centers  in  the  liberated 
departments  under  the  supervision  of  the  local 
authorities.  As  our  home  was  twelve  miles  from 
Laon,  we  should  make  our  request  there.  We 
went  to  Laon.  At  the  Red  Cross  an  applica- 
tion form  was  handed  to  us.  It  would  have  to 
be  passed  upon,  and  we  should  return  in  four 
days.  Four  days!  Had  we  walked  out  to  our 
home  and  tried  to  sleep  there,  we  should  have 
frozen.  There  was  no  place  to  sleep  in  Laon. 
One  could  not  buy  in  Laon  the  things  we  had 
to  have.  If  we  returned  to  Meaux  or  Paris  to 
wait  the  four  days,  we  could  not  get  back  to 
Laon.  The  military  authorities  take  up  the 
passes.  We  found  a  thousand  others  that  day 
in  the  same  position  as  ourselves.  Most  of  them 
renounced  going  home,  as  we  did.  My  husband 
has  a  place  in  a  pottery  at  Limoges.  We  leave 
to-night.     My  sister  hopes  to  get  into  the  Paris 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         119 

tramways.  Shall  we  ever  go  home?  The  only- 
thing  I  did  in  Laon  was  to  put  our  house  up  for 
sale." 

The  next  morning  I  read  in  a  Paris  news- 
paper an  editorial,  signed  by  a  member  of  the 
French  Academy,  about  the  vital  importance  of 
propaganda  to  encourage  and  make  possible  the 
immediate  return  of  northerners.  The  Acad- 
emician pointed  out  that  reconstruction  first 
of  all  depended  upon  getting  the  refugees  back 
home.  He  insisted  especially  upon  giving  every 
assistance  to  demobilized  soldiers  who  had  not 
yet  taken  root  elsewhere.  He  feared  for  the 
northern  departments  the  disastrous  influence  of 
migratory  currents. 

One  might  say  that  my  refugee  visitor  did  not 
have  much  pluck,  and  that  she  and  her  husband 
were  discouraged  by  a  comparatively  trifling  ob- 
stacle. If  that  was  the  kind  of  people  they  were, 
how  would  they  have  met  the  bigger  problems 
to  come,  after  securing  bedding  and  kitchen  uten- 
sils? But  when  one  has  been  bearing  a  strain — 
strain  of  exile,  strain  of  separation  from  hus- 


120  France  and  Ourselves 

band,  strain  of  worry  about  husband,  strain  of 
making  both  ends  meet — and  bearing  it  through 
five  years,  trifles  count  for  more  than  big  things. 
It  is  always  that  way  in  life.  Governments  and 
relief  organizations  pay  no  attention  to  the  pe- 
culiar psychology  of  the  human  female.  In 
this  case  the  persistent  hope  of  years  had  curbed 
the  migratory  instinct.  Home-going  was  aban- 
doned in  a  day  for  lack  of  a  sheet  and  a  sauce- 
pan! 

Where  there  is  the  impulse  to  go  home,  much 
could  be  done  to  surround  the  refugee  with 
strong  and  sympathetic  arms  and  to  aid  him  in 
starting  anew.  Another  category  of  refugees 
furnishes  a  more  difficult  problem.  The  migra- 
tory current  has  already  led  to  new  moorings. 

Recently  I  was  being  shown  the  destruction  of 
coal-mine  shafts  at  Bethune.  After  insisting 
upon  the  diabolical  plan  of  the  Germans  to  ruin 
French  industry  by  depriving  the  North  of  its 
coal,  the  engineer  said  to  me:  "Indemnity,  yes; 
but  getting  paid  for  this  in  money  is  a  small  part 
of  our  reparation  problem.     We  don't  know  how 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         121 

long  it  will  take,  how  much  it  will  cost,  what  suc- 
cess will  meet  our  efforts,  to  restore  these  mines. 
Then  we  have  to  rebuild  not  only  the  dwellings 
of  the  miners,  but  also  churches,  schools,  shops, 
theaters — whole  towns  and  cities,  in  fact — so 
that  we  can  assure  the  existence  and  normal  life 
of  our  workers.  Most  of  this  has  to  be  done  be- 
fore they  come  back." 

"Will  they  come  back?"  I  asked. 

The  engineer's  face  grew  grave.  I  knew  why, 
and  did  not  press  for  an  answer.  It  was  a  cold, 
rainy,  gloomy  afternoon  in  March.  As  we 
talked  we  plowed  through  mud  in  a  country  that 
was  unlovely  before  the  Germans  came.  On  a 
superb  March  day,  just  a  year  ago,  I  was  lectur- 
ing at  a  mining-center  at  the  Departement  du 
Gard.  The  superintendent  told  me  that  more 
than  a  thousand  miners  from  the  Pas-de-Calais 
and  several  hundred  from  Belgium  were  working 
in  his  mine.  "To  increase  our  output,"  he  said, 
"we  have  invested  in  new  machinery  and  have 
doubled  the  number  of  our  miners.  The  com- 
pany has  built  a  lot  of  new  houses.     When  the 


122  France  and  Ourselves 

war  is  over,  we  shall  do  our  best  to  hold  these 
people." 

Walking  along  in  the  bright  sunshine,  I  passed 
a  row  of  houses  among  the  firs  on  a  beautiful 
hillside  of  the  Cevennes.  It  was  hard  to  believe 
that  one  was  in  a  coal  region.  Each  house  had 
its  little  front  garden,  with  a  wealth  of  flowers, 
and  roses  climbed  trellises  against  the  wall.  Yel- 
low-haired children  of  all  ages,  playing  in  the 
road,  indicated  the  homes  of  refugees  from  the 
North.     I  stopped  to  speak  to  a  miner. 

"Happy  here?"  he  responded  to  my  leading 
question.  "It  would  be  harder  to  leave  Grand' 
Combe  than  it  was  to  leave  Bethune  three  years 
ago.  My  children  were  small  then.  Now  they 
go  to  school,  and  have  made  their  friends.  Lis- 
ten to  their  Midi  accent!  My  oldest  two  are 
working — their  first  jobs.  The  boy  is  a  sorter, 
and  the  girl  has  taken  up  typewriting  at  the 
office.  We  never  knew  what  the  sunshine  was  in 
the  North,  and  we  never  had  these  flowers.  My 
wife  and  I  are  homesick  occasionally.  I  don't 
deny  that.     But  we  are  better  off  here  than  we 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         123 

have  ever  been  in  our  lives.  Monsieur,"  and  here 
he  grabbed  my  arm  in  his  earnestness,  "I  never 
knew  life  could  be  what  it  is  in  this  place." 

The  miner  from  Bethune  had  discovered  in 
another  part  of  his  own  country  lucrative  work 
under  easier  living-conditions.  His  growing 
family  became  anchors  to  hold  him  in  the  new 
surroundings.  Had  the  war  ended  in  1915 — or 
in  1916 — he  might  not  yet  have  taken  root.  His 
case  is  typical.  In  every  part  of  France  have 
I  found  refugees  from  northern  France  and  Bel- 
gium whose  exile  has  turned  out  to  be  a  blessing 
in  disguise.  Nowhere,  except  in  parts  of  Brit- 
tany, did  refugees  settle  in  a  thickly  populated 
country  where  they  were  in  competition  in  the 
struggle  for  existence  with  the  indigenous  ele- 
ment. Normandy,  the  Limousine,  the  Isere, 
have  assimilated  easily  the  influx  of  refugees  in 
small  towns.  There  has  been  plenty  of  work 
for  every  one.  In  ports  and  large  industrial 
centers  jobs  were  waiting  for  men  and  women, 
boys  and  girls.  It  is  probable  that  when  war  in- 
dustries have  ceased  and  the  French  army  is  com- 


124  France  and  Ourselves 

pletely  demobilized  France  will  experience  a 
period  of  surplus  labor  supply.  But  will  the 
migratory  current  from  the  north  and  north- 
east be  remedied?  If  refugees  could  go  home 
to  find  things  as  they  had  left  them,  yes.  But 
with  the  problem  of  reconstruction  to  face,  in 
the  minds  of  tens  of  thousands  the  contras  are 
likely  to  outweigh  the  pros. 

In  the  summer  of  1914  a  Belgian  physician  ar- 
rived at  a  Normandy  watering-place  with  his  wife 
and  three  little  boys.  He  had  left  everything 
and  expected  to  face  hard  days.  But  the  mobil- 
ization had  called  away  most  of  the  French  doc- 
tors. There  was  a  chance  to  practise.  For  five 
summers  I  have  known  this  physician.  He  has 
cared  for  my  family.  He  used  to  talk  about  go- 
ing home.  Each  summer  I  have  noticed  a 
change  in  him.  His  practice  has  grown  marvel- 
ously.  He  goes  about  in  an  automobile.  His 
boys  are  preparing  for  their  "bachos"  in  a  French 
lycee.  A  year  ago  his  invalid  wife  died  and  was 
buried  in  France.  Last  September,  when  we 
saw  the  German  line  cracking  and  the  Belgian 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         125 

army  advancing  toward  Brussels,  I  talked  to  the 
doctor  of  the  future  of  his  country.  He  did  not 
seem  greatly  interested  and  turned  the  conversa- 
tion to  speculation  about  the  changes  the  war  had 
made  in  our  little  corner  of  Normandy. 

And  the  French  physicians  whom  the  Belgian 
has  supplanted?  After  five  years  will  they  be 
able  to  return  and  resume  their  practice  under 
ante-bellum  conditions?  The  Belgian  is  a  good 
doctor,  a  very  good  doctor,  and  has  won  the  con- 
fidence of  the  neighborhood.  The  demobilized 
physicians  will  be  forced,  perhaps,  to  start  anew 
somewhere  else.  Even  had  no  refugee  come  to 
my  summer  home,  there  would  have  been  other 
Normandy  doctors  to  take  the  practice  of  those 
who  were  mobilized. 

The  refugee  migratory  current  is  only  one 
factor,  and  by  no  means  the  most  important,  in 
starting  other  migratory  currents.  At  the  out- 
break of  the  war  France  called  millions  of  men 
from  their  homes  and  occupations  and  has  kept 
them  under  arms  for  five  years.  They  have  seen 
a  lot  and  learned  a  lot.     They  have  gone  from 


126  France  and  Ourselves 

one  front  to  another,  from  one  depot  to  another, 
from  one  hospital  to  another.  Aside  from  the 
fighting  units,  the  mobilized  workers  have  almost 
invariably  been  sent  to  factories  far  from  their 
homes.  The  services  of  the  rear  have  taken  men 
in  uniform  all  over  France. 

More  than  eighty  per  cent,  of  Frenchmen  be- 
tween the  ages  of  fifty  and  twenty  have  experi- 
enced not  only  five  years  of  change  of  occupa- 
tion, but  they  have  also  lived  in  totally  new  sur- 
roundings. Farm-hands,  who  would  never  have 
been  likely  to  leave  their  villages,  have  gone  to 
live  in  cities.  City  folk,  whose  knowledge  of 
the  country  was  limited  before  the  war  to  Sun- 
day excursions,  have  lived  continuously  for  years 
in  the  open.  And  while  these  millions  have  been 
away,  profound  changes  have  taken  place  at 
home.  Fathers  and  mothers  and  wives  have 
died.  Children  have  grown  up.  Professions 
and  businesses  have  passed  into  the  hands  of 
others.  Where  the  same  place  is  waiting  for  the 
returning  soldier,  will  he  come  back  the  same 
man,  with  the  inclination  and  the  ability  to  re- 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         127 

sume  his  old  work?  How  many  of  the  eighty 
per  cent,  will  fit  again  into  former  places  and 
former  occupations?  Do  we  not  have  to  count 
on  fresh  migratory  currents  started  by  those  who 
do  not  fit? 

Other  migratory  currents,  different  from  and 
not  influenced  by  the  refugee  and  mobilization 
problems,  began  in  France  during  the  war.  The 
demand  for  labor  in  industrial  centers  became 
more  and  more  insistent  as  the  war  dragged  on. 
Profits  of  army  contractors  and  manufacturers 
were  limited  only  by  the  amount  of  labor  they 
could  command.  So  they  made  systematic  ef- 
forts to  recruit  labor  in  agricultural  districts,  and 
the  exigencies  of  national  defense  compelled  the 
government  to  refrain  from  discouraging  the 
movement  of  population  to  industrial  centers. 
High  wages  were  not  the  sole  consideration  to 
tempt  peasants  and  villagers  of  both  sexes  to  go 
to  the  city.  The  government  put  maximum 
prices  on  grain  and  butter  and  eggs,  and  con- 
trolled traffic  in  live  stock.  It  is  true  that  in 
some  parts  of  France  agriculture,  owing  to  near- 


128  France  and  Ourselves 

ness  to  markets,  brought  fortunes  to  peasants. 
But  where  transportation  was  lacking  for  farm 
and  dairy  products,  more  was  to  be  gained  by- 
going  to  work  in  munition  factories.  One  could 
multiply  illustrations  of  this  phenomenon.  Pa- 
miers,  in  the  Department  of  Ariege,  and  Gren- 
oble and  other  towns  in  the  Department  of  Isere, 
are  striking  examples  of  the  trend  from  the 
country  to  the  city  as  a  result  of  labor-recruit- 
ing. 

In  the  first  two  summers  of  the  war  we  had 
an  excellent  laundress  whose  husband  was  killed 
at  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  In  1916  the  woman 
announced  that  she  was  going  to  move  with  her 
children  to  Paris.  "You  ought  not  to  do  that," 
remonstrated  my  wife.  "You  can  get  higher 
prices  and  steadier  work,  but  what  you  gain  will 
be  more  than  offset  by  higher  rent  and  food. 
You  will  coop  your  children  up  in  one  room  and 
be  paying  more  for  the  room  than  you  do  for 
your  little  house  here."  The  woman  answered: 
"But  in  Paris  I  can  get  clothes  and  milk  and  lots 
of  other  things  from  relief  organizations.     We 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         129 

have  n't  any  here."  The  woman  moved  to  Paris. 
I  saw  her  the  other  day.  She  said  she  would 
never  go  back  to  Normandy.  Relief  organiza- 
tions had  been  good  to  her ! 

A  comparison  of  figures  of  population  of  1914 
and  1919  reveals  the  forces  of  migratory  cur- 
rents. The  population  of  France  has  decreased 
by  two  millions.  Three  million  men  are  still 
mobilized  at  this  writing.  And  yet  the  popula- 
tion of  Paris  has  increased  nearly  a  million. 
Other  cities  claim  the  following  increases: 
Lyons,  four  hundred  thousand ;  Marseilles,  three 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand;  Toulouse,  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  thousand ;  Bordeaux,  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand,  and  St.  Etienne,  Rouen, 
Limoges,  Montpellier,  Cette,  Nice,  Havre,  Brest, 
Nantes,  and  Grenoble  from  forty  thousand  to 
one  hundred  thousand  each.  The  figures  can- 
not be  checked  up  until  the  new  census  is  taken. 
There  are  undoubtedly  exaggerations.  But  we 
cannot  be  far  from  wrong  if  we  take  these  cities 
and  a  dozen  other  centers  in  estimating  that  the 
already  depleted  agricultural  regions  of  France 


130  France  and  Ourselves 

have  contributed  to  the  cities  at  least  three  mil- 
lion new  inhabitants.  What  will  be  lost  by  re- 
turning refugees  is  likely  to  be  counterbalanced 
by  the  marked  determination  of  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  demobilized  soldiers  to  settle  in 
large  centers.  Theaters,  cafes,  cinemas,  paved 
streets,  lights,  tramways — the  excitement,  the 
warmth,  the  joy  of  herding  together — are  power- 
ful influences.  Eve's  taste  of  the  apple  was  not 
more  irrevocable  for  mankind  than  the  taste  of 
city  life  for  these  people.  Few  who  have  lived 
in  a  city  want  to  go  to  the  country  without  having 
in  their  pocket  the  money  for  a  return  ticket. 

Ever  since  the  armistice  the  influence  of  migra- 
tory currents  has  been  felt  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  and  in  the  attitude  of  public  opinion 
toward  peace. 

The  sufferers  by  the  German  invasion  were 
hostile  to  indemnities  in  kind.  They  opposed  in- 
demnity bills  which  provided  for  the  spending 
of  the  money,  by  those  who  received  it,  in  re- 
storing what  the  Germans  destroyed.  The  in- 
habitants of  the  North  were  determined  not  to 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         131 

have  a  string  attached  to  the  reimbursements  for 
their  losses.  The  claims,  their  representatives  in 
the  Chamber  said,  were  personal  claims.  They 
did  not  want  indemnities  regarded  in  the  light 
of  reconstructing  purely  and  simply  villages  and 
factories  and  farms.  In  the  changed  economic 
order  potent  reasons  may  develop  to  militate 
against  the  reconstruction  of  cities  on  the  same 
sites  or  on  the  same  scale.  It  was  urged  that 
beneficiaries,  therefore,  must  have  full  liberty 
to  dispose  of  the  sums  turned  over  to  them  as 
they  see  fit. 

As  regards  peace,  there  was  more  disposition 
in  the  early  days  of  1919  than  in  the  first  two 
years  of  the  war  to  sponsor  terms  which  the 
French  believe  will  contribute  to  stimulate  the 
industrial  and  economic  life  of  France.  Agri- 
cultural questions  were  put  in  the  background. 
The  French  want  France  to  become  what  she 
has  never  before  been,  a  great  exporter  of 
manufactured  products,  with  opportunities  to 
compete  in  the  world  markets  on  equal  terms 
with  other  nations.     The   deputies   and  news- 


132  France  and  Ourselves 

papers  and  chambers  of  commerce  of  a  dozen  de- 
partments, regarded  as  agricultural  before  the 
war,  supported  colonial  development  and  expan- 
sion, clamored  for  a  large  merchant  marine, 
championed  a  big  navy  program.  What  some 
foreign  observers  called  chauvinism  and  imper- 
ialism, born  of  victory  in  the  war,  was  really  the 
result  of  the  creation  of  industries  in  all  parts  of 
France  to  replace  those  of  the  North.  It  is 
true  that  in  many  regions  the  French  fear  the 
effect  of  the  war  upon  foreign  markets  for  lux- 
uries, especially  for  wines.  But  is  not  the  prin- 
cipal cause  the  unwillingness  of  those  who  have 
settled  in  cities  to  face  the  necessity  of  returning 
to  the  land? 

This  seems  to  be  proved  by  the  paradox  of 
virtually  unanimous  support  for  what  has  been 
termed  the  reactionary  attitude  of  the  French 
Government  toward  peace  at  a  time  when  Social- 
ism is  making  rapid  progress  in  France.  The 
Socialist  deputies  in  the  Chamber  and  the  Social- 
ist newspapers,  true  to  their  faith,  advocated  a 
peace  of  reconciliation,   and  were  enthusiastic 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         133 

about  the  Wilsonian  theories.  But  the  French 
proletariat  has  been  imbued  with  the  same  feel- 
ing, during  peace  negotiations,  that  led  the  Ger- 
man proletariat  to  support  the  Hohenzollern 
government  during  the  war — the  feeling  that  the 
well-being  of  working-classes  depends  in  a  large 
measure  upon  ability  to  export  under  the  most 
favorable  conditions.  Refugees  and  soldiers 
have  carried  their  doctrines  into  parts  of  France 
hitherto  unaffected  by  Socialist  political  propa- 
ganda. In  the  next  French  elections,  we  shall 
see  Socialist  candidates  gaining  ground  in  dis- 
tricts where  up  to  now  the  Socialists  polled  very 
few  votes.  But  this  does  not  mean  that  they 
will  secure  more  seats.  Quite  the  opposite  is 
likely  to  happen  this  year.  Public  opinion  is 
behind  Monsieur  Clemenceau  and  his  coadjutors. 
But  the  seed  will  have  been  sown  for  a  sweeping 
movement  to  the  Left  later. 

Another  symptom  of  the  new  spirit  created 
by  migratory  currents  is  the  changed  attitude  of 
the  French  toward  emigration.  The  aid  France 
received  from  African  and  Asiatic  colonials  was 


184  France  and  Ourselves 

not  greater  on  the  front  than  in  the  rear.  Ka- 
byles  from  southern  Algeria  swept  the  streets  and 
collected  the  garbage  of  Paris.  There  was  a 
large  influx  of  population  to  munition  centers 
and  ports  from  Senegal,  the  Sudan,  Algeria, 
Tunis,  Morocco,  Madagascar  and  Indo-China. 
Brest,  Nantes,  Bordeaux,  Marseilles,  Lyons, 
became  the  world's  meeting-places.  French 
employment  agents  scoured  Spain  and  Italy. 
Refugees  from  Serbia  were  received  cordially. 
All  over  France  one  finds  farms  worked  by  Ger- 
man prisoners,  and  garrisons  and  detachments  of 
English,  Americans,  Belgians,  Russians,  Cana- 
dians, South  Africans,  Australians,  Portuguese, 
Poles,  Czecho- Slovaks,  Armenians,  Syrians,  and 
Annamites.  Even  the  friendliest  of  tourists 
used  to  feel  instinctively  the  xenophobia  of  the 
French  provinces.  Hostility  to  strangers  has 
given  way  to  a  welcome  for  all.  Spaniards  and 
Italians  have  already  bought  farms  and  settled 
down.  In  some  agricultural  regions  I  have  no- 
ticed an  Italianization  similar  to  that  of  parts  of 
New  England. 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         135 

The  French  realize  their  weakness  to-day,  and 
the  fearful  handicap  for  the  future,  due  to  de- 
population. A  great  increase  in  natality,  even 
if  it  could  be  counted  upon,  would  not  remedy 
this  situation  for  many  years.  The  colonial  and 
foreign  elements  introduced  into  the  country  dur- 
ing the  war  will  be  needed  after  the  war.  Other 
parts  of  France  than  the  North  have  suffered 
nearly  as  much  from  internal  migratory  currents 
as  from  the  death  toll  of  the  war.  It  must  not 
be  forgotten,  also,  that  there  were  several  hun- 
dred thousand  Germans  and  Austro-Hungarians 
in  France  before  the  war  whose  business  ability 
and  energy  contributed  to  the  prosperity  of 
France.  And  the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
threatens  to  create  a  migratory  current  viewed 
with  anxiety  by  thoughtful  Frenchmen.  The 
German  element  is  being  expelled  from  the  re- 
gained provinces.  A  propaganda  is  on  foot, 
which  will  have  to  meet  with  success  if  France  is 
to  hold  what  she  has  taken  back,  to  turn  east- 
ward again  the  emigrants  who  left  Alsace-Lor- 
raine after  1871  out  of  loyalty  to  France.     This 


136  France  and  Ourselves 

may  lead  to  ruin  for  some  places  in  France.  The 
thriving  textile  town  of  Elbeuf,  on  the  Seine  be- 
tween Rouen  and  Havre,  is  an  example.  Its 
working  population  is  composed  of  Alsatians. 
If  the  Alsatians  leave  towns  like  Elbeuf,  the 
migratory  current  will  spell  disaster  in  the  same 
way  as  the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  did 
under  Louis  XIV. 

Consequently,  the  French  cannot  afford  to  look 
with  disfavor  upon  the  settlement  of  soldiers  and 
other  foreigners  in  France.  Most  of  all,  they 
place  their  hopes  in  the  Americans.  My  friends 
say,  "We  need  your  blood  and  energy.  We 
need  your  ideas.  We  have  lost  so  many  of  our 
own  youth  that  there  are  splendid  openings  for 
young  Americans.  And  they  can  marry  well 
here."  The  Frenchman  who  talks  this  way  has 
no  doubt  that  his  country  is  the  best  in  the  world 
and  he  is  sure  of  the  attraction  to  the  foreigner 
of  his  superior  civilization.  He  is  encouraged  by 
the  marriage  of  some  French  girls  to  English  and 
American  soldiers,  who  have  announced  their  in- 
tention of  remaining  in  France.     But  he  does 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         137 

not  realize  that  for  the  Englishman  as  well  as  for 
the  American  the  new  worlds,  mostly  under  the 
rule  of  Anglo- Saxondom,  furnish  opportunities 
for  youth  far  greater  than  France  and  without 
the  handicaps  of  crushing  taxation  and  obliga- 
tory military  service. 

Will  not  Franco-American  marriages  mean  a 
loss  instead  of  a  gain  to  France?  I  have  met 
many  American  officers  and  soldiers  who  have 
married  or  intend  to  marry  here.  But  not  one 
of  them  has  told  me  that  he  is  going  to  settle  in 
France!  There  are  stories  in  the  French  press 
of  two  hundred  thousand  Americans  remaining 
here  after  the  demobilization.  The  wish  is 
father  to  the  thought.  While  French  intellec- 
fuels  nourish  the  hope  of  new  blood  in  France, 
our  presence  here  is  awakening  the  impulse  to 
emigrate  to  America  that  the  French  have  never 
before  experienced  as  have  the  people  of  more 
densely  populated  European  countries.  The 
contact  with  American  soldiers  is  starting  a  mi- 
gratory current,  yes,  but  away  from  France,  not 
toward    France.     The   younger   generation    of 


13-8  France  and  Ourselves 

French  soldiers,  who  fought  side  by  side  with  the 
Americans,  and  the  boys  in  the  villages  where  our 
soldiers  have  been  encamped,  have  had  the  idea 
instilled  into  them  of  America  as  the  land  where 
one  is  free  from  long  military  service,  and  where 
one  can  earn  by  the  labor  of  his  hands  triple  or 
quadruple  what  one  could  hope  to  gain  by  any 
kind  of  work  in  France.  The  pay  of  our  sol- 
diers was  twenty  times  that  of  the  French  sol- 
diers. In  the  many  places  where  we  put  up 
warehouses  and  laid  out  ports  and  railway 
tracks,  the  French  saw  American  carpenters 
earning,  with  board  and  lodging  thrown  in, 
wages  larger  than  the  salary  of  a  city  postmaster, 
a  chief  of  police,  a  sub-prefect,  a  judge  of  the 
Court  of  Appeal,  or  the  rector  of  a  university. 

The  American  Expeditionary  Forces  will 
leave  few  stragglers  in  Europe.  Our  boys  will 
go  home  with  new  and  broader  vision,  but  with 
the  idea  they  brought  here  confirmed — that  the 
United  States  is  God's  country.  Migratory 
currents  of  American  origin,  born  of  our  inter- 
vention, will  take  place  within  the  borders  of  the 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         139 

United  States.  Will  not  army  and  industrial 
mobilization  have  results  in  America  similar  to 
those  we  have  observed  in  France?  The  tearing 
of  boys  and  men  away  from  their  homes,  and 
keeping  them  away  for  a  long  period  of  time,  will 
lead  to  widespread  changes  of  habitation.  The 
intensification  of  industries  will  increase  the  pop- 
ulation of  cities  and  denude  agricultural  districts. 
Schemes  that  have  been  set  forth  for  putting  the 
soldier  on  the  land  are  not  going  to  meet  with 
great  success.  Over  against  the  rare  soldier  from 
the  city  who,  having  learned  to  live  in  the  open, 
does  not  want  to  return  to  his  prison,  we  must 
put  the  country  soldier  to  whom  constant  asso- 
ciation with  large  numbers  of  men  has  been  a 
revelation  of  what  life  may  be.  And  must  we 
not  look  for  the  migratory  currents  created  by 
war  industries  to  arouse  an  interest  we  have  never 
before  had  in  world  markets,  thus  causing  us  to 
change  radically  our  foreign  policy? 

In  the  wake  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces  may  come  a  new  migratory  current  from 
Europe  to  America,  more  formidable  than  we 


140  France  and  Ourselves 

have  yet  had  to  cope  with.  The  devastation  of 
northern  France  and  a  part  of  Belgium  was 
not  unique.  Poland,  Lithuania,  East  Prussia, 
the  countries  of  the  Danube  and  the  Balkans, 
Russia  and  the  Ottoman  Empire,  have  been  rav- 
aged. Races  are  still  set  one  against  the  other. 
The  financial  burdens  laid  upon  every  European 
country  are  so  appalling  that  there  is  little  differ- 
ence in  the  economic  situation  of  victors,  van- 
quished, and  neutrals. 

The  victors  are  confronted  with  this  dilemma: 
If  they  attempt  to  get  their  war  expenses  out 
of  Germany,  they  will  have  to  continue  to  keep 
under  arms  all  of  their  young  manhood.  If  they 
do  not  demobilize  soon,  they  cannot  hope  for  a 
speedy  return  of  normal  economic  conditions. 
Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Belgium  have 
to  choose  between  the  burden  of  bearing  arms 
and  the  burden  of  paying  most  of  the  cost  of 
the  war  themselves.  In  either  case,  a  migratory 
current  to  escape  the  inevitable  aftermath  of  war 
will  be  started.  During  the  past  generation, 
Germany  not  only  held  a  rapidly  growing  popu- 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         141 

lation,  but  was  a  large  importer  of  labor.  Ital- 
ians now  find  another  outlet.  If  Germany,  as 
a  result  of  the  war,  finds  herself  deprived  of  her 
sources  of  wealth — iron  and  coal  and  world  mar- 
kets for  manufactured  products — and  saddled  to 
boot  with  taxation  that  means  economic  slavery, 
millions  of  Germans  will  try  to  emigrate.  In 
spite  of  the  glorious  future  promised  by  the  Con- 
ference of  Paris  to  emancipated  races  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  Russia,  one  has  the  right  to  be 
skeptical.  We  may  juggle  with  frontiers  as  we 
will.  But  we  cannot  get  away  from  the  economic 
laws  that  were  more  powerful  than  armies  and 
statesmen  in  forming  the  political  organic  units 
of  1914.  Experiments  in  creating  new  states  are 
likely  to  increase  rather  than  diminish  emigration 
from  eastern  Europe  to  America. 

Congress  proposes  to  prohibit  immigration 
during  a  period  of  four  years  after  the  signing  of 
peace.  Is  a  blanket  measure  of  this  character 
what  we  want  and  what  we  need?  Yes — if  we 
can  now  dispense  with  Europe's  contribution  to 
our  material  development.     No — if  increase  of 


142  France  and  Ourselves 

population  by  immigration  is  still  helpful  to  us. 
It  is  an  error  to  think  that  prohibition  for  a  lim- 
ited time  will  save  us  from  undesirable  elements. 
After  four  years  the  best  and  most  energetic  of 
the  new  migratory  current  will  have  found  its 
way  elsewhere.  Would  it  not  be  wiser  to  per- 
mit immigration  but  make  our  regulations  more 
stringent? 

We  have  always  handled  the  problem  of  entry 
into  the  United  States  stupidly  and  illogically, 
annoying  to  ourselves  and  to  the  immigrants. 
The  war  has  shown  us  the  way,  and  provided  us 
with  the  means,  of  suppressing  the  absurdity  of 
wholesale  detention  at  Ellis  Island.  As  a  war 
measure  we  are  demanding  a  passport,  with  the 
vise  of  an  American  consular  official,  of  every 
person  who  proposes  to  put  foot  on  American 
soil.  It  is  possible  to  continue  this  machinery 
after  the  war.  We  can  limit  the  granting  of 
vises  to  desirables.  The  applicant's  desirability 
can  best  be  determined  by  investigation  on  the 
spot  in  Europe. 

The  Parliaments  of  Great  Britain  and  the 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         143 

British  Dominions  are  as  keenly  alive  as  we  are 
to  the  necessity  of  being  ready  for  a  strong  mi- 
gratory current  from  continental  Europe.  Lon- 
don has  gone  farther  than  Washington,  and 
seems  inclined  to  follow  a  path  that  will  lead  to 
tremendous  consequences  for  Europe.  It  is  pro- 
posed at  Westminster  to  forbid  enemy  aliens  to 
enter  British  territory  for  an  indefinite  period 
and  to  deport  Germans,  Austrians,  and  Hungar- 
ians who  are  settled  in  the  British  Empire.  If 
this  proposal  is  carried  out,  other  nations,  nota- 
bly Brazil,  may  follow  the  precedent  set  by  the 
British.  Deportation  of  Germans  from  British 
territory  would  create  a  forced  migratory  cur- 
rent as  great  as  that  which  is  already  flowing  out 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  Prussian  Poland.  It  is 
unlikely  that  the  ousted  Germans  will  find  it  pos- 
sible to  settle  in  their  country  of  origin.  Where 
will  they  go,  and  in  what  direction  will  the  mi- 
gratory current  from  Germany  flow  ?  Will  pub- 
lic sentiment  in  America  bar  Germans  and  influ- 
ence Central  and  South  American  countries  to 
adopt  the  same  policy?    Upon  the  answer  to 


144  France  and  Ourselves 

these  questions  depends,  in  a  very  large  measure, 
the  influence  of  the  war  of  1914-1918  upon 
twentieth-century  Europe.  Nothing  is  more 
certain  than  that  we  cannot  bottle  up,  under  ad- 
verse economic  conditions,  the  eighty  million 
Germans  of  central  Europe  in  a  German  state 
narrowed  down  to  its  ethnographical  limits. 
Even  if  we  gave  back  to  Germany  her  colonies, 
they  would  not  support  a  large  white  population. 
Do  we  not  have  to  choose,  then,  between  sharing 
with  the  German  race  the  development  of  Africa, 
the  two  Americas,  and  Australia,  and  seeing  the 
Germans  overflow  into  eastern  Europe  and  Asia? 
In  December,  1914,  in  the  office  of  a  great  elec- 
trical manufacturing  concern  of  Berlin,  I  was 
interviewing  one  of  the  chief  promoters  in  Ger- 
many of  rapprochement  with  Great  Britain.  I 
had  come  to  get  his  version  of  the  causes  of  the 
war.  "Why  is  Germany  fighting?"  he  cried, 
jumping  up  from  his  desk.  "I  can  put  it  in  one 
sentence.  We  were  nervous  to  the  breaking- 
point  over  the  Westward-Ho  preparation  of  the 
Slavs."     In  expanding  his  thesis,  the  German 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         145 

explained  the  war  by  migratory  currents.  Rus- 
sia was  pressing  Germany.  So  Germany  had  to 
press  France  and  Belgium.  Great  Britain  was 
afraid  she  would  be  pressed  in  turn.  I  suppose 
that  if  I  had  met  this  manufacturer-philosopher 
again  after  we  had  entered  the  war,  he  would 
have  explained  our  intervention  in  the  same  way ! 
Some  Americans  did.  Were  not  we  to  be  at- 
tacked next? 

Would  it  be  a  strange  ending  for  a  war  caused 
by  German  fear  of  a  Slav  migratory  current 
westward,  to  have  a  German  migratory  current 
eastward?  Not  at  all!  The  greatest  wars  in 
Europe  were  due  to  migratory  currents  from  the 
east  and  north  seeking  a  way  out  to  the  Atlantic 
and  Mediterranean.  We  read  that  "civilization" 
was  saved  every  time  by  the  races  of  the  west  and 
south  stemming  the  migratory  current.  The 
French  claim  to-day  that  they  must  go  back  to 
the  Rhine,  as  they  have  done  in  the  past,  in  order 
to  prevent  a  renewal  of  German  aggression. 
But  the  Eastern  menace  is  relative.  The  Ger- 
mans have  gone  eastward  to  stem  the  Slav  tide. 


146  France  and  Ourselves 

And  at  the  time  of  her  war  with  Japan,  did  not 
Russia  try  to  gain  the  sympathies  of  the  world  by 
claiming  that  her  presence  in  Vladivostok  and 
Port  Arthur  was  essential  to  save  Europe  from 
the  yellow  peril? 

"The  world  is  not  changed,''  says  the  pessimist 
with  a  sigh.  "History  repeats  itself.  Human 
nature  is  always  the  same."  Platitudes!  What 
is  being  said  over  and  over  again  in  Paris  salons 
is,  I  am  told,  being  said  just  as  often  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Atlantic.  Let  us  put  over  against 
them  the  words  of  Phillips  Brooks,  as  much  gos- 
pel truth  to-day  as  when  they  were  spoken  a  gen- 
eration ago  from  a  Boston  pulpit: 

The  real  question  everywhere  is  whether  the  world, 
distracted  and  confused  as  everybody  sees  that  it  is, 
is  going  to  be  patched  up  and  restored  to  what  it  used 
to  be,  or  whether  it  is  going  forward  into  a  quite  new 
and  different  kind  of  life,  whose  exact  nature  nobody 
can  pretend  to  foretell,  but  which  is  to  be  distinctly 
new,  unlike  the  life  of  any  age  the  world  has  seen  al- 
ready. It  is  impossible  that  the  old  conditions,  so 
bruised  and  broken,  can  ever  be  repaired  and  stand  just 
as  they  stood  before. 


Human  Currents  of  the  War         147 

In  the  backward  and  forward  movement  of 
migratory  currents  in  Europe,  racial  elements 
have  been  steadily  absorbed  or  united  to  form  in- 
creasingly larger  political  organisms.  In  the 
overflow  to  extra-European  countries,  new  na- 
tions have  been  created.  Racial  antagonism  and 
intense  nationalism  are  the  aftermath  of  wars 
only  to  superficial  observers  who  cannot  see  far- 
ther than  the  end  of  their  noses,  only  to  oppor- 
tunist statesmen  who  mistake  passing  symptoms 
for  permanent  conditions. 

A  mother  once  said  to  me :  "I  have  come  to 
dread  the  day  my  babies  learn  to  walk." 
"Why?"  I  asked.  "Because  they  can  go  away 
from  me,"  she  said.  The  status  quo  is  a  comfort- 
able condition.  But  it  exists  only  in  infancy  and 
decrepitude.  Between  the  beginning  and  the 
end  of  life,  there  is  the  migratory  instinct. 
When  this  world  of  ours  hears  the  trumpet  of  the 
Angel  Gabriel,  and  not  until  then,  shall  we  be  in 
a  position  no  longer  to  reckon  with  evolution. 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  ATTITUDE   OF  FRANCE  TOWARD   PEACE1 


rXURING  the  first  month  of  its  activities  the 
-*— *  Peace  Conference  showed  unanimity  only 
in  the  choice  of  Premier  Clemenceau  for  presi- 
dent. This  was  more  than  a  personal  tribute  to 
the  man  who  led  France  to  victory.  It  was  the 
recognition  on  the  part  of  the  Allied  nations, 
great  and  small,  of  the  unique  claim  of  France  to 
first  consideration  in  the  solution  of  the  problems 
of  peace.  Proportionately  as  well  as  actually, 
France  is  the  power  which  has  made  the  greatest 
sacrifices  in  blood  and  treasure.  From  the  first 
days  of  the  war  the  fighting  was  largely  on 
French  soil.  In  her  hour  of  triumph  France 
faces  economic  disaster  through  the  ruin  of  her 
richest  industrial  and  mining  regions.     Of  all 

i  April,  1919. 

148 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     149 

the  warring  nations,  France  could  afford  least 
the  terrible  toll  in  young  manhood. 

The  Peace  Conference  has  brought  to  Paris  a 
host  of  journalists  from  Anglo-Saxon  countries. 
Few  of  them  have  been  in  Paris  before,  and  there 
is  a  tendency  among  them  to  pass  hasty  judg- 
ment upon  the  attitude  of  France  toward  peace. 
If  what  they  write  finds  general  acceptance  in 
the  British  Empire  and  the  United  States,  the 
effect  will  be  deplorable.  The  more  background 
one  has — background  of  intimate  association  with 
the  French  before  and  during  the  war — the  more 
one  hesitates  to  attempt  an  analysis  of  France's 
state  of  mind  in  the  hour  of  victory.  But  the 
analysis  must  be  made  in  order  to  counteract  the 
impression  which  is  going  abroad  that  the  French 
people  are  hostile  to  the  construction  of  a  new 
world  on  the  basis  of  what  is  coming  to  be  known 
in  peace-conference  circles  as  "the  American 
point  of  view." 

Imperialistic  and  chauvinistic  elements  are  at 
work  in  France,  as  in  all  other  countries,  to  make 
an  old-fashioned  peace  in  which  the  spoils  will  be 


150  France  and  Ourselves 

to  the  victors.  Reactionary  influences  are  more 
apparent  among  the  French  than  among  the 
British  and  Americans.  They  seem  to  possess 
more  power.  They  have  wider  and  franker 
newspaper  support.  And  one  finds  very  few 
Frenchmen  who  are  willing  to  champion  without 
reservations  President  Wilson's  program  for 
peace. 

Seeing  these  surface  indications,  many  who 
have  come  to  report  the  Peace  Conference  are 
filled  with  amazement  and  disgust.  They  are 
impatient  with  the  French  for  not  falling  into 
line  immediately  with  the  American  program.  I 
am  sorry  to  find  so  little  inclination  to  try  to  get 
a  sympathetic  understanding  of  the  French  atti- 
tude, so  little  effort  to  study  the  problems  con- 
fronting France,  and  to  appreciate  their  com- 
plexity and  intricacy. 

And  yet  it  is  not  difficult  to  explain  the  dis- 
trust, if  not  actual  antagonism,  of  the  French,  in 
the  opening  days  of  the  Peace  Conference,  to  our 
idealistic  program.  In  the  first  place,  French 
mentality  is  different  from  ours.     The  French 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     151 

are  less  given  than  we  to  generalizations,  and  they 
do  not  have  the  Anglo-Saxon  ability  of  self- 
deception.  If  the  French  are  less  sure  of  the 
infallibility  of  their  judgments,  it  is  not  because 
they  are  more  cynical  than  we,  but  because  they 
are  less  naive.  In  the  second  place,  France 
views  the  present  situation  and  the  peace  settle- 
ment from  a  European-Continental  point  of 
view.  America  and  most  of  the  British  Domin- 
ions have  oceans  between  them  and  Europe. 
Great  Britain  is  an  island  world  power  whose  in- 
terests are  largely  extra-European.  Since  the 
German  Navy  has  disappeared  and  the  path  to 
India  is  no  longer  menaced,  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
and  his  associates  have  changed  their  attitude  to- 
ward Mr.  Wilson.  The  entire  Anglo-Saxon 
world  is  able  to  view  the  actual  and  future  state 
of  central  and  eastern  Europe  with  an  equanim- 
ity and  a  detachment  that  no  Frenchman  can 
feel. 

From  sheltered  positions  across  the  seas  and 
on  an  island  that  has  not  been  invaded  for  eight 
hundred  years,  we  Anglo-Saxons  of  Great  Brit- 


152  France  and  Ourselves 

ain,  the  United  States,  and  the  Dominions,  could 
go  to  the  Peace  Conference  with  splendid  ideas 
of  world  reconstruction,  and  could  call  upon  the 
nations  of  the  world  to  deliberate  first  of  all  upon 
the  society  of  nations,  with  the  disposition  of 
Germany's  colonial  empire  as  the  initial  practical 
test  of  our  plan.  And  at  the  same  time  we  could 
calmly  proceed  with  the  rapid  demobilization  of 
our  armed  forces.  But  we  should  not  have  been 
surprised  or  aggrieved  when  Monsieur  Clemen- 
ceau  and  his  associates  (and  the  French  press 
and  nation  behind  them)  demurred.  The 
French  delegates  demanded  that  the  Peace  Con- 
ference put  at  the  head  of  its  program  the  impo- 
sition of  terms  of  peace  on  Germany  and  the  re- 
establishment  of  order  in  Russia. 

The  entire  French  nation  has  been  under  arms 
for  four  and  a  half  years.  Northern  France  is 
in  a  lamentable  state.  There  is  economic  chaos 
in  Belgium,  which  threatens  the  stability  of  the 
Government.  Germany  remains  strong  enough 
to  render  imprudent  the  demobilization  of  the 
French  Army.     Bolshevism  is  spreading  west- 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     153 

ward.  If  the  Entente  nations  continue  to  keep 
millions  under  arms,  and  do  not  soon  begin  to 
center  their  thought  and  effort  upon  industry  and 
commerce,  serious  social  unrest  is  bound  to  ap- 
pear. From  a  world  point  of  view  the  French 
may  not  be  logical  in  asking  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence to  decide  first  of  all  the  details  of  the  settle- 
ment with  Germany,  and  to  assume  immediately 
international  responsibility  for  restoring  order 
in  Russia ;  but  from  the  French  point  of  view,  is 
any  other  course  open  to  Monsieur  Clemenceau 
and  his  associates? 

One  may  say  without  hesitation,  also,  that  the 
weakness  and  irresolution  shown  in  the  first  ses- 
sions of  the  Peace  Conference  have  not  reassured 
the  French  regarding  the  possibility  of  creating 
on  the  spot  the  society  of  nations.  By  consent- 
ing to  the  formation  of  a  close  corporation,  with 
several  other  statesmen  to  run  the  conference, 
Mr.  Wilson  has  revealed  the  inconsistency  be- 
tween his  words  and  his  actions.  The  initial 
plenary  meeting  of  the  conference  was  perfunc- 
tory and  colorless.     The  second  plenary  meeting 


154  France  and  Ourselves 

ended  in  vehement  protests  from  the  representa- 
tives of  the  small  nations,  in  which  Premier  Bor- 
den of  Canada  joined,  against  the  intention  of 
the  five  great  powers  to  dictate  the  principles  of 
representation  and  the  methods  of  procedure. 

From  the  beginning  it  became  evident  that 
Great  Britain,  the  United  States,  France,  Italy, 
and  Japan  had  decided  to  make  the  important 
decisions  in  secret  sessions,  to  which  representa- 
tives of  the  other  states  would  be  invited  only  in 
a  consultative  capacity  when  problems  affecting 
their  particular  interests  were  involved.  China, 
with  her  four  hundred  millions,  is  a  "secondary 
state."  The  eighty  million  Germans  of  central 
Europe,  and  over  two  hundred  million  Russians, 
Lithuanians,  Ukrainians,  Hungarians,  Bulga- 
rians, Turks,  Greeks,  Armenians,  and  Egyp- 
tians, whose  interests  in  the  decisions  of  the  Peace 
Conference  are  most  vitally  affected,  are  not  rep- 
resented at  all.  The  advice  of  neutral  states  con- 
cerning the  organization  of  the  world  league, 
which  they  will  be  supposed  to  join,  is  not  asked. 

Is  it  any  wonder  that  the  French,  however 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace    155 

sympathetic  with  the  idea  of  a  society  of  na- 
tions, have  little  immediate  interest  in  high- 
sounding  phrases  when  they  feel  themselves  on 
the  edge  of  a  volcano?  Put  yourself  in  the 
Frenchman's  place.  In  one  column  of  his  morn- 
ing newspaper  he  reads  that  Lille,  four  months 
after  the  armistice,  is  still  without  food  and  coal 
and  adequate  transportation  for  the  renewal  of 
her  industrial  life.  The  next  column  informs 
him  that  Premier  Clemenceau  is  presiding  over 
meetings  where  Japan  and  China  quarrel  about 
Kiao-chau,  and  Australia  puts  forth  claims  to 
Samoa.  The  official  bulletin  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference announces  vaguely  that  the  future  of 
Germany's  African  colonies  is  being  discussed, 
but  no  step  has  been  taken  to  establish  peace  be- 
tween France  and  Germany,  and  the  conference 
has  postponed  action  on  the  Russian  question, 
pending  the  improbable  acceptance  of  its  invita- 
tion by  the  Bolshevists  and  other  factions  to  a 
meeting  in  the  Sea  of  Marmora.  As  for  Poland, 
whose  army  of  less  than  a  hundred  thousand  is 
facing  disaster  through  lack  of  ammunition  and 


156  France  and  Ourselves 

reinforcements,  the  five  big  powers  have  sent  a 
commission  to  Warsaw  to  find  out  what  is  already 
known  in  every  newspaper  office  in  Paris.  And 
the  Turks  keep  on  merrily  massacring  the  rem- 
nant of  the  Armenians.  This  is  the  situation  in 
February,  1919. 

Without  impugning  the  advisability  or  possi- 
bility of  establishing  a  durable  world  peace 
through  the  adoption  of  "the  American  pro- 
gram," public  opinion  in  France  asks  that  ques- 
tions be  discussed  and  decisions  made  in  the  fol- 
lowing order:  (1)  settlement  with  Germany 
and  suppression  of  Bolshevism;  (2)  creation  of 
Poland  and  Czecho- Slovakia;  (3)  Danubian, 
Adriatic,  and  Balkan  settlements;  (4)  Baltic  and 
Russian  settlements ;  ( 5 )  liquidation  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire;  (6)  Asiatic  and  African  problems; 
(7)  general  world  questions,  including  the  so- 
ciety of  nations. 

There  are  wide  differences  of  opinion  about 
how  these  questions  should  be  solved,  but  as  far 
as  I  have  been  able  to  ascertain  from  intimate 
contact  with  all  classes  in  France,  there  is  una- 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     157 

nimity  in  regard  to  order  of  solution.  I  find 
doubt  only  in  regard  to  the  order  of  (6)  and  (7) . 
Many  Frenchmen  are  willing  to  admit  that  deci- 
sions regarding  Asiatic  and  African  problems 
ought  to  follow  the  formation  of  the  society  of 
nations,  but  all  include  the  Ottoman  Empire 
within  the  sphere  of  the  general  European  settle- 
ment which  must  precede  the  society  of  nations. 
If  you  point  out  to  your  French  friends  the 
American  belief  that  the  solution  of  all  debatable 
questions  would  be  different,  easier  to  reach,  more 
satisfactory  to  those  interested,  more  in  accord- 
ance with  justice,  more  permanent,  if  we  al- 
ready have  our  society  of  nations  as  a  working 
international  organism,  they  will  agree  with  you. 
They  will  say  that  you  are  logical,  and  that  Presi- 
dent Wilson  is  voicing  their  hearts'  desire;  but 
they  add  that  security  is  France's  immediate  and 
pressing  need,  and  that  after  the  experiences  of 
the  last  generation  no  Frenchman  would  consent 
to  subordinate  practical  and  necessary  measures 
of  security  to  theories  that  might  not  work  out. 
Is  the  French  attitude  unreasonable?     Why  in- 


158  France  and  Ourselves 

terpret  it  as  hostility  to  the  American  program? 
The  Frenchman  says,  "Safety  first." 

In  the  French  mind,  the  suppression  of  Bolshe- 
vism must  be  undertaken  by  the  Allied  nations 
coincident  with  the  imposition  of  terms  of  peace 
upon  Germany.  For  if  we  conclude  peace  with 
Germany  while  a  state  of  anarchy  is  raging  in 
eastern  Europe,  Germany  will  still  have  an  op- 
portunity to  come  out  of  the  war  victorious. 
The  French  are  more  afraid  now  than  they  were 
during  the  war  of  the  German  plan  to  subjugate 
economically,  if  not  politically,  eastern  Europe. 
A  strong  Poland,  and  the  former  Baltic  Prov- 
inces wholly  free  from  German  influence,  are  re- 
garded by  Frenchmen  as  vital  necessities  for 
safeguarding  the  future  of  their  own  country. 
Bolshevism  has  already  penetrated  the  Baltic 
Provinces  and  menaces  Poland.  As  it  seems 
likely  that  the  dissolution  of  the  Hapsburg  Em- 
pire will  bring  about  the  union  of  the  German 
portions  of  Austria  with  Germany,  the  French 
cannot  conceive  of  security  for  themselves  in  any 
other  way  than  by  having  something  substantial 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     159 

in  the  East  to  replace  the  Russian  alliance.  No 
Frenchman  forgets  that  France  after  the  war, 
even  with  Alsace-Lorraine,  will  have  to  face  a 
Germany  twice  as  large  in  population  as  France, 
and  probably  more  closely  knit  together  than  un- 
der the  Hohenzollerns.  France  feels,  therefore, 
that  she  cannot  rely  solely  upon  the  guaranties 
afforded  her  by  the  projected  society  of  nations 
against  the  possibility  of  a  renewal  of  German 
aggression. 

It  is  with  these  considerations  in  mind  that  we 
must  interpret  the  speeches  of  Monsieur  Pichon 
and  Monsieur  Clemenceau  to  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  just  before  the  opening  of  the  Peace 
Conference.  The  members  of  the  American 
commission  to  negotiate  peace  and  the  journalists 
who  accompanied  them  to  Paris  were  dismayed 
at  the  "old-fashioned"  ideas  of  Monsieur  Pichon, 
which  seemed  to  indicate  that  nothing  was 
changed  in  the  aims  and  methods  of  European 
diplomacy.  They  were  aghast  when  they  con- 
trasted the  statements  of  Premier  Clemenceau 
and  President  Wilson,  made  on  the  same  day. 


160  France  and  Ourselves 

Premier  Clemenceau  told  the  Chamber  of  Depu- 
ties that  he  was  still  a  partizan  of  "the  balance  of 
power,"  and  that  if  the  nations  banded  against 
Germany  had  been  allies  in  1914,  Germany- 
would  not  have  dared  to  attack  France.  He 
admitted  frankly  that  he  could  not  discuss  with 
the  Chamber  the  Government's  ideas  about  terms 
of  peace,  because  he  had  a  maximum  and  a  mini- 
mum program,  and  was  going  into  the  Peace 
Conference  to  get  for  France  all  he  could.  At 
the  same  moment  President  Wilson,  speaking  in 
England,  declared  that  "the  balance  of  power" 
was  an  exploded  theory,  that  the  United  States 
would  enter  into  no  alliance  which  was  not  an 
alliance  of  all  nations,  and  that  the  creation  of  a 
new  world  required  new  methods. 

The  apparent  irreconcilability  between  the 
French  and  American  points  of  view  need  not 
discourage  us,  for  the  French  Premier  and  the 
American  President  based  their  conclusions  upon 
different  premises.  Premier  Clemenceau  was 
thinking  of  the  particular  interests  of  France  at 
the   present   moment.     President    Wilson   was 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     161 

thinking  of  the  general  interests  of  mankind  in 
the  future.  Once  we  are  able  to  give  France 
definite  and  tangible  assurances  of  speedy  eco- 
nomic rehabilitation  and  genuine  security  against 
the  renewal  of  German  aggression,  we  shall  find 
Premier  Clemenceau  and  every  other  Frenchman 
sympathetic  and  enthusiastic  in  championship  of 
the  American  program  for  a  durable  world 
peace. 

We  have  not  the  monopoly  of  liberalism  and 
idealism.  There  is  nothing  new  in  President 
Wilson's  * 'fourteen  points  and  subsequent  dis- 
courses." One  finds  in  the  writings  of  a  dozen 
Europeans,  including  several  Frenchmen,  every- 
thing that  President  Wilson  has  said  about  meth- 
ods for  establishing  universal  peace.  Men  as 
different  in  character  and  environment  and  epoch 
as  Sully  and  Kant  have  dreamed  of  the  society 
of  nations,  as  Grotius  and  Czar  Nicholas  II  have 
proposed  to  substitute  arbitration  for  war,  as  St. 
Paul  and  Karl  Marx  have  proclaimed  the  gospel 
of  internationalism.  What  Americans  are  talk- 
ing about  at  the  Hotel  Crillon  to-day  was  dis- 


162  France  and  Ourselves 

cussed  in  much  the  same  manner  in  the  same  city 
by  the  Jacobins. 

From  the  windows  of  the  Hotel  Crillon  our 
earnest  Americans  look  out  upon  the  spot  where 
were  enacted  the  scenes  that  drowned  in  blood 
the  fair  hopes  of  the  equally  earnest  Jacobins. 
Just  across  the  Seine,  also  within  view  of  the 
guillotine  emplacements,  President  Wilson  is 
advancing  his  program  in  the  closed  sessions  of 
the  "Big  Five."  While  he  speaks,  soldiers  of 
the  army  of  which  he  is  the  commander-in-chief 
are  being  shot  down  in  northern  Russia  by  men 
who  sincerely  believe  they  are  fighting  in  defense 
of  the  principles  President  Wilson  is  declaring. 
And  Czecho-Slovaks  and  Poles  and  Ukrainians 
are  executing  the  American  program  for  peace 
by  cutting  one  another's  throats  in  Silesia  and 
Galicia.  Invoking  Wilson's  "fourteen  points," 
the  Jugo- Slavs  are  feverishly  drilling  and  equip- 
ping an  army  to  fall  upon  the  Italians. 

The  American  commission  to  negotiate  peace 
has  to  learn  how  to  work  in  the  Old  World  atmos- 
phere.    We  Americans  are  temperamentally  im- 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     163 

patient.  We  think  quickly  and  comprehen- 
sively. The  spell  of  the  goal  is  upon  us.  It  has 
frequently  occurred  in  our  fighting  over  here 
that  an  American  regiment  would  push  forward 
to  capture  a  position  regardless  of  the  enemy  on 
the  right  and  left.  Success  has  sometimes  met 
efforts  of  this  kind.  On  other  occasions  rashness 
and  superabundance  of  confidence  have  led  us 
into  a  bad  hole.  In  our  fight  for  the  right  sort  of 
a  peace  the  risk  of  failure  is  in  following  these 
tactics. 

At  heart  very  few  people  in  the  Allied  coun- 
tries are  out  of  sympathy  with  the  American  pro- 
gram for  peace,  which  none  denies  is  the  best 
program  proposed  for  the  solution  of  the  prob- 
lems confronting  the  conference  of  Paris ;  but  we 
risk  compromising  the  success  of  our  cause  by 
failing  to  appreciate,  as  our  Allies  appreciate 
them,  the  obstacles  to  be  faced  and  overcome. 
Reactionary  and  imperialistic  forces  are  deep- 
rooted  and  tenacious,  but  we  have  the  reasonable 
hope  of  winning  and  keeping  the  support  of  Eu- 
ropean public  opinion  if  we  view  with  tolerance 


164  France  and  Ourselves 

and  treat  with  consideration  the  traditional  cur- 
rents of  European  thought.  But  if,  inspired  by 
particular  interests  or  by  past  experience,  we  try 
to  ride  roughshod  over  the  objections  raised  to 
the  application  of  our  principles,  we  shall  run 
into  machine-gun  fire  on  our  flanks  and  behind 
us. 

Misunderstandings  and  fruitless  controversy 
can  be  avoided  by  adapting  ourselves  to  Old 
World  methods  of  approaching  problems.  Let 
us  refuse  to  see  evidences  of  megalomania  and 
imperialism  in  the  demands  of  the  French  dele- 
gates, and  let  us  examine  and  weigh  and  discuss 
the  French  propositions  from  the  point  of  view 
of  loyal  friends  of  France,  whose  first  thought  is 
to  establish  a  peace  that  will  rehabilitate  France 
and  safeguard  France  in  the  future.  When  we 
are  sure  that  we  understand  the  attitude  of  the 
French  people  toward  peace,  then  we  are  ready 
to  see  if  we  cannot  reconcile  our  world  program 
with  the  real  interests  of  our  ally. 

The  demands  of  France  against  Germany  and 
her  allies  were  outlined  in  the  first  year  of  the  war 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     165 

as  follows:  (1)  punishment  of  those  responsible 
for  the  war;  (2)  reparation  for  losses  during  the 
war;  (3)  guaranties  against  future  aggression 
on  the  part  of  Germany  and  her  allies.  In  addi- 
tion to  these  war  aims,  French  statesmen  consist- 
ently announced  the  determination  of  France  to 
support  similar  demands  by  France's  allies,  and 
to  sign  no  treaty  of  peace  which  did  not  emanci- 
pate the  nationalities  subject  to  the  enemies  of 
France.  In  the  course  of  the  war  the  French 
Government  entered  into  agreements  with  sev- 
eral of  the  Allies,  justified  as  war  measures  that 
seemed  necessary  in  order  to  bring  the  war  to  a 
successful  conclusion.  After  the  Russian  Revo- 
lution the  French  Government  promised  the'  peo- 
ple to  safeguard  French  investments  in  Russia. 
In  the  preliminary  discussions  with  President 
Wilson  and  in  the  opening  sessions  of  the  Peace 
Conference,  Premier  Clemenceau  declared  the 
willingness  of  France  to  adopt  the  American 
program  in  its  entirety,  including  the  society  of 
nations ;  but  he  made  it  clear  that  this  willingness 
should  not  be  construed  as  the  abandonment  of 


166  France  and  Ourselves 

the  threefold  program,  sanctions,  reparations, 
securites.  Nor  could  France  go  back  upon  her 
signature  to  treaties  and  her  promise  to  her  own 
people  concerning  Russian  investments. 

The  question  of  punishments  is  more  sentimen- 
tal than  practical.  Although  there  is  in  France 
a  strong  feeling  that  steps  should  be  taken  to 
bring  before  the  bar  of  world  justice  the  respon- 
sible authors  of  the  war  and  those  who  were 
guilty  of  crimes  against  internationl  law  during 
the  war,  France  has  no  peculiar  or  intractable  at- 
titude on  this  question.  The  Peace  Conference 
has  appointed  a  commission  to  look  into  the  ad- 
visability  and  possibility  of  punishments,  and  the 
French  will  accept  its  decisions,  whatever  they 
may  be. 

France  is  not  involved  alone  in  the  secret 
treaties.  Great  Britain  was  a  signatory  to  the 
agreement  with  Italy,  and  the  other  agreements 
are  between  France  and  Great  Britain.  If 
some  acceptable  way  out  can  be  found,  France 
will  gladly  forego  the  execution  of  these  treaties. 

The  emancipation  of  subject  nationalities  is 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     167 

unanimously  adopted  by  all  the  nations  repre- 
sented at  the  Conference  of  Paris,  and  the  status 
of  the  emancipated  races,  with  the  exception  of 
Syria  and  Armenia,  will  be  determined  without 
France  advancing  special  claims  and  interests. 

French  investments  in  Russia  amount  to  more 
than  twenty-two  billion  francs,  but  France  will 
be  willing  to  agree  to  whatever  decision  the  Peace 
Conference  may  take  on  this  subject. 

There  remain  the  two  questions  of  reparations 
and  guaranties.  In  the  solution  of  these  one 
finds  all  the  difficulties  that  are  likely  to  arise 
between  France  and  other  nations,  especially  be- 
tween France  and  the  United  States,  at  the 
Peace  Conference. 

France  views  the  question  of  reparations  as 
one  which  is  vital  to  the  very  existence  of  the 
nation.  Shortly  before  the  armistice  Premier 
Clemenceau  stated  that  France  would  exact  from 
Germany  payment  of  the  bill  of  damages  to  the 
last  cent.  When  the  Entente  powers,  by  the 
memorandum  of  Versailles,  announced  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson  their  willingness  to  receive  an  offer 


168  France  and  Ourselves 

of  armistice  from  Germany,  and  to  treat  for 
peace  on  the  basis  of  President  Wilson's  "four- 
teen points  and  subsequent  discourses,"  there  was 
a  specific  statement  about  reparations.  The 
French  claim  that  Germany,  when  she  solicited 
the  armistice,  accepted  this  important  reserva- 
tion in  the  application  of  the  "fourteen  points 
and  subsequent  discourses." 

If  you  say  to  a  Frenchman,  "The  Entente 
powers  and  the  United  States  have  assumed  be- 
fore the  world  the  obligation  of  making  peace 
along  lines  of  strict  conformity  in  every  detail  to 
the  principles  we  have  agreed  upon,"  he  will  an- 
swer, "Yes,  but  only  in  so  far  as  the  application 
of  the  principles  does  not  prevent  our  collecting 
the  bill  of  damages  Germany  must  pay  us."  The 
French  cannot  admit  that,  after  the  sacrifices 
they  consented  to  make  up  to  the  day  of  victory, 
France  should  come  out  of  the  Peace  Conference 
impoverished  and  unable  to  hold  her  own  eco- 
nomically against  a  united  and  still  rich  post- 
bellum  Germany.  The  danger  of  a  Pyrrhic  vic- 
tory is  real  to  them,  and  they  believe  that  France 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     169 

is  not  called  upon  to  waive  her  claims  for  repara- 
tions, or  accept  uncertain  security  for  the  pay- 
ment of  her  bill  of  damages,  in  order  to  make 
easier  the  formation  of  the  society  of  nations. 

How  is  France  to  receive  adequate  compensa- 
tion from  Germany?  When  the  amount  Ger- 
many owes  France  is  fixed  by  the  commission  on 
reparations  recently  appointed  by  the  Peace  Con- 
ference, are  the  French  delegates  justified  in 
accepting  simply  a  blanket  assurance  from  the 
society  of  nations  that  Germany  will  pay  fully 
and  promptly  the  amounts  assessed?  A  creditor 
has  a  right  to  pass  upon  the  nature  of  the  securi- 
ties and  to  safeguard  amply  his  interests.  Ger- 
many does  not  possess  sufficient  wealth  to  com- 
pensate France  for  the  injuries  done  to  France 
during  the  war,  and  the  French  point  out  that 
much  of  the  destruction  wrought  in  northern 
France  has  been  the  cariying  out  of  a  deliberate 
plan  to  ruin  France  industrially,  and  to  render 
her  for  the  next  generation,  even  though  victori- 
ous on  the  field  of  battle,  inferior  to  Germany  in 
international  industrial  competition.     If  France 


170  France  and  Ourselves 

asks  for  a  Lorraine  frontier  farther  north  than 
that  of  1870,  for  the  acquisition  of  some  of  Ger- 
many's colonies,  for  a  favored  position  in  Syria, 
and  for  the  creation  of  a  special  regime  in  regard 
to  the  German  provinces  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine,  she  bases  her  claims  on  the  ground  of  repa- 
rations. "We  are  not  imperialistic,  nor  are  we 
affected  with  megalomania,"  declare  the  French. 
"We  want  to  have  in  our  own  hands  the  means 
of  compensating  ourselves  for  the  losses  incurred 
in  the  war.  If  we  do  not  have  these  securities, 
the  existence  of  France  will  be  jeopardized." 

This  is  France's  attitude  toward  peace  in  so  far 
as  reparations  are  concerned.  We  may  think 
that  France's  interests  will  be  safeguarded  and 
that  France  can  be  assured  of  equality  with  Ger- 
many in  post-bellum  industrial  competition  with- 
out annexation  of  German  territory,  without  a 
special  regime  for  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine, 
and  without  increasing  her  colonial  domain;  but 
is  not  the  burden  of  proof  on  us?  If  we  refuse 
to  agree  to  the  French  program  for  reparations, 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     171 

must  we  not  be  in  a  position  to  offer  France  a 
satisfactory  and  certain  alternative? 

Now  for  France's  attitude  toward  peace  in  so 
far  as  guaranties  against  a  renewal  of  German 
aggression  are  concerned.  Last  summer,  when 
the  issue  of  the  war  was  still  in  doubt,  I  was  lec- 
turing to  the  recruits  of  the  class  of  1919  in  a 
Brittany  garrison  town.  I  had  the  honor  of 
being  accompanied  by  the  general  commanding 
the  region.  He  told  me  that  he  always  impressed 
upon  the  drill  officers  the  necessity  of  instructing 
the  boys  in  more  than  methods  of  fighting. 

"We  French,"  he  explained,  "are  extremely 
individualistic.  The  sacrifices  we  are  making  in 
this  war  are  not  blind  sacrifices.  When  we  fight, 
we  want  to  know  not  only  how  to  fight,  but  why 
we  fight.     I  shall  give  you  an  illustration." 

We  were  standing  in  the  middle  of  a  hollow 
square.  The  general  looked  out  over  the  eager 
young  faces,  and  told  the  captain  of  the  company 
to  call  a  boy  from  the  ranks.  The  soldier  came 
up  and  saluted. 


172  France  and  Ourselves 

"My  little  one,"  said  the  general,  "how  many 
times  in  a  hundred  years  has  Germany  invaded 
France?" 

"Eighteen-fourteen,  eighteen-fifteen,  eighteen- 
seventy,  nineteen-fourteen,  my  general,"  an- 
swered the  recruit. 

As  he  looks  to  the  decisions  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference, these  four  invasions  are  present  in  the 
mind  of  every  Frenchman.  And  coupled  with 
1814,  1815,  1870,  1914  is  the  fact  the  Frenchmen 
cannot  escape  from  even  in  the  hour  of  victory: 
there  are  in  Europe  fewer  than  forty  million 
French  and  more  than  eighty  million  Germans. 
"The  very  reason  why  the  society  of  nations  will 
mean  the  salvation  of  France,"  argues  the  Amer- 
ican or  Britisher.  But  the  Frenchman,  while  not 
refusing  to  admit  the  possibility  of  a  solution 
through  the  creation  of  a  universal  league  of  na- 
tions, has  too  much  at  stake  to  put  all  his  hopes 
in  the  reign  of  peace  on  earth  and  good  will 
among  men.  He  has  lived  under  the  shadow  of 
the  German  menace  all  his  life,  and  his  narrow- 
est escape  from  being  crushed  under  the  iron  heel 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     173 

occurred  only  a  few  months  ago.  So  he  says: 
"The  Rhine  must  be,  as  it  was  before  the  nine- 
teenth century,  the  military  frontier  between  the 
French  and  the  Germans.  Denmark  must  have 
back  her  Danes.  The  Slavs  and  their  lands  must 
be  freed  absolutely  from  German  domination. 
Otherwise,  we  have  lost  the  war."  We  may 
think  that  France  can  be  made  secure  from  Ger- 
man aggression  by  some  other  means  than  by 
neutralizing  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  by 
despoiling  Germany  of  large  portions  of  what 
she  has  come  to  consider  through  centuries  her 
own  lands  in  the  East;  but  is  not  the  burden  of 
proof  on  us?  If  we  refuse  to  agree  to  the  French 
program  for  guaranties,  must  we  not  be  in  a 
position  to  offer  France  a  satisfactory  alterna- 
tive? 

Thus  it  is  that  we  Americans,  apostles  of  the 
new  order  and  convinced  that  we  have  found  a 
remedy  for  the  world's  ills,  must  turn  from  our 
general  principles  to  concrete  problems,  from 
theories  to  conditions.  If  we  do  not  do  this,  we 
bid  fair  to  arrive  at  exactly  the  opposite  result 


174  France  and  Ourselves 

from  that  for  which  we  are  striving.  Mission- 
aries of  peace,  we  may  engender  fresh  strife. 
Champions  of  internationalism  in  the  best  sense 
of  that  word,  we  may  intensify  nationalism. 
John  Calvin,  revolting  from  dogmas,  created  new 
dogmas.  Martin  Luther,  inspired  with  the  idea 
of  strengthening  religious  faith,  undermined  it. 
We  talk  of  making  a  "clean  sweep,"  and  think 
that  the  way  to  do  it  is  in  one  great  movement; 
but  I  can  remember  my  mother  telling  a  green 
servant  to  get  at  the  corners  first,  and  not  to  go 
forward  until  she  was  sure  that  everything  was 
clean  behind  her.  At  the  Peace  Conference,  un- 
til we  have  given  careful  and  sympathetic  atten- 
tion to  the  traditional  and  instinctive  states  of 
mind  of  the  peoples  whose  destinies  we  are  at- 
tempting to  determine,  we  shall  make  little  prog- 
ress toward  a  workable  society  of  nations.  In 
the  meetings  of  the  "Big  Five"  President  Wil- 
son may  be  able  to  wrest  concessions,  and  the 
smaller  nations  may  acquiesce ;  but  read  carefully 
the  official  bulletins,  and  you  will  notice  the  quali- 
fying  adjective   "provisional"   or   the   qualify- 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     175 

ing  phrase  "in  principle."     Let  us  not  deceive 
ourselves ! 

France  presents  at  the  Peace  Conference  the 
following  maximum  demands: 

(1)  The  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  in  the 
limits  of  1870,  without  conditions. 

(2)  Germany  will  agree  to  pay,  in  whatever 
manner  may  be  specified,  the  amount  of  France's 
claims  for  reparations,  as  awarded  to  France  by 
the  commission  appointed  for  that  purpose  by 
the  Peace  Conference. 

(3)  German  property,  public  and  private,  in 
Alsace-Lorraine  is  to  be  liquidated  by  the  French 
authorities,  and  regarded  as  a  payment  on  the  ac- 
count of  the  war  indemnity.  The  proprietors 
dispossessed  will  become  the  creditors  of  their 
own  Government. 

(4)  Germany  shall  replace  in  kind,  as  far  as 
practicable,  the  machinery,  raw  materials,  farm 
implements,  live  stock,  and  whatever  else  was  de- 
stroyed in  or  stolen  from  northern  France  or 
requisitioned  by  the  invading  armies ;  locomotives 
and  rolling-stock  seized ;  the  deficit  of  coal  France 


176  France  and  Ourselves 

may  have  to  claim  over  what  the  Sarre  Valley 
produces ;  and  French  shipping  sunk  by  the  sub- 
marines during  the  war. 

(5)  France  shall  have  a  share  of  the  German 
Navy  proportionate  to  her  losses  and  her  co- 
operation on  the  sea. 

(6)  The  cession  to  France  of  the  coal  basins 
in  the  Sarre  Valley,  the  new  frontier  line  not  to 
be  that  of  1814,  but  to  be  drawn  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  include  all  the  coal-deposits.  An  esti- 
mate will  be  made  as  to  the  value  of  the  coal  in 
this  region,  and  put  on  the  other  side  of  the  ledger 
against  the  losses  France  has  suffered  through 
the  occupation  by  Germany  of  the  coal  regions  of 
northern  France. 

(7)  The  economic  union  with  France,  and  ad- 
ministration by  France,  in  cooperation  with  Bel- 
gium, of  the  remaining  German  territory  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine  until  Germany's  debt  to 
France  and  Belgium  is  paid.  When  this  is  ac- 
complished, the  inhabitants  of  these  provinces 
are  to  be  given  the  opportunity  by  plebiscite  to 
decide  whether  they  wish  to  remain  in  economic 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     177 

(and  possibly  political)  connection  with  France 
and  Belgium,  or  to  return  to  their  former  status 
in  the  German  Confederation. 

(8)  The  permanent  military  neutralization  of 
German  territory  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine. 
After  the  French  and  Belgian  claims  for  repara- 
tions are  satisfied,  France  and  Belgium  will 
withdraw  their  armies.  Whatever  decision  the 
inhabitants  may  then  make  in  regard  to  their 
economic  and  political  status,  Germany,  France, 
adn  Belgium  bind  themselves  not  to  raise  or  in- 
troduce armed  forces  into  these  provinces. 

(9)  As  much  of  Schleswig  as  expresses  its 
desire  to  do  so  by  plebiscite  must  be  ceded  to 
Denmark. 

(10)  The  creation  of  a  strong  and  united  Po- 
land within  its  ethnographical  limits,  but  posses- 
sing, in  addition,  the  port  of  Dantzic  and  a  hin- 
terland extending  back  to  purely  Polish  terri- 
tory. 

(11)  Czecho- Slovakia  and  Lithuania  will  re- 
ceive from  Germany  and  Austria  all  the  terri- 
tories in  which  they  possess  a  majority  of  the 


178  France  and  Ourselves 

inhabitants  or  which  are  necessary  for  their  in- 
dependent economic  existence. 

(12)  Germany  shall  cede  to  France  whatever 
portions  of  her  African  colonies  France  asks 
for,  after  agreement  with  Great  Britain,  Bel- 
gium, and  Portugal,  and  renounce  the  advan- 
tages guaranteed  her  in  Morocco  by  the  agree- 
ments of  1906  and  1911. 

(13)  France  is  to  be  the  mandatary  of  the 
powers  in  the  organization  and  control  of  Syria, 
the  boundaries  of  the  said  state  to  be  determined 
by  the  Peace  Conference. 

(14)  Ample  guaranties  are  to  be  given  to 
France  for  the  integral  repayment  of  money 
loaned  by  the  French  Government  and  French 
subjects  to  Russia,  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria, 
and  Turkey,  and  for  the  protection  of  equitable 
liquidation  of  French  concessions  and  business 
enterprises  in  these  countries. 

The  "fourteen  points"  of  France  are  not  set 
forth  by  Premier  Clemenceau  and  Foreign  Sec- 
retary Pichon  in  opposition  to  President  Wil- 
son's "fourteen  points."     Monsieur  Clemenceau 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     179 

and  Monsieur  Pichon  are  lawyers  representing 
before  the  bar  of  world  justice  the  interests  of 
their  client.  They  have  both  stated  frankly  that 
their  first  duty  as  advocates  of  France  in  the 
Peace  Conference  is  to  secure  for  France  repara- 
tions and  compensations  for  what  she  has  suf- 
fered, and  guaranties  against  the  recurrence  of 
the  danger. 

During  the  first  month  of  the  conference  Mon- 
sieur Clemenceau  said  that  he  had  sacrificed  many 
of  his  personal  ideas  and  prejudices,  and  had  re- 
frained from  insisting  upon  certain  things  that 
he,  as  representative  of  France,  thought  France 
ought  to  have.  Monsieur  Pichon  is  the  spokes- 
man of  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  and,  willy-nilly,  he  is 
compelled  to  set  forth  and  defend  the  traditional 
point  of  view  of  French  foreign  policy  in  every 
disputed  question.  Just  as  in  the  case  of  Eng- 
land, France  has  a  foreign  policy  the  roots  of 
which  were  planted  before  Columbus  discovered 
America,  and  which  has  developed  along  its  or- 
iginal lines  for  five  centuries.  Dynasties  and 
governments  have  changed  in  France,  but  not  the 


180  France  and  Ourselves 

Quai  d'Orsay.  France  has  experienced  invasion 
and  defeat,  but  the  bureaucrats  in  the  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  have  gone  back  to  their  dos- 
siers to  take  them  up  again  without  destroying 
or  altering  a  single  document  therein. 

So  we  cannot  dismiss  with  a  wave  of  the  hand 
France's  "fourteen  points"  on  the  ground  that 
they  conflict  with  America's  "fourteen  points," 
which  France  promised  to  adopt  as  the  basis  of 
peace.  We  have  to  convince  Monsieur  Clemen- 
ceau  that  his  client's  interests  are  not  jeopard- 
ized by  giving  up  any  of  the  French  claims.  We 
have  to  convince  Monsieur  Pichon  that  America 
has  found  a  better  foreign  policy  for  France 
than  the  traditional  one  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay. 
This  is  not  an  asy  task  for  us  in  either  case,  but 
especially  in  the  second.  We  think  in  decades; 
France  thinks  in  centuries.  We  have  no  past 
experiences  or  present  problems  analogous  to 
those  of  France.  I  shall  have  to  limit  myself  to 
two  illustrations. 

The  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  We  say  that 
Europe  became  an  armed  camp  in  the  second 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     181 

half  of  the  nineteenth  century  owing  to  annexa- 
tions, or  attempted  annexations,  contrary  to  the 
will  of  the  inhabitants,  and  ask  France  to  con- 
sider her  own  bitter  experience  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine. The  French  answer  that  when  the  Rhine 
was  the  boundary  between  France  and  Germany, 
France  was  able  to  defend  herself,  and  give  you 
examples  from  Julius  Caesar  to  Louis  XIV. 
They  point  out  that  only  since  Prussia  installed 
herself  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  has  France 
been  at  the  mercy  of  the  Germans. 

France  in  Syria.  We  say  that  the  liberation 
of  subject  races  should  not  be  taken  as  the  occa- 
sion for  a  further  extension  of  the  doctrine  of 
European  eminent  domain,  which  has  proved  to 
be  the  underlying  cause  of  nineteenth-century 
wars.  The  French  answer  that  Syria  has  been 
intimately  associated  with  France  since  the  Cru- 
sades, and  that  if  there  are  Christian  elements 
left  in  that  portion  of  the  Mohammedan  world, 
it  is  because  of  the  protection  afforded  them  by 
France  ever  since  the  time  of  Francis  I.  The 
Syrians  do  not  want  to  lose  French  aid  and  pro- 


182  France  and  Ourselves 

tection  in  their  hour  of  emancipation.  If  the 
Peace  Conference  left  the  Syrians  without  Euro- 
pean aid,  they  would  be  as  badly  off  as  under  the 
Turks ;  worse  off,  in  fact,  because  they  would  be 
deprived  of  the  protection  against  Mohammedan 
fanaticism  that  France  has  hitherto  been  able  to 
give  in  virtue  of  her  treaties  with  the  Sublime 
Porte.  And  if  the  mandate  to  organize  Syria 
were  granted  to  some  other  nation,  it  would  be 
a  violation  of  France's  moral  right  and  a  re- 
fusal to  recognize  the  sentimental  interests  of 
France  in  Syria. 

I  have  said  that  it  is  not  an  easy  task  for  us 
to  reconcile  America's  "fourteen  points"  with 
France's  "fourteen  points,"  but  is  it  a  hopeless 
task?  No — emphatically  no.  It  is  hopeless 
only  if  we  go  about  it  in  the  wrong  way. 

During  the  latter  half  of  1917  and  the  whole 
year  of  1918  I  enjoyed  unusual  opportunities  of 
coming  into  close  contact  with  French  public 
opinion  throughout  the  country.  In  every  part 
of  France  I  talked  with  bourgeois,  peasants,  and 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     183 

working-men  about  the  peace  that  should  be  made 
after  the  war.  At  the  tables  of  prefets  and 
moires  and  "notables'  I  discussed  the  coming 
peace  conference,  and  what  would  be  France's 
attitude  toward  peace  after  the  collapse  of  Ger- 
many. In  village  cafes  and  the  homes  of  peas- 
ants I  tried  out  the  ideas  I  was  gathering  in 
educated  circles.  I  went  to  industrial  and  min- 
ing centers  to  talk  with  foremen,  factory  hands, 
miners,  skilled  and  unskilled  laborers.  I  asked 
the  small  functionaries  and  the  railway  men  to 
give  me  their  ideas.  Except  among  intellec- 
tuels,  there  was  little  knowledge  of  the  aims  and 
aspirations  expressed  in  the  French  Govern- 
ment's program  as  I  have  outlined  it  above.  In 
industrial  circles  I  found  some  notions,  but  not 
always  accurate  or  fair,  of  the  Government's  in- 
tentions when  the  day  of  making  peace  should  ar- 
rive. Nowhere  in  France  and  in  no  class  of  so- 
ciety did  I  find  enthusiasm  and  unqualified  ap- 
proval of  what  I  have  called  France's  "fourteen 
points."     On  the  other  hand,  in  industrial  circles, 


184  France  and  Ourselves 

and  sometimes  among  intellectuels,  there  was 
warm  advocacy  of  President  Wilson's  "fourteen 
points." 

Social  unrest  is  widespread  in  France;  the 
people  are  in  a  state  of  high  nervous  tension. 
The  war  has  imposed  upon  them  sacrifices  so 
great  in  every  way  that  they  are  ripe  for  a  com- 
plete and  radical  change  in  international  rela- 
tions. The  war  lasted  too  long.  Jingoism, 
chauvinism,  militarism,  imperialism,  aggressive 
nationalism,  the  usual  unlovely  concomitants  of 
victory,  are  manifest  only  in  the  newspapers, 
which  fail  singularly  to  reflect  public  opinion  in 
France,  and  in  small  elements  of  the  population 
whose  strength  and  influence  are  absurdly  over- 
estimated. The  vision  of  a  new  world,  set  forth 
in  the  American  program  for  peace  and  in  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  speeches  before  and  during  the 
conference,  would  have  appealed  in  any  circum- 
stances to  the  underlying  chivalry  and  idealism 
of  French  character.  Under  present  condition^ 
the  appeal  is  more  potent  than  we  realize. 

Where,  then,  is  the  support  for  a  peace  pro- 


The  Attitude  of  France  Toward  Peace     185 

gram  which  seems  on  the  surface  to  be  a  conse- 
cration of  old  and  discredited  methods  of  estab- 
lishing peace  after  a  war?  Why  did  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  give  an  overwhelming  vote  of 
confidence  to  the  Government  after  Monsieur 
Pichon's  exposition  of  foreign  policy?  Why  did 
the  French  nation  stand  behind  Premier  Clem- 
enceau  in  the  initial  period  of  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence? The  answer  to  these  questions  is  summed 
up  in  one  short  phrase,  the  instinct  of  self-preser- 
vation. 

If  we  can  make  it  clear  to  the  French  people 
that  the  society  of  nations  will  first  of  all  protect 
them  against  the  possibility  of  a  renewal  of  Ger- 
man aggression,  and  will  afford  them  certain 
and  rapid  means  of  recovering  and  holding  their 
industrial  and  commercial  and  moral  position  in 
the  post-bellum  period,  no  reactionary  forces  in 
France  are  strong  enough  to  prevent  them  from 
accepting  the  American  program  for  peace  in 
its  entirety. 

How  and  in  what  measure  is  the  United  States 
willing  to  aid  and  stand  by  France  after  the 


186  France  and  Ourselves 

war?  We  must  satisfy  France  on  this  point; 
then  everything  else  will  follow  as  we,  and  the 
French  with  us,  have  dreamed  it,  as  we,  and 
the  French  with  us,  certainly  want  it. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  RECONSTRUCTION   OF   NORTHERN   FRANCE1 

AS  we  walked  through  the  streets  of  Soissons, 
the  old  priest,  who  was  making  his  first 
visit  to  the  invaded  regions,  groaned  anew  at 
every  step.  The  architect  and  I,  accustomed  to 
seeing  destroyed  cities  ever  since  the  first  mad 
rush  of  the  Hun  toward  Paris,  were  affected  by 
our  companion's  distress.  When  we  reached  the 
cathedral  the  priest's  despair  brought  forth 
words.  Raising  his  hands  to  heaven,  he  cried: 
fCOssa  ista  resurgent?  Domine,  tu  scis" 
"Men  also  know,  mon  pere/J  answered  the 
architect,  gently.  "For  God  restricts  the  resur- 
recting power  of  men  only  when  it  is  a  question 
of  human  bones.  We  can  enter  by  the  transept 
door,  and  you  will  see." 

i  June,  1919. 

187 


188  France  and  Ourselves 

We  climbed  over  a  mound  of  fallen  stone. 
Pieces  of  statues  and  gargoyles  protruded  from 
the  amorphous  mass.  Bits  of  stained  glass 
gleamed  in  the  sun.  An  angel's  face  stared  up 
at  us  from  a  chunk  of  plaster.  My  cane  disen- 
gaged a  twisted  brass  candlestick.  The  priest 
stooped  over  to  pick  up  the  INRI  of  a  crucifix. 
We  had  to  make  our  way  carefully  to  avoid 
splinters  of  carved  panels.  But  when  we  entered 
the  cathedral  we  realized  that  German  cannon 
had  not  prevented  the  Soissonnais  from  saving 
the  heritage  of  their  fathers.  The  roof  of  the 
nave  and  of  part  of  the  transept  had  already 
been  replaced.  The  high  altar  was  prepared  for 
mass.     Sand-bags  protected  tombs  and  shrines. 

With  glowing  face,  the  architect  pointed  to  a 
wall  built  from  pillar  to  pillar  to  shut  off  the 
nave.  "We  were  determined  to  keep  the  apse 
intact  and  strengthen  the  corner  pillars.  All  this 
was  done  under  the  enemy's  fire.  Part  of  it 
has  been  done  twice.  And  now  we  are  clearing 
out  the  nave  and  rebuilding  the  walls  and  roof." 

We  went  to  the  other  side  of  the  temporary 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     189 

wall.  German  prisoners,  French  soldiers,  civil- 
ian masons  were  working  side  by  side. 

The  next  day  at  Gambrai  we  visited  a  textile- 
mill  which  the  Germans  had  turned  into  a  soda- 
water  factory.  Some  buildings  were  empty. 
The  fine  looms  in  others  had  lost  their  copper 
fittings,  and  had  afterward  been  smashed  with 
axes  by  Russian  prisoners.  An  explosion  had 
wrecked  the  machines  in  the  power-plant. 

"I  am  glad  you  came  this  week,"  said  the  sup- 
erintendent, "for  we  are  going  to  begin  to  re- 
move the  debris.  New  looms  are  all  ready  to  be 
put  in  place.  If  we  can  get  raw  materials  and 
coal,  work  will  start  up  within  a  month." 

At  Lille  we  found  the  same  eagerness  to  go 
ahead  without  waiting  for  government  initiative 
or  German  indemnities.  The  first  winter  of  lib- 
eration was  a  cruel  deception.  So  inadequate 
and  dilatory  were  the  steps  taken  by  the  military 
authorities  that  the  people  had  become  bitter. 

"Nineteen  hundred  and  nineteen  is  the  cru- 
cial year,"  an  automobile  manufacturer  assured 
us.     "Our  biggest  problems  are  those  of  trans- 


190  France  and  Ourselves 

portation,  and  we  can  accomplish  little  without 
government  aid.  But  if  we  wait  for  the  Govern- 
ment to  take  up  and  direct  reconstruction  work 
we  shall  soon  be  beyond  redemption.  There  is 
confusion,  if  not  anarchy,  in  the  various  govern- 
ment bureaus.  We  have  to  keep  pressing  Paris 
to  give  us  food-supplies  and  a  minimum  provision 
of  raw  materials.  We  insist  now  that  we  be  al- 
lowed to  buy  machinery  and  whatever  else  we 
need  for  reconstruction  where  and  how  we  will. 
My  plant  was  used  by  the  Germans  throughout 
their  occupation,  and  they  tried  to  burn  it  when 
they  left.  I  started  in  immediately  to  repair 
what  could  be  repaired,  and  to  order  new  ma- 
chinery. You  can  have  no  idea  of  the  difficulties 
the  Government  put  in  our  way." 

In  Fives,  a  suburb  of  Lille,  we  visited  one  of 
the  most  important  steel-construction  plants  in 
France.  Here  locomotives  and  rolling-stock  for 
the  Northern  Railway  Company  were  made  be- 
fore the  war.  The  Germans  sacked  the  plant,  re- 
moving what  they  could  of  the  machinery  and 
destroying  the  rest.     But  ever  since  1915  the 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     191 

Compagnie  de  Fives-Lille  had  been  preparing 
for  the  day  of  liberation.  In  their  own  shops, 
in  a  branch  in  central  France,  machines  hare 
been  made.  They  are  awaiting  transportation. 
After  the  plant  is  restored  some  means  must  be 
devised  to  keep  it  supplied  with  coal  and  raw 
materials. 

Throughout  northern  France  the  will  to  get 
back  to  normal  activity  is  manifest.  There  is 
the  spur  of  necessity.  Everywhere,  as  at  Fives- 
Lille,  employers  and  artisans  and  laborers  know 
that  the  path  of  salvation  is  in  the  resumption  of 
production.  In  agricultural  regions  there  is  the 
same  unbroken  spirit.  And  illustrations  are 
numerous  of  local  efforts  to  preserve  historic 
monuments,  as  at  Soissons;  of  refusal  to  leave 
homes  unless  forcibly  ejected  by  the  military 
authorities.  Going  through  what  seemed  to  be 
entirely  ruined  cities,  one  is  constantly  surprised 
at  the  sight  of  people  who  are  working  to  make 
the  ruins  habitable. 

But  six  months  after  the  armistice  one  is 
tempted  to  doubt  the  efficiency,  the  capacity,  the 


192  France  and  Ourselves 

ability  of  a  government  in  Paris  to  undertake 
and  carry  through  reconstruction  in  the  invaded 
departments.  Students  of  democratic  institu- 
tions are  watching  with  keen  interest  the  prob- 
lems that  have  arisen.  The  doctrine  of  state 
control  of  industries  is  being  tested.  Is  there  a 
feeling  of  solidarity  in  the  nation?  Are  the  peo- 
ple as  a  whole  willing  to  make  sacrifices  for  the 
common  weal?  Is  it  possible  for  a  highly  cen- 
tralized democracy  to  cope  with  the  difficulties 
of  certain  categories  of  citizens,  especially  when 
those  citizens  belong  to  a  restricted  portion  of  the 
state?  Or  must  the  North  be  allowed  a  free 
hand  in  working  out  its  own  salvation,  with  only 
limited  dependence  upon,  and  limited  expectation 
of,  aid  from  the  rest  of  the  nation?  Decentral- 
ization, a  large  measure  of  local  autonomy,  power 
of  initiative  left  in  the  hands  of  municipalities 
and  communes,  seem  necessary  in  order  that 
"these  bones  rise  again." 

In  1915  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  established 
a  special  department  to  study  the  needs  and  look 
after  the  interests  of  the  invaded  regions.     The 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     193 

prerogatives  of  bureaucracy  were  encroached 
upon.  A  howl  went  up.  Soon  the  services  of 
this  department  were  distributed  among  the  min- 
istries of  Public  Works,  Agriculture,  and  Com- 
merce. When  Hindenburg  executed  his  "genial 
retreat,"  resulting  in  the  liberation  of  a  hundred 
communes,  the  preparations  of  the  Government 
proved  of  no  practical  value.  So  reconstruc- 
tion interests  were  once  more  grouped  under  a 
new  ministry,  called  the  Ministry  of  the  Block- 
ade and  of  the  Liberated  Regions. 

In  the  autumn  of  1918  the  Germans  began 
their  retreat  from  Flanders.  Government  prep- 
arations again  proved  inadequate.  There  was 
chaos.  No  one  was  responsible.  Every  problem 
was  referred  to  some  other  bureau.  After  the 
armistice,  the  Ministry  of  Armament  was  reor- 
ganized into  the  Ministry  of  Industrial  Recon- 
struction, with  a  limited  field  which  touched  the 
North  only  in  part.  At  the  end  of  1918  recon- 
struction questions  were  intrusted  to  a  Commis- 
sion Inter-Ministerielle,  with  representatives  of 
the  Presidents  du  Conseil  and  the  ministries  of 


194  France  and  Ourselves 

the  Liberated  Regions,  War,  Public  Works, 
Agriculture,  Industrial  Reconstruction,  Com- 
merce, and  Finance.  Premier  Clemenceau  ap- 
pointed as  president  of  this  commission  an  emi- 
nent Frenchman  who  had  been  urging  its  crea- 
tion for  more  than  three  years! 

To  assure  the  transformation  and  contin- 
ued activity  of  factories  which  worked  for  the 
Ministry  of  War,  the  Ministry  of  Industrial  Re- 
construction was  granted  a  credit  of  two  billion 
francs.  Monsieur  Loucheur,  under  whose  guid- 
ance French  industry  intensified  its  production 
during  the  war,  is  using  this  money  for  ships, 
locomotives  and  rolling-stock,  agricultural  ma- 
chinery, fertilizers,  and  the  different  machines 
and  materials  needed  to  reconstruct  the  invaded 
regions.  But,  as  two  birds  must  be  killed  with 
one  stone,  the  orders  are  given  wholly  to  French 
factories  on  French  soil.  Part  of  the  money  goes 
to  plants  created  by  the  state  during  the  war, 
and  part  to  enterprises  that  worked  in  connec- 
tion with  the  former  Ministry  of  Armament. 
The  Government  had  built  an  arsenal  at  Roanne 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     195 

for  cannon  and  shells,  and  a  plant  at  Bourges 
for  explosives.  The  former  will  repair  old  and 
construct  new  railway  rolling-stock,  and  the  lat- 
ter will  make  chemical  fertilizers.  Private  fac- 
tories which  furnished  wood  for  aeroplanes  have 
been  given  orders  for  doors  and  window-frames 
and  shingles.  Telegraph  and  telephone  material 
is  expected  to  be  produced  by  factories  which 
made  aeroplane  motors.  The  new  ministry  has 
authority  to  distribute  indemnities,  to  import  raw 
materials,  to  allot  labor-supply,  and  to  apportion 
transportation. 

It  is  admitted  that  the  idea  is  a  good  one,  and 
that  state  aid  is  necessary  to  tide  industry  over 
the  critical  period  of  cessation  of  war  work  and 
demobilization.  The  state  must  also  control 
transportation  and  importation  of  raw  materials. 
But  public  opinion  fears  waste  of  money,  new 
burdens  upon  taxpayers,  discouragement  of  in- 
dividual enterprise,  and,  above  all,  the  crystal- 
lization of  state  control.  Critics  are  legion  to 
point  out  the  difficulties.  One  cannot  pick  up  a 
newspaper  without  seeing  an  article  protesting 


196  France  and  Ourselves 

against  the  Ministry  of  Industrial  Reconstruc- 
tion. Since  large  investments  must  be  made  for 
new  machinery,  will  not  the  extension  of  state  in- 
dustrialism, justified  during  the  war  by  consid- 
erations of  national  defense,  tend  to  become 
permanent?  Will  private  factories  get  their 
share  of  the  orders?  Will  not  the  state,  backed 
by  public  money,  compete  with  private  indus- 
trial establishments?  If  there  is  overproduc- 
tion, the  state  will  be  tempted  to  forbid  compe- 
tition. If  there  is  increase  in  the  cost  of  produc- 
tion, the  state  will  be  tempted  to  regulate  prices, 
or  lose  public  funds  in  trying  to  compete  with 
private  enterprises  and  foreigners.  The  hands 
in  state  establishments  need  a  period  of  appren- 
ticeship, which  will  cause  great  delay  in  turning 
out  the  products  sorely  needed.  The  Ministry 
of  Industrial  Reconstruction  is  attempting  to 
solve  industrial  problems  of  the  whole  of  France 
at  the  expense  of  sacrificing  the  immediate  and 
pressing  necessities  of  the  North.  Are  the  manu- 
facturers of  the  North  to  be  made  to  wait  for 
their  machinery,  and  the  people  of  the  North  for 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     197 

their  homes,  in  order  to  safeguard  the  industrial 
interests  of  other  regions,  which  have  been  fos- 
tered and  developed  during  the  past  five  years 
through  the  misfortunes  of  the  North? 

The  policy  of  the  French  Government  in  re- 
gard to  the  use  of  imported  merchandise  in  the  re- 
construction of  northern  France  is  already  unmis- 
takably defined.  There  is  going  to  be  no  com- 
petition between  French  and  foreign-manufac- 
tured articles  in  France.  Following  the  ex- 
ample of  other  belligerents,  the  French  Govern- 
ment has  been  requiring  importation  licenses  for 
all  goods  brought  into  the  country.  The  reasons 
for  controlling  importations  during  the  war  were 
sound.  Precious  transportation  facilities  had  to 
be  reserved  for  articles  of  absolute  necessity,  and 
purchases  abroad  were  limited  in  order  to  pre- 
vent the  depreciation  of  the  franc  in  foreign  ex- 
changes. Until  peace  is  signed,  war  legislation 
holds.  After  peace  is  signed,  it  is  certain  that 
pressure  will  be  brought  to  bear  to  protect 
French  industry  by  levying  high  import  duties. 

But  the  Lille  automobile  manufacturer  said, 


198  France  and  Ourselves 

"Nineteen  hundred  and  nineteen  is  the  crucial 
year."  In  half  a  dozen  industrial  centers  of  the 
North  I  received  support  for  this  opinion 
from  men  in  every  line  of  production.  All  fear 
the  influence  of  five  years  of  lost  markets  upon 
their  home  and  foreign  trade.  They  feel  that  if 
they  do  not  get  back  to  their  normal  production 
quickly,  they  will  find  closed  doors — at  home  as 
well  as  abroad. 

The  five  departments  of  northern  France  pro- 
duced three  fourths  of  France's  coke  and  one 
fourth  of  France's  steel,  most  of  which  was  trans- 
formed into  manufactured  articles  on  the  spot. 
The  woolen  industry,  at  Roubaix,  Tourcoing, 
Cambrai,  Sedan,  and  Rheims  disputed  with  silk 
the  first  rank  in  France's  foreign  commerce. 
Since  80  per  cent,  of  woolen  weaving  was  in  the 
North,  and  the  North  furnished  the  other  20  per 
cent,  of  raw  materials,  French  woolen  cloth  has 
virtually  disappeared  from  Paris  markets. 
Most  of  France's  linen  was  spun  at  Armentieres, 
Lille,  Bailleul,  Comines,  Cambrai,  and  Valen- 
ciennes; of  her  cotton  at  Roubaix,  Tourcoing, 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     199 

Lille,  Saint- Quentin,  and  Amiens.  The  Pas-de- 
Calais  was  famous  for  its  linen  and  cotton  lace. 
Among  other  products  were  pottery,  glass,  and 
chemicals.  The  Departement  du  Nord  alone 
had  an  industrial  production  of  four  billion  francs 
annually  before  the  war,  of  which  two  and  a  half 
billions  were  in  textile  industries. 

In  considering  the  problem  of  industrial  recon- 
struction, too  much  emphasis  cannot  be  laid  upon 
the  fact  that  the  textile  industry  of  the  North 
was  not  a  phenomenon  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
and  consequently  did  not  owe  its  preeminent  sit- 
uation to  the  nearness  of  coal.  Roubaix,  Tour- 
coing,  Courtrai,  Armentieres,  Valenciennes, 
Cambrai,  and  Le  Cateau  were  famous  for  their 
textile  exports  as  early  as  the  fifteenth  century. 
Flanders  was  the  richest  and  most  populous  coun- 
try of  Europe  during  the  Middle  Ages.  Its 
woolen,  linen,  and  cotton  cloth  are  the  devel- 
opment of  ten  generations.  The  wealth  of 
France's  northern  departments  was  in  the  skill 
and  number  of  the  artisans.  All  of  France's 
weavers  of  fine  cloth  were  settled  there.     Within 


200  France  and  Ourselves 

a  radius  of  fifty  miles  of  Lille  one  found  three 
quarters  of  France's  skilled  workmen  for  five  in- 
dustries, more  than  half  for  thirteen,  and  more 
than  a  third  for  twenty-three.  Fecundity  and 
the  handing  down  of  traditions  and  knowledge 
on  the  part  of  the  artisans,  and  bold  use  of  cap- 
ital and  credit  on  the  part  of  the  manufacturers, 
made  the  North  supreme  in  French  industry. 

The  first  thought,  then,  of  the  manufacturers 
of  the  North  is  to  prevent  organic  ruin  through 
the  loss  of  skilled  workmen.  The  only  way  this 
can  be  done  is  to  start  factories  immediately. 
They  cannot  afford  to  wait  for  machinery  and 
raw  materials.  Otherwise,  the  emigration  that 
has  already  started  will  continue. 

On  the  eve  of  his  first  departure  from  Amer- 
ica, President  Wilson  spoke  to  Congress  about 
the  obligation  of  the  world  toward  the  regions 
that  suffered  from  the  German  invasion.  His 
specific  mention  of  the  necessity  of  granting  com- 
mercial favors  during  the  period  of  reconstruc- 
tion is  deeply  appreciated  in  northern  France. 
But  months  have  passed  since  then,  and  noth- 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     201 

ing  definite  has  been  proposed  on  either  side  of 
the  Atlantic  for  the  restoration  of  French  and 
Belgian  industries.  The  Peace  Conference  has 
lost  itself  in  a  maze  of  problems  relating  to  the 
past  and  future  of  mankind.  In  the  meantime, 
a  hundred  miles  from  Paris,  a  tragedy  is  being 
enacted  which  may  affect  more  profoundly  than 
treaties  the  new  European  equilibrium.  The 
morale  of  the  people  of  the  liberated  regions, 
which  resisted  superbly  during  four  years  of 
German  occupation,  is  being  undermined  by 
forced  unemployment  and  by  the  feeling  that 
others  are  taking  advantage  of  their  misfortunes 
— more  subtle  forces  of  demoralization  than  in- 
vasion and  exile. 

A  Lillois  put  the  situation  to  me  in  this  way : 
"In  other  parts  of  France  factories  prospered 
during  the  war.  As  their  products  were  for  war 
purposes,  they  were  allowed  to  keep  some  of  their 
personnel  and  the  rest  was  gradually  demobilized. 
They  received  subsidies  from  the  Government 
and  enjoyed  special  transportation  facilities. 
Ever  since  nineteen-fourteen  they  have  been  em- 


202  France  and  Ourselves 

ploying  our  demobilized  and  refugee  artisans. 
To-day  our  engineers,  foremen,  and  skilled 
workmen  are  bound  elsewhere  by  contracts  and 
by  not  having  jobs  here  to  return  to.  It  would 
be  enough  for  us  to  contend,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  reconstruction  era,  with  famine  and  high 
prices  and  the  delays  in  getting  started  arising 
from  rebuilding,  restocking,  and  gathering  to- 
gether again  our  working  forces.  But  we  have 
the  opposition  of  our  own  countrymen  who  are 
not  interested  in  seeing  us  get  on  our  feet.  We 
do  not  succeed  in  securing  permits  to  import 
machinery  from  abroad.  Why?  Because,  hav- 
ing lost  war  orders,  manufacturers  of  central  and 
southern  France  want  the  monopoly  of  making 
new  machines  for  us.  They  even  refuse  to  ad- 
mit that  we  have  a  right  to  priority  in  the  im- 
portation and  transportation  of  raw  materials. 
The  anxiety  of  the  Government  seems  to  be  con- 
fined to  sustaining  the  activity  and  expansion 
of  the  manufacturers  who  reaped  rich  rewards 
during  the  war." 

A  year  ago,  in  the  darkest  days  of  the  ad- 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     203 

vance  on  Paris,  I  was  lecturing  in  one  of  the 
large  steel-plants  of  the  Loire  Inferieure.  The 
chief  engineer  was  a  refugee  from  northern 
France.  He  was  not  pessimistic  about  the  war, 
for  he  felt  that  Germany  was  at  the  end  of  her 
rope.  He  predicted  an  internal  collapse  of  Ger- 
many in  the  autumn  of  1918,  no  matter  what  her 
military  situation  might  be  at  the  time.  But  he 
was  exceedingly  pessimistic  about  the  post-bellum 
relations  between  the  invaded  regions  and  the 
rest  of  France.  He  told  me  that  the  Govern- 
ment had  no  reconstruction  policy,  and  that  fail- 
ure to  take  immediate  measures  for  the  relief  of 
the  North  would  be  as  disastrous  to  the  nation 
as  a  whole  as  to  the  invaded  regions. 

"I  do  not  go  so  far  as  to  predict  civil  war," 
he  said.  "That  would  be  absurd  as  well  as  im- 
possible. But  I  do  say  that  the  most  deplorable 
result  of  this  war  for  France  is  likely  to  be  the 
creation  of  ill-feeling  on  the  part  of  the  North 
toward  the  rest  of  France  which  will  weaken 
seriously  the  solidarity  of  the  French  nation." 

At  the  Peace  Conference  the  French  insist 


204  France  and  Ourselves 

upon  the  right  to  the  special  consideration  of 
their  allies.  They  say  that  they  have  borne  the 
brunt  of  the  war,  have  made  the  greatest  sacri- 
fices, are  exposed  to  the  greatest  dangers  and 
handicaps  in  the  post-bellum  period.  Not  only 
for  their  own  sake,  but  for  the  common  cause, 
are  not  the  French  justified  in  asking  for  fav- 
ored treatment?  The  war  is  not  yet  won,  and 
a  strong  France  emerging  from  the  Peace  Con- 
ference is  essential  to  prevent  Germany  from 
winning  the  war.  However,  it  is  equally  im- 
portant for  the  French  Government  to  realize  in 
turn  the  justice  of  exactly  the  same  claim  to  spe- 
cial consideration  that  comes  from  its  citizens 
of  the  invaded  regions.  What  France  has  been 
in  the  Entente  Alliance,  northern  France  has 
been  in  the  French  Republic. 

The  North  must  face  competition  with  new 
factories  created  in  other  parts  of  France,  and 
with  the  intact  and  admirably  equipped  factor- 
ies of  Alsace-Lorraine,  in  a  country  of  stationary 
population,  which  means  stationary  consumption. 
The   North  has  lost   foreign  markets.     Great 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     205 

Britain  now  produces  all  the  articles  formerly 
manufactured  in  northern  France  and  can  sup- 
ply them  at  home  and  abroad  at  lower  prices. 
For  the  time  being  German  markets  are  lost, 
and  in  attempting  to  recover  them  northern 
France  will  have  the  competition  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine. Japan  is  looking  after  the  Far  East. 
South  America  is  learning  to  buy  from  the 
United  States.  A  Lille  newspaper  said  recently 
that  three  nightmares  were  haunting  the  sleep  of 
the  manufacturers  of  the  North — inability  to  re- 
create industries  soon  enough  to  prevent  organic 
ruin;  a  new  catastrophe,  when  production  is  re- 
sumed, through  a  lowering  of  prices  or  overpro- 
duction; trouble  with  labor,  which  is  likely  to 
spread  all  over  France. 

Northerners  believe  that  the  speedy  restora- 
tion of  their  industries  is  the  most  vital  task  of 
reconstruction,  which  should  take  precedence  for 
the  moment  over  rebuilding  cities  and  aiding  ag- 
riculture. For  organic  ruin  is  imminent.  The 
communities  of  artisans  are  the  precious  heritage 
of  centuries.     If  they  are  allowed  to  scatter,  the 


206  France  and  Ourselves 

revenues  upon  which  France  is  counting  for  re- 
cuperating her  finances  will  not  materialize. 
The  manufacturers  of  the  North  protest  against 
the  narrow  point  of  view  of  virtually  all  out- 
siders, who  conceive  the  reconstruction  of  north- 
ern France  in  terms  of  brick  and  stone,  cement 
and  wood.  In  talks  with  those  who  do  not  see 
the  problems  of  the  North  from  the  chair  of  a 
functionary  in  a  Paris  ministry  or  through  the 
eyes  of  one  who  has  made  a  two-days'  trip  in 
the  devastated  regions,  I  have  gathered  the  fol- 
lowing conditions  of  renascence: 

(1)  State  aid  to  restore  credits.  Without 
waiting  for  the  Germans  to  pay,  the  state  must 
advance  indemnities  sufficient  for  rebuilding  and 
repairing,  replacing  machinery,  restocking  in 
raw  materials,  and  carrying  wages  until  returns 
come  in  from  articles  marketed. 

(2)  Exceptions  for  the  North  in  the  applica- 
tion of  administrative  regulations.  The  excep- 
tion the  North  asks  for  most  insistently  at  the 
present  moment  is  waiving  the  principle  of  de- 
mobilization by  classes.     The  North  demands  the 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     207 

release  from  the  army  of  artisans,  miners,  and 
fathers  of  families  of  the  northern  departments, 
irrespective  of  age.  Follow  the  suspension  of 
the  income  and  other  state  taxes,  the  modification 
of  tariff  duties  and  import  and  export  regula- 
tions, in  favor  of  the  North.  Northerners  point 
out  also  the  unfairness  of  uniform  rules,  which 
apply  equally  to  them,  in  regard  to  the  allot- 
ment of  transportation  and  the  distribution  of 
imported  raw  materials. 

(3)  A  separate  administrative  regime  for  all 
the  invaded  regions  during  the  period  of  recon- 
struction. Flanders,  Artois,  Picardy,  Cham- 
pagne, and  Lorraine  are  distinct  provinces,  with 
different  needs  and  different  characteristics. 
During  the  years  of  recuperation  and  readjust- 
ment each  province  must  enjoy  an  autonomy 
that  is  not  possible  under  the  administrative  sys- 
tem of  present-day  France,  with  its  artificial  de- 
partmental limits,  each  department  depending 
upon  Paris  and  having  to  conform  to  the  general 
laws,  decrees,  and  regulations  enacted  for  all  of 
France.    At  the  same  time,  the  five  provinces 


208  France  and  Ourselves 

have  many  interests  in  common,  owing  to  the 
privileged  position  they  hope  to  have  during  the 
reconstruction  period.  They  ask,  therefore,  to 
be  allowed  to  deal  with  the  various  branches  of 
the  Government  at  Paris  through  an  intermediate 
regional  administration  centered  at  Lille. 

(4)  Special  and  distinct  provisions,  national 
and  international,  in  regard  to  commerce  and 
tariffs.  France,  in  her  customs  duties,  must 
favor  the  industries  of  the  North.  In  treaties  of 
commerce  and  tariff  regulations,  Allied  countries 
should  waive  restrictions  concerning  exports  and 
imports  intended  for  and  coming  from  the  north 
of  France  until  the  invaded  regions  are  on  their 
feet. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  only  a  portion 
of  the  invaded  regions  was  destroyed  in  the  phys- 
ical sense  of  the  word.  With  the  exception  of 
Rheims,  the  nucleus  of  industrial  life  could  be  re- 
established everywhere  without  waiting  for  the 
rebuilding  of  homes.  Work  is  the  magnet  that 
draws  men  to  cities.     After  one  gets  a  job,  he 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     209 

looks  for  a  home.  It  is  putting  the  cart  before 
the  horse  to  plan  and  carry  out  a  wholesale  pro- 
gram of  reconstruction  of  cities  and  towns,  until 
means. of  livelihood  are  safeguarded  to  those  who 
remained  during  the  cataclysm  and  assured  to 
those  invited  to  return.  Whoever  has  lived 
through  an  earthquake  or  fire  or  struggle  be- 
tween armies  knows  how  tenaciously  human  be- 
ings cling  to  the  place  where  they  earn  their  daily 
bread.  One  finds  shelter  somehow  where  he  has 
work.  The  best  elements  of  a  population  do  not 
flee  before  danger  and  a  shortage  of  food.  Un- 
employment and  lack  of  opportunity  to  get 
ahead  in  the  world,  however,  drive  very  quickly 
from  a  community  the  workers  of  real  economic 
value.  More  than  once  I  have  seen  the  order  to 
evacuate  a  town  meet  with  stubborn  resistance 
on  the  part  of  people  whose  homes  were  being 
shelled  and  destroyed.  The  same  type  of  urban 
population,  which  did  not  flee  before  the  Ger- 
mans, is  now  leaving  cities  of  northern  France 
of  its  own  initiative. 

Agricultural  reconstruction  goes  hand  in  hand 


210  France  and  Ourselves 

with  industrial  reconstruction.  Cereals  and 
meat  can  be  sent  into  the  North.  But  until  lo- 
cal agriculture  is  in  a  position  to  furnish  pota- 
toes, green  vegetables,  fruits,  and  dairy  prod- 
ucts, high  prices  and  the  lack  of  a  well-rounded 
food  diet  will  affect  economic  and  health  condi- 
tions in  industrial  communities.  More  than  this, 
the  sugar  and  linen  industries  are  dependent 
upon  local  production  of  beets  and  flax.  Be- 
fore the  war  northern  France  had  a  quarter  of  a 
million  acres  sown  in  flax.  Since  the  flax  of 
Pomerania  and  Russia  is  not  likely  to  come  into 
the  market  again  for  several  years,  this  raw  ma- 
terial is  an  indispensable  asset. 

In  the  strip  of  territory  from  the  North  Sea 
to  Switzerland,  where  the  armies  faced  each  other 
during  the  years  of  trench  warfare,  much  of  the 
land  is  dead.  The  problem  of  bringing  it  to  life 
again  will  take  a  long  time  to  solve.  Returning 
it  to  cultivation  cannot  be  undertaken  by  its  own- 
ers. The  state  must  bear  the  expense  of  clearing 
it,  of  filling  in  the  trenches  and  shell-holes,  of 
fertilization  and  reforestation.     There  must  be 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     211 

military  supervision  of  this  work,  for  unexploded 
shells  and  hand-grenades  are  likely  to  be  turned 
up  in  any  field  through  which  or  near  which  the 
trenches  ran.  The  strain  was  severe,  also,  upon 
the  forests  and  farms  throughout  the  provinces 
occupied  by  the  Germans.  Fields  were  plowed 
constantly,  sowed  without  manure,  and  used  for 
intensive  production  of  the  same  crops.  They 
are  exhausted,  and  need  to  lie  fallow  for  a  while. 
Since  fertilization  out  of  proportion  to  the  gain 
from  the  yield  is  required  for  at  least  five  years, 
the  Government  will  have  to  provide  the  farmers 
with  fertilizers.  There  is  nothing  haphazard 
about  location  and  extent  of  forests  in  France. 
The  situation  and  proportion  of  wooded  lands 
could  not  be  allowed  to  change  without  affecting 
water-supply  and  climate.  Nothing  is  more  im- 
perative than  the  reconstruction  *of  forests  under 
state  guidance. 

The  pillage  by  the  Huns  of  farms  was  scarcely 
less  thorough  than  that  of  factories.  The  invad- 
ers made  a  clean  sweep  of  agricultural  machin- 
ery, farm  implements,  copper  kitchen  utensils, 


212  France  and  Ourselves 

bedding,  horses,  live  stock,  poultry,  and  seed. 
In  the  first  renewal  of  the  armistice  Marshal 
Foch  added  the  delivery  of  agricultural  machin- 
ery to  the  delivery  of  locomotives  and  rolling- 
stock  provided  for  in  the  original  armistice.  I 
suppose  he  did  not  go  farther  in  demanding  the 
return  of  stolen  property  only  because  what  the 
Germans  took  from  the  farmers  of  the  North 
had  ceased  to  exist. 

The  delegates  on  the  Armistice  Commission 
at  Spa,  as  well  as  the  peace  delegates  at  Paris, 
have  been  warned  not  to  try  to  exact  the  pound 
of  flesh.  But  is  the  criticism  that  France  wants 
to  take  advantage  of  Germany's  helplessness 
justified?  If  France  does  not  secure  restitution 
from  Germany,  she  will  have  to  devise  some 
measures — and  without  delay — to  furnish  those 
who  were  robbed  with  means  of  subsistence  and 
production.  The  estimate  of  a  competent  au- 
thority that  the  failure  to  plow  land  in  February 
and  March,  1919,  will  result  in  the  loss  of  two 
billions  of  francs  throws  light  upon  the  attitude 
of  the  French  delegates. 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     213 

A  year  before  the  end  of  the  war,  contractors 
and  builders  presented  a  memorandum  to  the 
Government  suggesting  reconstruction  measures 
that  should  be  decided  upon  in  advance.  They 
pointed  out  that  as  soon  as  the  armistice  was 
signed,  skilled  workers  in  building  trades  and 
their  employers  should  be  released  from  military 
service ;  factories  working  for  war  material  should 
be  ready  to  devote  their  energies  to  replacing 
what  was  destroyed;  and  the  privilege  of  prior- 
ity in  transport,  given  to  war  material  dur- 
ing hostilities,  should  automatically  be  accorded 
to  reconstruction  material.  The  category  of 
"skilled  workers  in  building  trades  and  their  em- 
ployers" should  include  all  workers  in  wood, 
stone,  and  cement.  Cannon-  and  shell-factories 
should  be  ready  to  turn  out  rolling-stock  and 
auto-trucks,  iron  girders,  bridges,  and  machinery 
for  the  factories  in  the  North.  Adequate  pro- 
duction of  agricultural  machinery  could  be  as- 
sured only  by  the  manufacture  of  uniform  types 
in  series.  The  state  must  have  ready  a  plan 
to  recruit  an  army  of  builders  and  carpenters  and 


214  France  and  Ourselves 

masons,  and  to  house  and  feed  reconstruction 
workers. 

But  in  spite  of  numerous  bureaus  and  commis- 
sions, nothing  was  done  along  these  lines.  The 
cessation  of  hostilities  found  the  Government  un- 
prepared to  grapple  with  the  problem  of  rebuild- 
ing in  the  devastated  areas.  The  Government 
is  being  bitterly  criticized  now  for  lack  of  fore- 
sight, and  for  the  slow  progress  made  since  the 
armistice.  One  must  not  forget,  however,  that 
it  was  still  nip  and  tuck  for  France  during  the 
last  year  of  the  war — perhaps  more  so  than  in 
the  earlier  years.  Victory  was  a  miracle  in  it- 
self. Was  it  reasonable  to  expect  another  mir- 
acle— the  change  over  night  to  reconstruction 
with  unimpaired  energy  and  ability? 

An  experimental  stage  in  reconstruction  was 
inevitable.  However  pressing  the  needs,  actual 
progress  could  hardly  have  been  expected  during 
the  first  winter  of  liberation.  Divergence  of 
opinion  was  bound  to  arise,  and  governmental 
machinery  to  break  down.  After  catastrophes, 
the  indifference  and  apathy  of  those  who  have 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     215 

not  suffered,  and  the  desire  of  ghouls  of  all  classes 
of  society  to  take  advantage  of  the  misfortunes 
of  others  always  come  to  the  surface.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  problems  of  reconstruction  are 
clearer  than  they  were  a  priori.  Wrong  meth- 
ods and  impracticable  schemes,  which  threatened 
to  waste  time  and  money  and  divert  energy,  are 
discredited.  What  the  French  did  not  know 
when  the  armistice  was  signed  they  know  now. 
They  are  ready  to  do  their  own  part  in  binding 
up  the  wounds  of  their  brothers  of  the  North  and 
in  nursing  them  through  the  period  of  convales- 
cence back  to  health.  They  are  ready  to  ac- 
cept and  direct  the  loving  aid  offered  by  friends 
of  France  in  other  countries. 

On  March  8th,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Union 
des  Grandes  Associations  Francoises,  Monsieur 
Deschanel,  of  the  French  Academy,  who  is  Presi- 
dent of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  said:  "The 
inhabitants  of  our  invaded  departments  wonder 
whether  the  rest  of  France  and  foreigners  realize 
what  has  really  taken  place."  The  challenge  in 
these  words  was  answered.     By  a  unanimous 


216  France  and  Ourselves 

vote,  the  representatives  of  the  national  organ- 
izations declared  the  responsibility  of  the  rest  of 
France  in  the  matter  of  reconstruction,  and  the 
solidarity  of  the  rest  of  France  with  the  northern 
provinces. 

The  provinces  devastated  by  the  Germans  have 
the  right  to  look  to  France  and  not  to  Germany 
for  financing  their  rehabilitation.  The  repara- 
tion for  her  crimes  Germany  owes  to  France  as  a 
whole.  It  is  the  business  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment to  collect  damages  from  Germany.  But 
the  restoration  of  northern  France  should  not  de- 
pend upon  when  and  how  much  indemnity  is 
paid.  As  France  did  not  succeed  in  defending 
the  integrity  of  her  territory,  every  Frenchman 
must  recognize  the  debt  of  honor  he  owes  per- 
sonally to  the  invaded  regions,  and  assent  to  the 
sacrifices  necessary  to  finance  reconstruction. 
The  consideration  of  interest  enters  into  the  ques- 
tion also.  Upon  the  rapid  rehabilitation  of  the 
North  depends  the  recuperation — political,  eco- 
nomic, social — of  France. 

For  months  after  the  liberation  of  the  North, 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     217 

the  provinces  remained  in  the  zone  of  the  armies, 
subjected  to  military  administration.  The  re- 
sult was  complete  paralysis.  Not  until  munic- 
ipal and  communal  authority  was  reestablished 
did  the  work  of  reconstruction  begin.  The  new 
plan  adopted  by  the  Government  is  to  divide  the 
northern  departments  into  districts,  each  au- 
tonomous, with  the  privilege  of  recruiting  its  own 
workers  and  with  control  of  its  own  transporta- 
tion. How  and  when  and  whether  this  or  that 
town  or  village  or  this  or  that  building  in  the 
town  or  village  is  to  be  rebuilt  will  be  decided 
upon  by  the  people  of  each  community.  Is  not 
this  the  only  way?  Of  the  102,000  buildings  de- 
stroyed by  the  Germans,  considerably  less  than 
one  half  of  1  per  cent,  were  built  or  owned  by  the 
French  Government.  If  the  99%  per  cent,  are 
to  rise  from  their  ashes,  it  will  be  by  individual, 
corporative,  and  communal  effort. 

The  heart  of  the  world  has  been  touched  by  the 
misery  of  northern  France.  Two  continents 
share  the  eagerness  to  aid  in  reconstruction. 
French  cities  which  did  not  suffer  from  the  Ger- 


218  France  and  Ourselves 

man  invasion  have  adopted  cities  of  the  North 
as  filleuls.  The  idea  was  taken  up  in  Allied 
countries,  especially  in  the  United  States.  My 
American  readers  often  write  to  me,  asking  how 
they  can  help  France.  No  letter  has  touched 
me  more  deeply  than  one  from  a  father  whose 
only  son  was  killed  in  the  advance  from  the 
Marne  to  the  Vesle.  He  was  ready  to  recon- 
struct, at  his  own  expense,  the  town  in  which 
his  son  fell.  He  named  a  place  of  less  than  a 
thousand  inhabitants,  the  rebuilding  of  which  I 
found  would  cost  about  two  million  dollars. 
But  in  this  case,  as  in  all  others,  reconstruction 
could  not  be  undertaken  en  bloc.  In  coopera- 
tion with  the  communal  authorities,  the  Ameri- 
can father  might  rebuild  the  mairie,  the  school, 
the  fountains,  the  lavoir,  or  the  church.  Homes 
and  shops  and  local  industries — these  depend 
upon  the  needs  of  the  community,  which  may  be 
entirely  changed.  Only  the  people  of  each  com- 
munity can  do  their  rebuilding — and  in  their 
own  way. 

Ossa  ista  resurgent?    Perhaps,  after  all,  we 


The  Reconstruction  of  Northern  France     219 

must  say  with  the  priest,  Domine,  tu  scis.  For 
the  answer  depends  upon  an  unknown  factor,  the 
will  of  the  people  concerned.  The  illustration  of 
the  cathedral  at  Soissons,  however,  is  significant. 
Our  part  in  the  reconstruction  of  northern  France 
is  to  make  the  necessary  sacrifices,  as  govern- 
ments and  individuals,  to  show  our  solidarity  with 
those  who  have  suffered  for  us.  We  can  make 
possible  reconstruction.  We  can  smooth  the 
path  for  and  strengthen  those  who  are  called 
upon  to  perform  one  of  the  most  formidable  tasks 
of  history.  At  the  least,  we  can  refrain  from 
discouraging  them  by  indifference  and  inclina- 
tion to  profit  by  their  misfortunes.  But,  when 
all  is  said  and  done,  the  reconstruction  of  north- 
ern France  depends  upon  the  people  of  northern 
France. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   CASE  AGAINST   CAILLAUX  l 

AFTER  the  disappearance  of  the  Second 
Empire  in  the  catacylsm  of  1870,  Thiers 
dominated  France.  The  man  who  had  to  make 
a  humiliating  peace  with  Germany  died  before 
the  new  form  of  government  for  France  was  defi- 
nitely decided  upon.  But  he  lived  long  enough 
to  set  the  example  which  has  been  followed 
throughout  the  half -century  of  the  Third  Re- 
public. France  has  had  her  parliament,  free 
from  the  control  of  the  executive  and  master  of 
the  policies  of  the  nation.  There  has  been  a 
Government  and  an  Opposition.  But  leaders 
have  not  arisen  from  parties  through  advocacy 
of  party  programs  and  been  maintained  in  pub- 
lic life  by  defense  of  the  principles  and  attach- 
ment to  the  interests  of  their  party.     We  hunt 

i  November,  1919. 


The  Case  Against  Caillauw  221 

in  vain  to  find  continuity  in  French  political  par- 
ties. We  cannot  even  classify  groups  or  par- 
ties by  a  general  adherence  to  political  and  eco- 
nomic concepts  or  tendencies.  The  French  have 
no  equivalents  for  parties  as  we  understand  them 
in  the  Anglo-Saxon  world.  I  have  often  been 
asked  to  indicate  what  parties  were  similar  to 
Conservative  and  Liberal,  Republican  and 
Democrat,  or  even  Labor.  I  do  not  try  to  an- 
swer. Any  attempt  at  identification  of  parties 
and  groups  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  with  po- 
litical divisions  of  the  House  of  Commons  and 
Congress  involves  one  in  hopeless  contradiction. 
Did  Thiers  stand  for  the  establishment  of  a 
republic  or  the  restoration  of  the  monarchy  or 
empire?  We  do  not  know.  Thiers  rallied 
France  around  him  to  meet  the  crisis  of  the 
hour — the  recovery  of  France  from  the  disaster 
of  defeat  by  Prussia.  In  every  country  where 
political  leaders  have  to  depend  upon  the  elec- 
torate for  continuing  in  office,  they  are  oppor- 
tunists. But  with  the  British  and  ourselves  poli- 
ticians are  limited  by  traditional  policies  and  are 


222  France  and  Ourselves 

bound  by  party  organization.  Personal  popu- 
larity and  a  personal  following  are  precious 
assets.  And  yet,  however  powerful  a  man  may 
be,  he  has  to  go  before  the  public  with  party 
backing.  The  greatest  leader  in  contemporary 
American  life  bucked  the  system  without  suc- 
cess. The  failure  of  the  Bull  Moose  campaign 
and  the  inability  of  brilliant  British  and  Domin- 
ion statesmen  to  maintain  their  power  after  aban- 
doning their  party  give  proof  of  the  ascendency 
of  parties  over  men  in  Anglo- Saxondom. 

Only  if  we  keep  in  mind  this  essential  differ- 
ence can  we  hope  to  understand  French  politics. 
The  parliamentary  history  of  the  Third  Repub- 
lic is  a  stirring  drama  of  man  pitted  against  man. 
Personalities  and  not  principles  have  dominated. 
Individuals  have  espoused  causes  and  raised 
issues  and  have  appealed  for  support  to  parlia- 
ment and  people,  untrammeled  by  the  general 
concepts  and  particular  planks  of  party  pro- 
grams. This  explains  the  insurmountable  diffi- 
culty that  confronts  the  Paris  correspondent  of  a 
London  or  a  New  York  newspaper  when  he  tries 


The  Case  Against  Caillaux  223 

to  make  clear  to  his  readers  the  result  of  a  gen- 
eral election  in  France.  One  has  to  give  up  try- 
ing to  draw  deductions  from  the  distribution  of 
seats,  and  to  prophesy  party  alignments  in  the 
choice  of  premiers  when  a  new  cabinet  is  being 
formed.  It  explains  the  uncertainty  of  the  life 
of  a  cabinet.  Above  all,  it  is  our  clue  to  the  bit- 
ter struggles  between  leaders  that  seem  so  unin- 
telligible to  us.  Jules  Ferry,  Gambetta,  Bou- 
langer,  Paul  Deroulede,  Waldeck-Rousseau, 
Combes,  Briand,  Viviani,  Caillaux,  and  Clemen- 
ceau — we  have  a  general  idea  of  what  these  men 
have  stood  for  (perhaps!),  but  when  we  try  to 
class  them  with  parties  or  fixed  and  continuous 
policies  emanating  from  parties,  we  begin  to 
flounder. 

Now  that  I  have  cleared  the  decks  for  action 
by  renouncing  any  attempt  to  identify  French 
politicians  with  parties  or  to  establish  an  analogy 
between  French  and  our  own  political  systems, 
it  is  possible  to  discuss  the  Caillaux  case. 

Since  the  Dreyfus  affair,  which  mystified  and 
then  shocked  public  opinion  in  Great  Britain  and 


224  France  and  Ourselves 

America,  no  political  scandal  in  France  has 
equalled  the  Caillaux  affair.  Like  Dreyfus, 
Caillaux  has  been  charged  with  high  treason,  and 
had  his  case  tried  in  the  newspapers  before  it  was 
tried  in  court.  Public  opinion  has  adjudged  him 
guilty  and  has  not  protested  against  an  unusually 
long  term  of  imprisonment  without  the  case  ever 
coming  before  a  jury.  Whatever  we  Anglo- 
Saxons  may  think  of  Caillaux,  the  fact  of  long 
imprisonment  without  trial  upsets  us.  The  pro- 
tection of  the  individual  through  the  Habeas 
Corpus  Act  is  a  corner-stone  of  Anglo-Saxon 
liberty.  If  Caillaux  is  guilty  of  the  charges 
against  him,  why  has  he  not  been  brought  to 
trial?  Bolo,  Duval,  and  Lenoir,  with  whom  he 
is  supposed  to  have  been  associated,  were  con- 
victed and  shot. 

A  study  of  the  evidence  in  the  Caillaux  case, 
such  as  has  been  published  in  the  newspapers, 
and  of  the  methods  of  the  press  campaign  against 
Caillaux,  give  rise  to  grave  misgivings  in  the 
minds  of  the  seeker  after  the  truth.  Caillaux  has 
been  in  prison  for  more  than  two  years.     Al- 


The  Case  Against  Caillaux  225 

though  constantly  hinted  at  and  frequently- 
promised,  no  proof  of  his  guilt  of  the  treason  with 
which  he  has  been  charged  has  been  published. 
The  letters  and  telegrams  made  public,  and  the 
evidence  brought  out  in  trials  for  treason  in 
France  and  Italy,  afford  only  the  most  circum- 
stantial evidence  against  Caillaux  of  intelligence 
with  the  enemy.  We  are  not  sure  that  Caillaux 
saw  or  had  communication  with  the  German  Min- 
ister in  Argentina  in  1914.  There  is  a  tangle  of 
contradiction  in  the  whole  story  about  his  visit  to 
Rome.  No  direct  proof  involves  Caillaux  in 
dealings  with  German  agents  in  Switzerland  or 
Spain.  The  accusations  hinted  at  in  the  trials  in 
connection  with  the  Bonnet  Rouge  and  the  Jour- 
nal have  never  been  substantiated.  Many  of  the 
stories  that  were  allowed  by  the  Government  to 
be  printed  to  discredit  Caillaux,  such  as  having 
securities  hidden  in  a  safe-deposit  box  in  Florence 
to  avoid  his  own  income  tax  and  having  increased 
his  personal  fortune  during  and  since  his  pre- 
miership, were  disproved.  But,  as  in  the  Drey- 
fus case,  the  newspapers  of  France,  almost  with- 


226  France  and  Ourselves 

out  exception,  have  failed  to  give  Caillaux's  side 
of  the  story.  When  some  newspapers  attempted 
to  do  so,  the  testimony  in  his  favor  was  cut  out 
by  the  military  censorship. 

A  prominent  Paris  lawyer  said  to  me  some 
months  ago:  "I  have  the  clearest  sort  of  moral 
conviction  that  Caillaux  has  been  mixed  up  with 
the  Germans  before  and  during  the  war  in  trea- 
sonable dealings,  and  I  have  no  sympathy  with 
him.  He  ought  to  be  shot.  But  speaking  from 
a  legal  point  of  view,  we  have  no  case  against 
him  and  could  not  secure  his  conviction  even  in 
a  court  martial.  If  his  case  ever  does  come  be- 
fore the  High  Court  of  the  Senate,  I  doubt  if  he 
gets  more  than  Malvy — a  decree  of  expulsion." 

"Then  why  has  he  been  kept  in  prison  so  long 
without  trial?"  I  asked.  "To  my  Anglo-Saxon 
mind  that  does  not  seem  in  accord  with  the  ele- 
mentary principles  of  justice." 

"Ah!  mon  ami''  the  lawyer  answered  quickly, 
"you  know  as  well  as  I  that  the  Tiger  knows 
what  he  is  about.  Sains  populi  suprema  lex  is 
justification  for  anything.     As  he  had  gone  into 


The  Case  Against  Caillauoo  22fl 

office  on  the  pledge  of  getting  after  the  traitors 
and  breaking  up  the  defeatist  campaign,  Clemen- 
ceau  would  have  been  a  fool  to  allow  Caillaux  to 
remain  at  liberty  in  France  or  elsewhere.  To 
try  him  and  not  secure  a  conviction  was  a  risk 
our  chere  patrie  could  not  run." 

I  could  only  agree  with  the  lawyer.  I  did 
agree  with  him  heart  and  soul.  The  mortal  dan- 
ger to  France  of  the  insidious  defeatist  campaign 
was  fully  appreciated  by  those  who  came  into 
contact  with  it,  as  I  had  done.  When  the  Ger- 
mans knew  that  American  aid  would  inevitably 
ruin  their  hopes  of  military  success,  they  bent 
their  energies  to  the  task  of  demoralizing  France 
from  the  rear.  The  cost  of  the  struggle  had 
been  fearful.  The  nervous  tension  was  grow- 
ing. American  military  aid  came  slowly.  The 
ground  was  ripe  for  a  propaganda  to  make  "an 
honorable  peace''  before  France  was  hopelessly 
ruined.  When  Clemenceau  made  his  famous 
speech  against  traitors  and  defeatists  in  the  Sen- 
ate, heroic  measures  were  necessary  if  France 
were  to  carry  on.     It  is  well  enough  for  those 


228  France  and  Ourselves 

who  are  far  from  the  scene  of  action  to  talk  about 
technical  legal  procedure  and  to  view  a  situation 
impassively  and  objectively.  But  in  time  of 
crisis  quick  and  energetic  action,  regardless  of 
the  niceties  of  law,  is  imperative.  ceJe  fais  la 
guerre,"  said  Clemenceau.  When  you  are  strug- 
gling for  existence,  you  have  not  time  to  be  con- 
cerned with  the  legitimate  safeguards  that  the 
law  and  a  sense  of  abstract  justice  erect  for  the 
protection  of  individuals. 

Clemenceau  arrested  the  men  who  were  under- 
mining the  faith  of  France  in  ultimate  victory  or 
questioning  the  wisdom  of  continuing  the  war 
jusquau  bout.  Vulgar  traitors,  who  gave  the 
enemy  a  voice  in  the  French  press,  were  shot. 
Extremists,  many  of  them  sincere  but  none  the 
less  playing  the  game  of  Germany,  were  silenced. 
Senator  Humbert,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Military  Affairs,  was  jailed  for  letting 
the  influential  Journal,  of  which  he  was  proprie- 
tor and  editor,  get  into  the  hands  of  Germany. 
Former  Minister  of  the  Interior  Malvy,  despite 
the  testimony  in  his  behalf  of  the  four  war  Pre- 


The  Case  Against  Caillaux  229 

miers  (Viviani,  Briand,  Ribot,  and  Painleve), 
was  sent  into  exile  for  not  having  stopped  the 
defeatist  propaganda.  Former  Premier  Cail- 
laux was  locked  up  in  La  Sante  Prison  and  kept 
there. 

Public  sentiment  was  overwhelmingly  behind 
Clemenceau  in  every  step  he  took  to  strengthen 
the  country  internally.  This  was  not  because 
Clemenceau  came  in  on  the  turn  of  the  tide.  As 
dark  days,  from  the  military  point  of  view,  as  any 
his  predecessors  faced  had  to  be  lived  through. 
And  the  country  was  more  exhausted  and  more 
enervated.  Nor  was  it  because  the  blows  he 
struck,  not  sparing  the  highest,  cowed  the  de- 
featists. The  propaganda  continued.  Power- 
ful friends  of  Caillaux  and  the  entire  Socialist 
press  demanded  a  speedy  trial  or  release  for  lack 
of  evidence.  One  of  the  two  most  influential 
newspapers  of  the  provinces  tried  to  remain 
"Caillautist"  in  defiance  of  the  censorship  and 
other  forms  of  governmental  pressure.  The 
Chamber  of  Deputies  was  hostile  to  the  new  pre- 
mier and  not  unfriendly  to  the  fallen  leader. 


230  France  and  Ourselves 

Clemenceau  remained  in  power  to  pilot  France 
through  the  "last  quarter  of  an  hour"  to  victory, 
because  he  dared  to  keep  Caillaux  in  jail  and 
press  the  trials  of  the  others.  If  he  had  weak- 
ened, if  he  had  yielded  to  technical  legal  proof, 
if  he  had  been  faithful  to  his  own  lifelong  advo- 
cacy of  a  free  press,  he  would  have  been  lost — 
and  France  with  him.  The  fundamental  com- 
mon sense  of  the  people,  a  national  instinct  of 
self-preservation,  put  and  kept  France  behind 
the  man  who  embodied  the  traditional  spirit  of 
France. 

Public  men  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries  some- 
times get  themselves  into  trouble  and  lose  their 
influence  and  popularity.  Guessing  wrong,  or 
failing  to  succeed,  or  leading  badly,  are  causes  of 
disgrace  the  world  over.  Democracies  do  not 
spare  their  idols  and  heroes.  But  with  us  the 
public  man,  who  has  held  a  position  such  as  Cail- 
laux held,  is  protected  against  universal  antip- 
athy and  condemnation  by  party  solidarity. 
Newspapers  and  individuals  lose  confidence  in 
party  leaders  and  their  policies.     But  they  rarely 


The  Case  Against  Caillaux  231 

turn  openly  against  them  for  fear  of  "hurting 
the  party."  They  are  reserved  in  public  expres- 
sion of  their  changed  opinions.  The  old  chief  is 
saved  from  a  sheep -like  and  universal  turning 
away  of  allegiance  by  our  party  system.  The 
chief  has  been  spokesman  for  his  party.  Dis- 
crediting him  is  discrediting  the  party  and 
threatens  to  ruin  the  political  future  of  the  man 
who  indulges  in  violent  and  open  denunciation  or 
who  abandons  the  erstwhile  leader.  For  in- 
stance, would  it  not  be  interesting  to  hear  "hon- 
est-to-God"  opinions  of  prominent  Democrats 
on  Mr.  Wilson  and  of  prominent  Republicans  on 
Mr.  Lodge?  Our  mugwampery  takes  refuge  in 
the  secrecy  of  the  ballot-box. 

It  is  not  so  in  France.  Nothing  is  easier  than 
the  role  of  Peter  in  French  politics.  Ten  years 
ago  Joseph  Caillaux,  President  du  Conseil  des 
Ministres  de  la  Republique,  was  the  master  of 
France  by  the  will  of  the  people  expressed 
through  their  Deputies.  Just  before  the  war 
the  crime  of  his  wife  dimmed  his  prestige.  But 
he  was  Minister  of  Finance,  holding  down  this 


232  France  and  Ourselves 

important  post  uncommonly  well,  and  leader  of 
the  most  influential  French  party.  In  the  last 
general  election  the  Radical  Socialists  had  won 
a  brilliant  victory.  And  during  the  first  three 
years  of  the  war,  despite  his  growing  unpopular- 
ity and  the  suspicion  noised  abroad  about  his  po- 
litical activities  outside  of  France,  he  was  unof- 
ficial Minister  of  the  Interior,  acting  through 
Malvy,  with  the  internal  administration  of 
France  in  the  hands  of  his  appointees.  It  was 
not  infrequently  that  your  cocher  or  chauffeur  or 
concierge  would  shake  his  head  gravely  and  tell 
you  that  Caillaux  was  going  to  be  the  next  pre- 
mier. "The  bourgeois  will  enjoy  that,  heinf 
Qu'en  dites-vous?" 

How  a  former  premier  and  party  leader,  still 
enjoying  sufficient  power  at  the  moment  of  his 
arrest  to  make  him  a  real  menace,  could  be  shut 
up  in  a  cell  like  a  convicted  criminal  and  grad- 
ually be  forgotten,  is  not  a  simple  matter  to  ex- 
plain. At  the  time  of  the  arrest  of  Caillaux,  it 
was  not  believed  that  Clemenceau  would  have 
dared  to  take  this  step  without  damning  proofs 


The  Case  Against  Caillaux  233 

of  the  former  premier's  guilt,  or  that  the  trial 
could  be  long  postponed.  Who  would  have  pre- 
dicted the  end  of  the  war,  a  year  of  peace  nego- 
tiations, a  new  general  election,  the  convening  of 
a  new  parliament,  with  Caillaux  still  in  prison 
and  untried? 

There  are  the  obvious  factors  in  the  situation — 
the  unusual  power  in  the  hands  of  a  French  pre- 
mier owing  to  the  highly  centralized  administra- 
tive system,  enhanced  by  the  state  of  war  (con- 
trol of  the  manhood  of  the  nation  mobilized  in 
the  army,  suppression  of  right  of  assembly,  free 
speech,  free  press,  and  martial  law)  ;  Clemen- 
ceau's  appeal  for  a  free  hand  to  win  the  war ;  his 
prestige  through  victory;  the  anxiety  to  make  a 
profitable  peace;  the  fear  of  labor  getting  out  of 
hand  or  becoming  contaminated  with  Bolshevism ; 
the  exhaustion  of  a  great  struggle. 

If  this  were  all  there  was  in  the  Caillaux  case, 
if  it  were  simply  a  question  of  a  discredited  pub- 
lic man  who  had  been  discarded,  it  would  not  be 
worth  our  while  to  devote  time  and  thought  to 
Joseph  Caillaux.     We  have  so  many  important 


234  France  and  Ourselves 

problems  to  solve  in  this  changing  world  of  ours 
that  the  fortunes  of  one  man,  whether  he  be 
guilty  or  innocent,  are  of  little  importance.  We 
might  feel  that  a  country  which  has  allowed  Cail- 
laux  to  stay  in  jail  for  more  than  two  years  with- 
out trial,  thus  seemingly  having  already  con- 
victed him,  will  not  be  interested  in  the  proceed- 
ings of  the  High  Court  of  the  Senate  when  Cail- 
laux  finally  does  come  up  for  judgment.  But, 
like  the  Dreyfus  case,  the  Caillaux  case  is  bound 
up  with  a  period  of  history  upon  which  judgment 
must  be  passed,  with  national  politics,  with  cur- 
rents of  opinion  of  far-reaching  influence  and 
purport. 

Bitterness  against  Caillaux  and  condemnation 
of  Caillaux  as  a  political  leader  are  inspired  by 
his  fiscal  policy  and  his  foreign  policy.  He  went 
counter  to  the  natural  instincts  of  his  compatriots 
in  the  matter  of  taxation  and  the  matter  of  rela- 
tions with  Germany.  His  unpopularity  goes 
back  to  the  income  tax  and  to  the  Agadir  inci- 
dent. When  he  comes  up  for  trial,  the  merits 
and  demerits  of  his  leadership  in  the  years  before 


The  Case  Against  Caillaux  235 

the  war  will  be  brought  before  the  Senate  to 
decide  upon.  France,  whatever  may  be  the  fate 
of  Caillaux  personally,  will  find  herself  plunged 
into  a  bitter  controversy  concerning  fiscal  and 
foreign  policies,  past,  present  and  future. 

Students  of  British  politics  remember  the  feel- 
ing in  England  against  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  when, 
as  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  he  proposed  to 
tax  the  "unearned  increment"  in  land  values. 
The  Budget  of  1909  arrayed  against  "the  Welsh 
demagogue"  all  the  Tories.  The  House  of 
Lords  rejected  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  "revolution- 
ary" scheme.  But  as  comparatively  few  peo- 
ple were  affected  by  the  tax,  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
had  the  nation  behind  him.  The  country  was  ap- 
pealed to  a  second  time,  and  the  fight  ended  in  a 
serious  curtailment  of  the  prerogative  of  the 
House  of  Lords.  One  used  to  hear,  however,  the 
bitterest  sort  of  criticism  of  Lloyd  George  for 
years  after  Limehouse.  You  cannot  with  im- 
punity touch  a  man  in  his  pocket-book. 

The  statesman  in  France  who  faced  the  unen- 
viable task  of  Lloyd  George  in  England,  devis- 


236  France  and  Ourselves 

ing  ways  and  means  to  increase  the  nation's  reve- 
nue, was  Joseph  Caillaux.  Like  Lloyd  George, 
he  had  a  genius  for  finance,  and  his  worst  enemies 
admit  his  ability  in  budget-making.  No  other 
man  in  contemporary  France  has  equaled  Cail- 
laux's  record  in  handling  the  national  finances. 
He  had  a  harder  task  than  Lloyd  George  and 
one  that  could  not  win  him  the  favor  and  ap- 
proval of  the  bulk  of  the  electorate,  however  suc- 
cessful he  might  be.  There  are  few  great  for- 
tunes in  France  of  any  kind  and  none  at  all  in 
land.  Capital  is  widely  distributed.  Hundreds 
of  thousands  have  income  from  investments. 
Taxing  wealth,  whether  by  an  inheritance  or  an 
income  tax,  hits  the  entire  nation  and  not  a  class. 
Caillaux 's  proposal  of  an  income  tax  was  not  re- 
ceived with  joy  by  millions  of  dispossessed,  who 
would  not  have  to  pay  it,  as  in  Great  Britain  and 
America.  (I  am  speaking  of  before  the  war, 
when  the  exemption  figure  was  high.)  Love  of 
money  and  secretiveness  in  money  matters  are 
innate  in  the  French.  The  proposal  of  Caillaux 
would  take  money  from  them  and  would  compel 


The  Case  Against  Caillaux  237 

them  to  disclose  to  vulgar  functionaries  and  to 
put  on  record  where  outsiders  could  see  it  the 
exact  statement  of  their  business  and  their  family- 
fortune. 

Opposition  to  the  income  tax  made  Caillaux 
the  man  in  France  most  hated  by  the  "respect- 
able elements,"  which  include  peasants  and  shop- 
keepers as  well  as  aristocrats  and  bourgeois. 
Press  and  people  determined  to  resist  its  applica- 
tion. The  onus  of  proposing  and  sponsoring  the 
income  tax  fell  upon  Caillaux  and  not  upon  the 
Radical  Socialist  party  as  a  whole.  The  party 
was  divided  in  fiscal  policy  and  was  able  to  shift 
the  responsibility  for  the  unpopular  measure  to 
Caillaux,  who  accepted  it.  He  defended  the  in- 
come tax  with  great  skill,  using  every  argument 
he  could  lay  his  hands  on.  He  condemned  in- 
creasing and  widening  the  scope  of  indirect  taxes 
(dear  to  the  French  because  they  were  being 
taxed  without  having  the  pain  of  handing  money 
outright  to  the  Government)  on  the  ground  of 
the  great  uncertainty  in  estimating  them,  the 
fear  that  levying  additional  taxation  might  lead 


238  France  and  Ourselves 

to  restriction  of  use  of  the  thing  taxed  and  thus 
deceive  the  hopes  of  budget-makers,  and  the  in- 
justice of  increasing  the  burden  upon  the  small 
wage-earners  and  parents  of  large  families. 
Then,  as  is  the  case  always  where  a  man  becomes 
the  embodiment  of  a  principle  that  is  difficult  to 
combat  in  itself,  the  opponents  of  Caillaux's  in- 
come tax  began  to  seek  to  discredit  the  man  in 
order  to  defeat  the  principle. 

There  was  of  course  much  that  could  be  used 
against  Caillaux.  He  was  vereuoc,  as  the  French 
say.  But  questionable  honesty  in  political  meth- 
ods and  in  the  stock-market  is  unfortunately  the 
weakness  of  politicians  as  a  class.  And  in 
France,  corruption  in  private  morals  is  also  com- 
mon among  political  leaders.  If  Madame  Cail- 
laux had  refrained  from  shooting  Gaston  Cal- 
mette,  editor  of  the  Figaro,  the  world  at  large 
would  have  known  little  of  Caillaux's  private 
life.  The  enemies  of  Caillaux  knew  well  enough 
that  if  the  scandal  brought  out  at  the  trial  of 
Madame  Caillaux  was  simply  a  querelle  de  mat- 
tresses,   Caillaux    would    not    be    permanently 


The  Case  Against  Caillauoc  239 

ruined.  Too  many  of  them  were  tarred  with  the 
same  brush.  So  they  sought  to  pierce  the  armor 
of  Caillaux  at  the  one  politically  vulnerable  point 
— his  attitude,  as  President  du  Conseil,  toward 
Germany.  It  was  planned  to  make  the  assault 
upon  the  author  of  the  income  tax  at  the  closing 
session  of  his  wife's  trial  for  murder.  But  the 
war  clouds  broke  with  dramatic  suddenness. 
There  were  no  sensational  disclosures.  Madame 
Caillaux  was  acquitted.  President  Poincare  ap- 
pealed to  political  leaders  to  form  Vunion  sacree 
to  repel  the  invader. 

Had  the  war  been  averted,  had  Great  Britain 
failed  to  join  France,  had  Germany  won  or 
pulled  out  with  a  draw,  had  the  United  States 
not  given  financial  aid  to  France,  Caillaux  would 
have  been  the  wise  and  far-seeing  statesman  to 
whom  France  ought  to  have  listened.  Until  vic- 
tory was  assured,  all  his  political  opponents  and 
the  bourgeoisie  at  large  feared  the  return  of 
Caillaux  to  power.  They  may  deny  it  now. 
But  it  is  none  the  less  true.  Fortunately,  Cail- 
laux was  not  called  from  his  cell  in  La  Sante  to 


240  France  and  Ourselves 

be  a  second  Jules  Favre.  American  interven- 
tion brought  victory  to  the  Entente.  But 
whether  or  not  the  cards  have  fallen  definitely 
against  Caillaux  depends  upon  the  aftermath  of 
the  war.  Is  the  menace  of  Germany  removed? 
Is  France  going  to  be  able  to  afford  the  price  of 
victory?  Standing  alone,  no.  Protected  by  a 
military  alliance  with  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  and  aided  by  the  Anglo-Saxon 
world  during  the  period  of  reconstruction,  yes. 
The  judgment  of  history  on  the  foreign  policy 
of  Joseph  Caillaux  depends  upon  the  attitude  of 
the  British  and  ourselves  toward  France. 

As  Minister  of  Finance  and  President  du  Con- 
seil,  Caillaux  realized  that  the  fiscal  difficulties 
of  France  were  largely  due  to  the  bad  relations 
between  France  and  Germany.  Increasing 
sums  had  to  be  added  to  every  budget  for  mili- 
tary equipment,  for  strengthening  land  fortifica- 
tions, for  the  navy,  and  for  the  maintenance  of  a 
larger  standing  army.  The  population  of  Ger- 
many and  the  wealth  of  Germany  were  increas- 
ing by  leaps  and  bounds.     Public  opinion  in 


The  Case  Against  Caillauoc  241 

France  supported  the  prolongation  of  compul- 
sory military  service  from  two  years  to  three 
years.  But  the  nation's  treasurer  had  to  insist 
upon  the  unpalatable  truth  that  the  additional 
sacrifice  involved  money  as  well  as  one  more 
year  of  a  young  man's  life.  You  had  to  pay 
and  feed  and  equip  the  extra  soldiers  and  the 
extra  officers  required  to  train  and  command 
them.  If  public  opinion  insisted  upon  keeping 
pace  with  Germany,  it  must  accept  the  income 
tax.  The  alternative  was  trying  to  come  to  an 
understanding  with  Germany. 

The  limits  of  a  magazine  article  forbid  going 
into  the  Anglo-French  Treaty  of  1904  and  the 
resultant  difficulties  between  France  and  Ger- 
many over  the  status  of  Morocco.  The  Alge- 
ciras  Convention  was  differently  interpreted  by 
France  and  Germany  and  led  to  the  sending  of 
the  German  gunboat  Panther  to  Agadir  in  1911 
"to  protect  German  rights."  It  was  Germany's 
way  of  forcing  concessions  from  France  else- 
where in  Africa  in  return  for  German  recogni- 
tion of  France's  special  position  in  Morocco. 


242  France  and  Ourselves 

Former  Premier  Clemenceau  and  former  For- 
eign Secretary  Delcasse  had  advocated  the  settle- 
ment of  colonial  problems  by  an  understanding 
with  Great  Britain  and  looked  to  the  British  to 
aid  France  in  case  the  conflict  over  African  colon- 
ies led  to  German  aggression  in  Europe.  Cail- 
laux  (and  he  was  by  no  means  alone  among 
French  statesmen  and  publicists)  believed  that 
the  friendship  of  Great  Britain  was  not  a  suffi- 
cient guarantee  for  France  against  Germany,  and 
that  the  wisest  course  for  France  was  to  com- 
pound colonial  rivalries  and  ambitions  with  Ger- 
many by  mutual  concessions,  as  had  been  done 
with  Great  Britain  in  the  agreement  of  1904. 
Despite  opposition  that  never  died  out  even  after 
the  fait  accompli,  Caillaux  negotiated  and  signed 
an  agreement  transferring  to  Germany  sover- 
eignty over  a  large  part  of  the  French  Congo. 

The  anti-Caillautists  and  Anglophiles,  of 
whom  Clemenceau  was  one  of  the  most  able 
spokesmen,  declared  that  France  had  been  humili- 
ated and  betrayed.  They  argued  that  Ger- 
many's threat  of  war  was  a  bluff,  and  that  Great 


The  Case  Against  Caillaux  243 

Britain  would  have  stood  behind  France  to  the 
bitter  end  if  the  Caillaux  Cabinet  had  said  non 
possumus  to  the  German  demands.  Caillaux 
was  accused  of  using  the  Agadir  incident  to  play 
the  stock-market. 

In  defense  of  his  policy,  Caillaux  set  forth  the 
divergence  of  French  and  British  foreign  policy. 
He  claimed  that  the  British  were  of  course  will- 
ing to  make  the  agreement  of  1904  in  order  to 
secure  advantages  and  remove  opposition  in 
Africa  and  Asia.  But  British  interests  were 
extra-European.  France,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  primarily  interested  in  Europe.  She  was  a 
continental  power,  in  juxtaposition  with  Ger- 
many. For  the  sake  of  colonial  aspirations,  no 
matter  how  fully  she  could  rely  upon  British 
backing,  it  was  folly  for  France  to  keep  alive  the 
hostility  of  Germany  when  there  was  a  possibility 
of  establishing  better  relations  with  Germany. 
France  had  neither  the  money  nor  the  man-power 
to  continue  indefinitely  to  be  the  enemy  of  her 
more  populous  continental  neighbor.  If  no  war 
came,  the  weight  of  armaments  would  eventually 


244  France  and  Ourselves 

crush  France.  If  war  came,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  Great  Britain  had  specifically  limited 
her  promise  of  aid  to  the  protection  of  the  Atlan- 
tic coast  of  France  against  naval  aggression,  and 
that,  only  in  return  for  French  naval  protection 
of  British  interests  in  the  Mediterranean. 

All  who  were  in  Paris  from  August  1  to  Au- 
gust 4,  1914,  remember  how  nervous  and  uncer- 
tain French  public  opinion  was  in  regard  to  Brit- 
ish intervention.  Sir  Edward  Grey  told  the 
House  of  Commons  that  Great  Britain  was  not 
bound  to  give  France  military  aid.  The  viola- 
tion of  Belgian  neutrality  precipitated  British 
intervention.  No  one  doubts  that  the  British 
would  have  come  to  the  aid  of  the  French,  even 
if  the  Germans  had  not  committed  this  act  of 
criminal  folly.  But  it  would  not  have  been  a 
simple  matter  to  overcome  the  opposition  of  the 
Haldanes  and  Morleys  and  the  strongly  pacifist 
labor  elements. 

After  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Caillaux  would 
not  admit  that  he  had  been  wrong  in  his  estimate 
of  the  British  and  in  his  belief  that  the  war  was 


The  Case  Against  CaiUauoc  245 

an  unqualified  disaster  to  his  country.  Without 
actually  committing  himself  to  an  opinion  as  to 
the  military  outcome,  he  still  maintained  that 
France  and  Germany  had  a  common  interest  in 
terminating  the  war  as  soon  as  possible  and  in 
reconciling  their  conflicting  extra-European  co- 
lonial ambitions.  He  remained  stubbornly  un- 
der the  spell  of  his  ante-bellum  theories.  With 
amazing  egoism  he  conceived  himself  as  the  in- 
strument for  remaking  Europe  on  the  foundation 
of  a  rapprochement  between  France  and  Ger- 
many. I  am  not  concerned  here  with  the  ques- 
tion of  Caillaux's  guilt  or  abuse  of  his  position 
either  before  or  during  the  war.  The  accusa- 
tions against  him  of  treason  or  of  intelligence 
with  the  enemy  are  still  unproven.  But  Cail- 
laux  himself  in  his  writings  and  in  his  speeches 
(notably  his  book  on  "Agadir:  Ma  Politique  Eac- 
terieure"  and  his  last  speech  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  before  his  arrest)  confessed  to  holding 
the  opinions  and  following  the  policy  outlined 
above.  The  opinions  may  have  been  well 
grounded  and  sincere.     The  policy  may  have 


246  France  and  Ourselves 

been  wise.  But  France  could  not  possibly  have 
followed  Caillaux. 

Adverse  judgment  has  been  passed  upon  Cail- 
laux by  his  fellow-countrymen  because  he  sinned 
against  the  national  consciousness  of  France. 
In  this  sense  he  betrayed  France.  A  man  who 
has  been  placed  by  the  people  in  the  highest  posi- 
tion of  trust  is  under  the  obligation  of  represent- 
ing them.  As  an  individual  Joseph  Caillaux  had 
the  right  of  an  individual  in  a  free  country  to 
think  and  act  as  he  pleased  to  bring  about  a  rap- 
prochement with  Germany.  As  premier  he 
abused  his  delegated  authority,  and  later  as  for- 
mer premier  the  influence  derived  from  having 
been  premier,  to  bring  about  the  triumph  of  a 
policy  antipathetic  to  the  instincts  of  the  peo- 
ple who  had  entrusted  him  with  leadership. 
Whether  or  not  his  policy  was,  or  might  have 
been,  in  accord  with  the  permanent  interests  of 
France  does  not  enter  into  the  question. 

Two  years  ago  I  had  the  privilege  of  explain- 
ing to  "Century"  readers  how  the  French  felt 
about  Alsace  and  Lorraine.     (1)   The  loss  of 


The  Case  Against  Caillaux  247 

these  two  provinces  affected  vitally  the  life  and 
thought  of  the  generation  coming  to  manhood 
and  the  generation  born  in  the  Third  Republic. 
It  was  a  question  of  honor,  of  justice,  of  patriot- 
ism. Bygones  could  not  be  bygones.  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  were  part  of  the  living  flesh  of 
France.  It  was  inconceivable  that  a  Frenchman 
could  attempt  to  advocate  or  negotiate  any  sort 
of  rapprochement  between  the  aggressor  and  the 
victim  of  aggression  that  did  not  have  as  its  pre- 
liminary condition,  before  bases  of  compromise 
and  mutual  concession  in  other  moot  questions 
were  agreed  upon,  the  restoration  of  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  to  France.  In  entertaining  the 
thought  that  he  could  bridge  the  chasm  between 
France  and  Germany  without  taking  up  first  the 
Alsace-Lorraine  question  Caillaux  misjudged 
the  sentiment  of  national  honor.  This  is  where 
Caillaux  went  wrong  before  the  war. 

During  the  war  he  showed  equal  disregard  of 
the  traditions  and  sense  of  honor  of  his  race. 
Perhaps  he  was  obsessed.  Perhaps  the  process 
of  pure  reasoning  or  the  study  of  the  material 


248  France  and  Ourselves 

factors  and  advantages  of  the  problem  of 
France's  continental  policy  blinded  him  to  moral 
and  psychological  considerations.  Perhaps  he 
mistook  the  mental  attitude  of  thinkers  au-dessus 
de  la  melee,  or  of  Socialists  who  regarded  every 
problem  in  the  light  of  class  instead  of  national 
interest  for  the  feeling  of  the  majority  in  France. 
He  came  to  grief  in  forgetting  the  old  dictum 
that  "France  does  not  treat  with  the  enemy  upon 
the  soil  of  la  patrie"  More  than  once  France 
had  been  compelled  to  do  so — and  with  the  same 
enemy.  But  it  had  been  only  when  the  knife  was 
at  her  throat  and  when  she  stood  alone  without 
allies.  This  was  the  last  straw  on  the  camel's 
back.  Once  more  the  Germans  had  invaded 
France,  bringing  death  and  destruction,  and 
treating  hapless  civilians  with  a  barbarity  more 
ruthless  than  ever  before.  They  were  held  on 
the  Marne  and  driven  back  to  the  Aisne  in  one 
of  the  most  costly  but  most  glorious  battles  of 
French  history.  And  yet  a  former  President  du 
Conseil  dared  to  advocate  in  France,  in  neutral 
countries  and  in  Italy,  cessation  of  hostilities  be- 


The  Case  Against  Caillaux  249 

fore  the  task  was  completed,  and  reconciliation 
with  Germany,  the  aggressor,  the  invader,  the 
assassin,  the  pillager.  When  they  found  out 
what  Caillaux  had  been  doing,  the  French  re- 
volted against  the  insult  of  it  all.  "Bravo!"  they 
cried  at  the  news  of  Caillaux's  arrest. 

But  now  that  the  war  is  over  and  the  Germans 
have  been  beaten  and  humiliated,  and  especially 
since  Alsace  and  Lorraine  have  returned  to 
France,  the  attitude  toward  Germans  is  being 
modified.  Your  hatred  of  the  man  you  have 
whipped  cannot  remain  as  intense  as  your  hatred 
of  the  bully.  The  thief  who  has  been  made  to 
disgorge  stolen  property  is  in  a  different  relation 
toward  you.  The  French  have  paid  off  old 
scores  with  a  vengeance.  But  their  superiority 
over  Germany  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they  are 
not  alone  in  imposing  their  will  upon  Germany. 
The  victory  could  not  have  been  won  without  the 
aid  of  Anglo-  Saxondom.  The  peace  cannot  be 
assured  without  the  cooperation  of  Anglo- 
Saxondom. 

The  French  have  paid  a  fearful  price  for  vie- 


250  France  and  Ourselves 

tory.  The  excitement  and  uncertainty  and  ne- 
cessity of  straining  every  nerve  are  over.  A 
more  dangerous  period  of  moral  depression  is 
being  entered  upon  than  at  any  time  during  the 
war.  The  French  are  beginning  to  realize  for 
the  first  time  what  the  victory  has  cost  them.  If 
it  proves  to  be  a  real  victory,  with  tangible  and 
beneficial  results,  all  right.     If  not — ? 

The  unthinkable  alternative  is  possible  only  if 
the  British  and  ourselves  withdraw  or  gradually 
lessen  our  military  support  of  France.  Is  it  true 
that  Anglo- Saxondom  considers  its  interests 
wholly  extra-European,  and  that  the  continental 
position  of  France  will  compel  her  to  come  to  a 
rapprochement  with  Germany  after  all?  This  is 
the  significance  of  the  Caillaux  case.  Are  we 
going  to  give  Joseph  Caillaux  the  chance  to  say, 
"I  told  you  so"? 


CHAPTER  IX 


WHAT   CONFRONTS   FRANCE1 


UNTIL  Germany  forced  us  into  the  war, 
public  opinion  was  divided  as  to  the  advis- 
ability of  getting  involved  in  the  European  con- 
flict. Most  Americans  knew  little  and  cared  less 
about  what  was  going  on  in  Europe.  We  had 
our  prejudices  and  our  sympathies.  We  con- 
demned the  invasion  of  Belgium  and  the  way 
Germany  was  conducting  the  war.  We  resented 
the  methods  and  the  appeal  of  the  German  propa- 
ganda in  the  United  States.  But  at  the  end  of 
1916  there  were  few  who  dared  to  prophesy  that 
American  intervention,  even  if  it  became  neces- 
sary, would  be  popular.  The  astonishing  events 
of  the  first  months  of  1917  demonstrated  the 
absurdity  of  the  belief  in  our  lack  of  national 
unity.     This  belief  was  far  more  widespread  in 

i  December,  1919. 

251 


252  France  and  Ourselves 

Europe  than  we  dreamed  of  and  was  fostered  by 
Americans  who  had  lived  too  long  in  exile  or  who 
had  become  plus  royalistes  que  le  rot  in  their 
championship  of  one  or  the  other  of  the  groups 
of  belligerents.  The  American  people  did  not 
need  to  be  whipped  into  line.  Every  measure 
placed  before  Congress  by  the  President  to  make 
our  belligerency  effective  received  the  immediate 
and  unanimous  approval  of  the  nation.  We 
went  into  the  war  for  all  we  were  worth  and  were 
willing  to  consent  to  every  sacrifice  necessary  to 
defeat  Germany.  We  gave  aid  to  France  and 
our  other  allies  to  the  full  extent  of  our  resources 
in  man-power,  materials,  and  money. 

But  the  war  was  won  only  in  the  narrowest 
sense  of  the  word  when  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
was  signed.  Whether  the  victory  is  to  mean 
anything,  whether  it  is  to  mark  a  permanent 
progress  on  the  road  toward  democracy  and  world 
peace,  depends  upon  what  happens  in  Europe 
during  the  next  few  years.  If  we  do  not  con- 
tinue to  give  active  aid  to  our  allies  during  the 
period  of  readjustment  and  reconstruction,  our 


What  Confronts  France  253 

intervention  from  1917  to  1919  will  have  proved 
a  flash  in  the  pan — no  more  than  that. 

France  is  the  pivot  upon  which  all  turns.  A 
strong  France  means  the  regeneration  of  Europe 
and  the  hope  of  a  world  peace  for  which  we 
fought.  A  weak  France  means  the  return  of  the 
old  autocratic  regime  in  central  Europe  and  Ger- 
many triumphant,  though  beaten  on  the  field  of 
battle.  Our  obligation  to  France,  our  moral  re- 
sponsibility to  "carry  on,"  is  as  great  now  as  it 
was  when  the  A.  E.  F.  was  fighting  over  there. 

Every  news  despatch  from  Europe  is  impreg- 
nated with  the  feeling  of  hopelessness  and  im- 
pending disaster.  Pessimistic  forebodings  seem 
to  be  the  order  of  the  day.  One  cannot  deny  or 
minimize  the  dangers.  But  the  role  of  Cassan- 
dra is  as  futile  to  play  as  it  is  easy  to  play.  The 
crisis  through  which  the  world  is  passing  calls 
for  constructive  thinking.  We  have  to  see  foun- 
dations upon  which  to  build  and  be  confident  that 
we  can  build  upon  them.  The  disquieting  radi- 
calism that  is  capturing  many  of  our  best  intel- 
lects assumes  that  the  regeneration  of  the  world 


254  France  and  Ourselves 

depends  upon  the  destruction  of  the  existing  so- 
cial order.  Do  the  foundations  necessarily  have 
to  be  new?  Some  political  systems  and  organ- 
isms have  crumbled  and  others  show  serious 
fissures.  Does  unsuccessful  building,  however, 
prove  that  the  foundations  are  responsible  for 
instability?  We  have  the  most  striking  demon- 
stration of  the  falsity  of  this  reasoning  in  com- 
paring Christ  and  His  church.  The  great  ma- 
jority of  thinking  men  will  agree  that  the  salva- 
tion of  the  world  lies  in  reconstruction  on  the  old 
foundations.  That  is  the  way  we  shall  go  about 
it.  There  is  no  fear  that  France  will  be  swept 
away  from  her  moorings.  In  studying  what 
confronts  France  we  do  not  need  to  take  into 
consideration  the  possibility  of  a  social  revolu- 
tion, partnership  in  a  super-state,  or  the  inaugu- 
ration of  the  era  of  internationalism  in  Europe. 

The  prevalent  idea  that  France  has  just  passed 
through  an  ordeal  unique  in  her  history,  and  that 
the  nation  has  never  before  been  called  upon  to 
face  post-bellum  conditions  as  calamitous  and  as 
hopeless  as  those  she   faces  to-day,   is  wholly 


What  Confronts  France  255 

wrong.  Let  us  leave  to  the  ignorant  and  un- 
thinking the  belief  that  our  experiences  are  unlike 
those  of  others.  Human  nature  is  never  called 
upon  to  bear  more  than  it  can  stand  or  more  than 
previous  generations  have  stood.  The  Preacher 
was  not  mistaken  when  he  said,  "There  is  no  new 
thing  under  the  sun."  No  historian  has  been 
able  to  refute  Vico's  theory  of  cycles.  If  we 
want  to  forecast  the  reaction  of  France  to  the 
losses  and  devastation  of  the  recent  war,  we  have 
every  reason  to  study  the  periods  in  her  history 
when  through  war  her  fairest  provinces  were  de- 
vastated, her  economic  life  ruined,  her  financial 
credit  impaired,  and  her  soil  occupied  for  a  long 
time  by  the  enemy. 

For  propaganda  purposes  during  the  war  it 
was  justifiable  to  claim  that  what  the  Germans 
did  between  1914  and  1919  was  worse  than  any- 
thing that  had  ever  happened  in  France  and  than 
anything  that  had  been  done  by  other  nations  at 
war.  When  I  traveled  through  the  devastated 
regions  of  northern  France,  I  remembered  what 
I  had  read  of  other  invasions  in  the  fourteenth, 


256  France  and  Ourselves 

fifteenth,  and  sixteenth  centuries.  It  was  of  a 
more  extended  region  that  Thomas  Basin,  Bishop 
of  Lisieux,  said: 

I  have  seen  with  my  own  eyes  the  fields  of  Champagne, 
Brie,  Gatinais,  Chartres,  Dreux,  Maine,  and  Perche, 
those  of  Vexin,  Beauvais,  from  the  country  of  Caux  on 
the  Seine  up  to  Amiens,  from  Senlis,  Soissons,  Valois 
and  all  the  country  up  to  Laon  and  beyond  towards 
Hainaut,  hideous  to  look  at,  devoid  of  peasants,  full  of 
thistles  and  cactus. 

And  Jean  Juvenal  des  Ursins,  Bishop  of  Beau- 
vais, wrote  to  King  Charles : 

How  many  churches  have  been  burned!  They  take 
the  poor  farmers,  they  imprison  them,  they  put  them  in 
irons  in  disgusting  places  full  of  vermin.  They  are 
freed  only  after  having  paid  more  than  they  possess. 
These  brigands  mistreat  also  the  women  and  girls. 
Mills,  ovens,  cider-presses,  every  sort  of  agricultural 
and  household  utensil  is  ruined  or  stolen.  Alas !  Sire, 
look  at  your  other  cities  and  countries,  like  Guyenne, 
Toulouse,  Languedoc.  Everything  is  going  to  destruc- 
tion and  desolation — even  to  final  perdition. 

But  both  bishops  lived  to  describe  the  wonder- 
ful recovery  of  France  after  Jeanne  d'Arc  com- 
pelled the  English  to  withdraw  from  the  devas- 


What  Confronts  France  257 

tated  regions.  Peasants  and  artisans  reap- 
peared, when  all  were  thought  to  be  hopelessly 
dispersed  if  not  dead;  cities  were  rebuilt;  indus- 
try, with  a  fresh  impetus,  entered  into  a  more 
flourishing  period  than  France  had  ever  known ; 
commerce,  despite  currency  depreciated  to  noth- 
ing, revived  and  restored  confidence  in  the  coin- 
age; and  soon  the  cultivated  lands  of  the  king- 
dom were  a  third  more  than  they  had  ever  been. 
Charles  VII  became  the  greatest  monarch  in 
Europe.  It  was  a  far  cry — and  yet  not  many 
years — from  the  day  Jeanne  d'Arc  sought  an 
audience  with  her  dispossessed  and  discredited 
sovereign  to  the  time  when  the  Doge  of  Venice 
said  of  the  ruler  of  France  that  he  was  "the  king 
of  kings  without  whom  nothing  could  be  done  in 
Europe." 

To  cheer  up  his  compatriots  during  the  war 
Ernest  Lavisse,  the  aged  historian,  wrote  a  de- 
tailed account  of  how  France  was  left  after  the 
wars  of  the  Ligue.  The  period  of  strife  that 
ended  with  Henri  IV  hurt  France  as  much  as 
the  Hundred  Years'  War,  but  the  first  ten  years 


258  France  and  Ourselves 

of  peace  brought  a  change  as  rapid  as  that  after 
the  English  had  been  driven  out.  The  recovery 
was  not  immediate.  Prosperity  began  to  set  in 
five  years  after  Henri  IV  entered  Paris.  In 
proportion  to  the  population  and  wealth  of  the 
country,  France  suffered  more  from  civil  strife 
at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century  than  from  the 
Germans  in  the  twentieth  century.  Four  thou- 
sand chateaux  and  one  hundred  and  twenty-five 
thousand  houses  were  burned  and  the  weaving 
and  silk  industries  were  completely  stopped.  At 
Provins,  for  instance,  four  looms  out  of  six  hun- 
dred, and  at  Tours  two  hundred  silk-weavers  out 
of  fourteen  hundred  were  left.  The  cities  were 
full  of  beggars,  refugee  peasants,  and  unem- 
ployed workmen.  In  March,  1596,  the  police  of 
Paris  counted  nearly  eight  thousand  refugees 
sleeping  in  one  cemetery.  In  1597,  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  Parisians  died  of  the  plague. 
Etienne  Pasquier  said  that  he  saw  no  longer 
France,  but  the  corpse  of  France.  And  yet  be- 
fore the  end  of  his  reign  Henri  IV  was  able  to 
boast  that  every  peasant  could  eat  chicken  on 


What  Confronts  France  259 

Sunday.  In  1598,  the  Venetian  Ambassador 
wrote  that  France  was  recovering  easily  "just  as 
that  had  happened  several  times  in  the  space  of 
a  thousand  years." 

Prince  von  Biilow  has  given  remarkable  testi- 
mony of  the  traditional  power  of  the  French  to 
recover  after  long  periods  of  war  and  invasion. 
He  declared: 

France  has  an  unchangeable  faith  in  the  indestruc- 
tibility of  the  vital  forces  of  the  nation.  No  people 
have  ever  repaired  as  quickly  as  the  French  the  results 
of  national  catastrophes;  no  people  have  found  again 
with  the  same  ease  self-confidence  and  the  spirit  of 
initiative  after  cruel  misfortune.  More  than  once  Eu- 
rope believed  that  France  had  ceased  to  be  dangerous, 
but  each  time  the  French  nation  confronted  Europe 
again  after  a  short  delay  with  its  former  vigor  or 
increased  strength. 

The  confidence  that  we  have  every  reason  to 
feel  in  the  rapid  rehabilitation  of  France  is  a  con- 
fidence based  not  only  on  the  admirable  spirit  of 
the  French  race  but  also  on  the  natural  resources 
of  France.  The  country  has  unrivaled  wealth  in 
her  soil,  her  rivers,  her  outlet  to  two  oceans  with 
the  longest  port-studded  sea-coast  in  Europe, 


260  France  and  Ourselves 

and  her  colonies  (the  richest  of  which  are  very 
near  the  mother  country) .  France  has  the  good- 
will and  friendship  of  the  world.  And  we  have 
to  take  into  consideration  the  inestimable  moral 
value  of  the  victory  and  how  it  was  won — a  vic- 
tory consecrated  by  the  restoration  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine. 

In  the  speech  at  Strasbourg  that  crowned  his 
long  career  Premier  Clemenceau  gave  the  slogan 
for  the  reconstruction  era.  He  said  simply, 
"Work  is  our  salvation."  France  has  already 
gotten  to  work.  The  record  of  the  year  since 
the  armistice  is  impressive.  Monsieur  Tardieu 
has  given  some  of  the  figures:  2016  kilometers  of 
railway  reestablished  out  of  2246  destroyed;  700 
kilometers  of  canals  out  of  1075  again  in  com- 
mission; 588  repaired  out  of  1160  tunnels  and 
bridges  blown  up;  60,000  houses  rebuilt;  nearly 
1,000,000  acres  (one  fourth  of  the  total  ravished) 
bearing  crops ;  virtually  all  the  trenches  filled  in ; 
and  10,000,000  meters  of  barbed  wire  torn  up  and 
removed. 

To  the  Ciceronian  cry  that  the  republic  must 


What  Confronts  France  261 

not  be  despaired  of,  the  French  have  answered: 
Nihil  desperandum. 

But  what  confronts  France  to-day  has  three 
elements  that  are  without  analogy  in  past  history. 
Upon  the  problems  arising  from  German  politi- 
cal unity,  decreasing  birth-rate  and  a  national 
debt  that  threatens  bankruptcy,  we  must  con- 
centrate our  attention.  In  examining  these 
three  problems,  explaining  the  solutions  that  are 
suggested  for  them,  and  pointing  out  how  Amer- 
ica can  aid  France  in  solving  two  of  them,  I  de- 
sire to  insist  upon  the  fact  that  my  sources  of 
information  are  French  sources.  The  French 
are  alive  to  the  serious  character  of  the  problems. 
They  have  not  waited  for  foreigners  to  call  atten- 
tion to  the  danger  of  failing  to  solve  them 
promptly.  They  do  not  need  to  be  exhorted  to 
confront  them  resolutely  and  effectively.  No 
nation  in  the  world  knows  better  than  the  French 
that  God  helps  those  who  help  themselves.  They 
proved  that  during  the  war. 

Americans  and  Britishers  regard  too  lightly 
the    effect    of    the    numerical    and    industrial 


262  France  and  Ourselves 

strength  of  post-bellum  Germany  upon  the  re- 
habilitation of  France.  They  do  not  compre- 
hend how  it  is  that  her  continental  position  handi- 
caps France  in  a  way  that  neither  Great  Britain 
nor  the  United  States  needs  to  fear.  Writing 
from  Paris  during  the  Peace  Conference,  I  at- 
tempted to  set  forth  in  "The  Century"  the  atti- 
tude of  France  toward  peace,  and  show  why  it 
necessarily  differed  from  the  attitude  of  her 
Anglo-Saxon  allies.1  As  a  continental  Eu- 
ropean state,  having  a  frontier  in  common  with 
Germany,  it  is  impossible  for  France  to  trust  her 
security  to  the  vague  and  as  yet  untried  formulae 
of  the  society  of  nations.  She  must  have  more 
positive  military  guarantees  against  a  renewal  of 
German  aggression  than  are  required  by  the 
other  great  powers.  Owing  to  the  wanton  de- 
struction of  her  industries,  committed  by  the 
Germans  for  the  very  purpose  of  putting  her  out 
of  the  running  as  a  competitor  in  commerce,  it  is 
reasonable  for  her  to  demand  aid  and  protection 
against  the  intact  industrial  machinery  of  Ger- 

i  See  "The  Century,"  April,  1919. 


What  Confronts  France  263 

many.  Hence  the  importance  of  the  supplemen- 
tary treaty  with  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  Hence  the  insistence  of  France  upon  the 
necessity  of  inter-allied  control  of  Germany's  ex- 
port trade  until  such  a  time  as  Germany  has 
made  full  reparation  for  the  damage  done  to 
French  industry  during  the  German  occupa- 
tion. 

No  one  contests  the  argument  that  the  best  so- 
lution of  this  problem  is  the  formation  of  a  society 
of  nations.  Then  France,  no  more  than  any 
other  nation,  need  fear  that  she  will  be  left  alone 
to  confront  an  unscrupulous  enemy  of  superior 
numbers.  But  the  society  of  nations  is  still  in  the 
academic  stage.  The  surcharged  atmosphere  of 
the  Conference  of  Paris  could  not  have  been  ex- 
pected to  produce  a  visible  charter  for  an  organ- 
ization that  must,  in  the  very  nature  of  things, 
be  born  of  the  renunciation  of  particular  interests 
for  the  common  weal.  The  "Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations"  did  not  have  the  germ  of  life 
in  it.  In  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  it  was  an 
anomaly.     None  of  my  French  friends  expected 


264  France  and  Ourselves 

the  United  States  Senate  to  accept  without  reser- 
vation this  abortion. 

Until  such  a  time  as  world-wide  public  opinion 
is  ready  to  force  statesmen  to  formulate  and 
adopt  an  honest  and  inclusive  and  effective  cove- 
nant, the  French  prefer  the  joint  guarantee  of 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  We  can 
help  France  best  by  entering  into  this  guarantee 
and  showing  Germany  that  we  are  in  dead  ear- 
nest in  our  pledge  to  protect  France  against  mili- 
tary aggression  and  unfair  commercial  competi- 
tion. 

M.  Eric  Sjoestedt,  Paris  correspondent  of  the 
Dagens  Nyheter  of  Stockholm,  wrote  in  1913  a 
very  clever  article  on  what  he  called  the  "depopu- 
lation scare."  Monsieur  Sjoestedt  thought  the 
French  were  bothering  their  heads  excessively 
over  the  failure  of  the  population  of  France  to 
increase.  From  the  economic  point  of  view, 
France  was  better  off  through  not  increasing  her 
population.  He  pointed  to  the  competitive  in- 
dustries of  England  and  Germany  to  prove  what 
happens  to  nations  that  multiply  too  rapidly. 


What  Confronts  France  265 

The  prosperity  and  tranquillity  of  France  were 
due  to  the  fact  that  every  one  had  elbow  room 
and  people  could  save  money  and  buy  land. 
From  a  social  point  of  view,  the  limitation  of 
families  was  a  distinct  advantage  to  the  well- 
being  of  the  nation. 

Most  French  economists  and  publicists  were 
far  from  accepting  these  opinions.  They  looked 
on  the  decreasing  natality  of  France  as  a  source 
of  economic  and  social  weakness.  They  had 
their  grave  misgivings  about  the  manner  in 
which  French  surplus  capital  was  being  invested. 
And  they  wondered  about  the  military  inferiority 
of  France  in  the  face  of  Germany. 

This  anxiety  was  also  dismissed  lightly  by  the 

Swedish  journalist.     He  said: 

Remains  the  military  point  of  view.  With  her  pres- 
ent population  France  is  perfectly  able  to  hold  her  own 
against  Germany:  for  nations  cannot  use  their  full 
numerical  strength  in  war.  It  is  physically  impossible 
to  put  millions  of  men  in  the  field  against  each  other: 
they  could  neither  be  fed  nor  directed. 

How  strange  assertions  like  this  read  now  that 
we  have   been   through   the    Great  War!     Of 


266  France  and  Ourselves 

course  the  French  military  authorities  were  not 
as  unconcerned  as  Monsieur  Sjoestedt.  To 
make  up  for  the  inferiority  of  numbers,  the  law 
increasing  obligatory  service  from  two  to  three 
years  was  passed  just  before  the  war.  The  in- 
vasion of  France  and  the  occupation  of  Belgium 
and  northern  France  for  more  than  four  years 
by  the  Germans,  despite  Russian  and  British  in- 
tervention immediately  and  Italian  and  Ameri- 
can intervention  later,  is  proof  that  the  possession 
of  a  much  larger  population  gives  the  bigger  na- 
tion an  overwhelming  initial  advantage  that  the 
most  closely  knit  alliances  are  unable  to  offset. 
France  now  relies  upon  a  defensive  alliance  with 
Great  Britain  and  America.  But  will  it  not  take 
time  to  mobilize  and  train  and  transport  our 
armies  to  France?  And  are  we  sure  of  the  fu- 
ture tendencies  of  Russia? 

The  head-lines  of  French  newspapers  and  re- 
views show  very  clearly  that  the  molders  of  pub- 
lic opinion  are  alive  to  the  dangers  of  the  present 
situation.  Glancing  through  my  last  mail  from 
France,  I  find  these  headings:     "France  is  a 


What  Confronts  France  267 

dying  country" ;  "The  decrease  of  the  birth-rate" ; 
"The  problem  of  depopulation";  "We  must  in- 
crease our  birth-rate";  "Warning — We  must 
look  out!";  "Let  us  repeople  France";  "For 
large  families" ;  "The  struggle  against  depopula- 
tion." All  tell  the  same  sad  tale — statistics,  rea- 
sons for  the  evil,  dangers  that  await  France, 
remedies. 

In  the  last  normal  year  before  the  war  (1913) 
the  increase  in  population  per  thousand  inhabit- 
ants in  central  and  western  Europe  was  as  fol- 
lows : 

Germany 14.1 

Great  Britain  . ., 11.5 

Austria-Hungary    . 11.4 

Italy    11.3 

France 0.7 

One  of  the  prophets  whose  voice  and  pen  have 
warned  France  of  the  danger  ahead  summed  up 
the  problem  in  a  single  sentence.  Emile  Picard 
said:  "At  this  rate  it  would  require  370  years 
for  our  population  to  double,  while  Germany  in 
a  century  has  almost  tripled  her  population."     A 


268  France  and  Ourselves 

Japanese  correspondent  writing  from  Paris  put 
the  situation  more  brutally  in  the  sweeping  state- 
ment, "Each  year  the  population  of  France  is 
diminishing:  one  can  therefore  reasonably  pre- 
dict that  at  the  end  of  this  century  France  will, 
because  of  this  fact,  disappear  from  the  list  of 
nations." 

If  we  are  inclined  to  protest  against  this  star- 
tling conclusion,  which  seems  to  make  hopeless 
any  permanent  good  arising  out  of  the  victory 
over  Germany,  there  are  competent  French  au- 
thorities who  are  not  less  positive  that  France  is 
going  to  impotence  and  destruction  through  the 
failure  to  procreate  a  new  generation.  In  his 
pastoral  letter  for  Easter,  1917,  the  Archbishop 
of  Auch  wrote  that  while  less  than  a  century  ago 
France  was  at  the  head  of  all  the  peoples  of 
Europe,  to-day  she  counts  for  only  one  tenth. 
In  actual  increase  of  population,  counting  in  all 
the  little  countries  with  a  tithe  or  less  than  a 
tithe  of  her  own  population,  France  was  six- 
teenth on  the  list  of  the  seventeen  European 
countries. 


What  Confronts  France  269 

M.  Paul  Bureau,  of  the  Catholic  University  of 
Paris,  declares  that  unless  there  is  a  sudden  and 
sweeping  change  in  the  demographic  charts  the 
French  nation  is  doomed  to  extinction.  The  fa- 
mous Dr.  Bertillon,  who  has  worked  for  twenty 
years  to  arouse  the  French  to  the  breakers  ahead, 
insists  that  the  crisis  is  of  recent  origin.  From 
1856  to  1866  France  averaged  1,000,000  births  a 
year.  In  proportion  to  other  countries,  she 
ought  to  have  had  1,400,000.  From  1867  to 
1882,  the  annual  increase  fluctuated  between 
1,000,000  and  900,000.  The  fall  in  the  succeed- 
ing decades  of  the  Third  Republic  was  rapid — 
800,000,  700,000,  600,000. 

"We  are  falling  behind  now  about  500,000 
births  per  year  in  proportion  to  other  countries," 
says  Dr.  Bertillon.  "Our  death-rate  is  increas- 
ing: each  year  300,000  above  fifty  years  are  dy- 
ing. If  the  birth-rate  continues  to  fall  in  the 
same  degree,  in  eighty  years  there  will  be  no 
France.  Reducing  infant  mortality  is  a  drop 
in  the  bucket.  In  1913,  only  83,000  babies  died. 
The  best  of  care  and  skill  could  hardly  have  saved 


270  France  and  Ourselves 

a  quarter  of  these.  The  only  remedy  for  France 
is  to  have  as  many  births  as  other  nations." 

An  analysis  of  comparative  population  of 
France  and  Germany  shows  only  one  fourth 
more  Germans  than  Frenchmen  between  forty 
and  fifty,  and  two  fifths  more  between  twenty 
and  forty.  But  between  seventeen  and  nine- 
teen— and  certainly  under  that  age — Germany 
has  more  than  twice  as  many  males  as  has  France. 
The  losses  in  the  war  do  not  change  greatly  this 
proportion.  And  the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
to  France  brings  an  increase  of  population  that 
scarcely  balances  the  dead  and  disabled,  of  the 
French  armies.  The  latest  statistics  at  hand 
show  an  excess  of  deaths  over  births  in  1917  of 
269,838;  and  in  1918,  389,575. 

The  failure  of  France  to  breed  a  new  genera- 
tion constitutes  a  military  inferiority  that  no  alli- 
ances can  make  up  for.  The  stipulations  of  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  are  only  temporary.  Ger- 
many bowed  to  force.  France  will  not  be  able 
to  continue  to  apply  that  force  when  the  British 
and  American  armies  are  far  away  and  demobil- 


What  Confronts  France  271 

ized.  The  Anglo-American  Treaty  helps  for  the 
time  being.  France  will  have  a  breathing-spell. 
This  will  give  her  time  to  make  children.  Make 
children  she  must.     France  realizes  that. 

The  handicap  from  depopulation  is  far  greater 
than  military  inferiority.  Granted  that  we  are 
able  to  hold  Germany  to  her  promises  to  limit 
armies  and  the  manufacture  of  war  materials,  we 
cannot  conceive  of  a  larger  racial  unit  being  kept 
under  the  economic  control,  or  being  checked  in 
economic  expansion,  by  a  smaller  racial  unit, 
especially  when  the  smaller  unit  is  inferior  in 
the  tools  of  production.  France  must  have  a 
large  new  generation  to  man  her  factories,  to 
furnish  the  home  market  for  manufactured  arti- 
cles, to  act  as  agents  for  trade  abroad. 

Decrease  in  the  density  of  population,  or  fail- 
ure to  increase  the  density  of  population,  makes 
impossible  further  development  of  public  works, 
canals,  railways,  mining,  and  industrial  enter- 
prises. Far-seeing  Frenchmen  do  not  hesitate  to 
hold  up  the  example  of  Germany  before  their 
compatriots.     In  1880,  with  a  population  of  less 


272  France  and  Ourselves 

than  50,000,000,  Germany  had  an  emigration 
overflow  of  200,000  per  annum.  In  1914,  with 
a  population  of  nearly  70,000,000,  emigration 
had  ceased,  and  from  600,000  to  800,000  foreign- 
ers entered  Germany  each  year  to  work  in  the 
fields  and  in  the  mines  and  factories.  This  re- 
futes the  theory  that  increase  in  population 
brings  economic  and  social  distress  by  making 
work  harder  to  find.  Germany  was  able  to  in- 
crease her  industries,  her  means  of  transporta- 
tion, her  cities,  her  agricultural  yield,  for  the  very 
reason  that  the  population  grew  so  rapidly  and 
thus  made  possible  greater  collective  effort  and 
expenditure.  In  America  we  have  had  the  expe- 
rience of  Germany.  Our  rapid  increase  of 
wealth  and  power  is  largely  due  to  the  rapid  in- 
crease of  population. 

Another  serious  phase  of  depopulation  is  its 
menace  to  the  influence  of  France  overseas. 
With  a  colonial  empire  second  only  to  that  of 
Great  Britain  and  mostly  won  since  the  popula- 
tion of  France  became  stationary,  the  French 
have  been  able  to  carry  on  and  expand  up  to  this 


What  Confronts  France  273 

point  only  because  the  flower  of  France  felt  the 
sacred  call  to  a  military  career.  I  have  had  the 
fortune  to  live  in  intimate  association  with  many 
men  of  my  own  age  and  older  in  France.  It  is 
a  generation  born  between  1850  and  1880.  In 
other  circumstances  than  those  of  the  humiliating 
defeat  and  the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  very 
many  of  these  men — the  men  who  have  made  pos- 
sible the  colonial  success  of  France — would  not 
have  chosen  a  military  career. 

It  has  been  difficult  enough  to  get  civil  admin- 
istrators for  the  French  colonies.  Of  bona-fide 
colonists  there  have  been  very  few.  Now  that 
the  military  incentive  may  be  lacking,  how  can 
France  hope  to  induce  her  good  men — or  even 
enough  men — to  enter  the  colonial  career? 
There  is  no  inducement  of  caste.  Remains  the 
reason  that  has  sent  Britons  overseas — surplus 
population.  The  present  conditions  may  be 
maintained  in  the  French  colonies  for  a  decade  or 
two.  But  that  is  the  limit.  Eventually  there 
must  be  more  Frenchmen  or  there  will  be  fewer 
colonies. 


274  France  and  Ourselves 

Qualified  French  observers  are  virtually  unani- 
mous in  denying  that  the  reason  for  a  low  birth- 
rate is  the  general  economic  reason,  given  to  ex- 
plain smaller  families  the  world  over.  In  the 
upper  classes  the  economic  reason  may  be  true  as 
it  is  in  other  countries.  But  France  is  the  last 
country  in  Europe  to  be  able  to  advance  this 
reason  as  applicable  to  the  mass  of  her  popula- 
tion. For  France  has  greater  natural  wealth 
and  a  better  distribution  of  land  and  affords  more 
opportunities  for  making  a  living  than  any  other 
European  country  except  Russia.  And  there  is 
an  abnormal  discrepancy  between  the  decrease  in 
the  French  birth-rate  and  that  of  other  countries. 
Dr.  Richet  said  frankly  in  a  recent  address  to  the 
Academie  de  Medecine: 

The  one  and  only  cause  of  depopulation  in  France  is 
economy.  We  do  not  want  to  have  children  because 
that  entails  spending  money.  It  costs  to  lodge  and 
feed  and  clothe  a  child,  and  we  do  not  consent  to  go  to 
that  expense.  The  number  of  births  can  be  what  the 
State  wishes.  Decide  upon  the  amount  of  the  aid  given 
to  parents,  and  you  will  at  the  same  time  be  sure  of  the 
number  of  French  births.  There  are  now  700,000 
births :  there  will  be  2,000,000  if  you  wish.     If  a  child, 


What  Confronts  France  275 

instead  of  causing  the  family  expense,  brings  money  to 
the  family,  the  number  of  births  will  be  enormous. 

Dr.  Richet's  reason  for  the  decreasing  birth- 
rate is  accepted  by  his  compatriots.  This  is 
shown  by  the  nature  of  the  religious  appeal  put 
forth  in  the  pastoral  letters  of  the  clergy,  and  the 
remedies,  social  and  legislative,  suggested  by 
economists  and  publicists.  Bishops  endeavor  to 
show  that  restricting  the  size  of  families  is  false 
economy  and  that  children  are  really  a  source  of 
wealth  to  the  nation  and  eventually  to  every  in- 
dividual in  the  body  social.  The  propaganda 
organizations  for  increasing  the  birth-rate  believe 
that  the  state  must  intervene  to  make  it  possible 
to  raise  children  without  the  financial  inconven- 
iences— penalties,  one  might  say — that  now  at- 
tend the  parents  of  large  families.  The  advo- 
cacy of  legislation  to  stamp  out  abortion  has  been 
superseded  by  bills  to  give  state  aid  to  parents 
by  means  of  premiums,  lessening  of  taxation,  and 
freedom  from  military  service  for  the  father  after 
the  birth  of  the  third  child.  The  Chamber  of 
Deputies  and  the  Senate  are  considering  bills  to 


276  France  and  Ourselves 

modify  the  civil  code  in  such  a  way  as  to  allow 
parents  the  right  to  make  a  will,  so  that  property 
and  business  may  be  saved  from  arbitrary  divi- 
sion and  dissolution. 

The  question  of  taxation  means  more  in  rela- 
tion to  the  problem  of  natality  in  France  than  in 
other  countries.  I  know  this  from  personal  ex- 
perience as  the  father  of  four  children  raised  in 
France.  The  vicious  system  of  increasing  reve- 
nue by  additional  indirect  taxation  distributes  the 
burden  unfairly.  Taxes  on  food,  railway  tickets, 
medicines,  clothing,  consumption  of  fuel  and 
light  and  water,  matches,  theater  tickets — all 
these  means  of  increasing  revenue  act  as  a  means 
of  decreasing  potential  revenue-payers. 

The  legislators  feel  that  the  impulse  for  reme- 
dial legislation  in  the  matter  of  depopulation 
must  have  behind  it  more  than  public  opinion. 
Voters  are  selfish,  and  parents  are  not  apt  to  get 
a  square  deal  and  to  secure  special  privileges  of 
state  aid  and  lighter  taxes  unless  their  electoral 
influence  is  greatly  increased.  The  franchise  in 
France  puts  the  fathers  of  large  families   in 


What  Confronts  France  277 

a  shockingly  disadvantageous  position.  Three 
fourths  of  the  French  electorate  have  no  particu- 
lar interest  in  the  problem  of  what  to  do  for  the 
family  with  three  children  or  more.  And  yet  the 
other  fourth  represents  considerably  more  than 
half  the  population  of  France.  That  fathers 
should  have  the  right  to  supplementary  votes  for 
all  their  living  children  is  a  proposal  that  is  being 
taken  seriously.  A  bill  to  that  effect  was  de- 
feated in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  by  the  narrow 
margin  of  219  against  200.  The  project  is  be- 
fore the  Senate  now.  If  the  defeat  of  Germany 
results  in  being  able  to  cut  down  the  standing 
army,  there  is  no  doubt  parenthood  and  not  age 
will  be  the  criterion  of  exemption  from  military 
service. 

A  remarkably  large  foundation  for  a  country 
of  few  millionaires  has  been  established  in  France 
by  Theodore  Cognacq.  The  fund,  which  is  man- 
aged by  the  Academie  de  Medecine,  amounts  to 
50,000,000  francs.  The  interest  is  to  be  given 
yearly  to  ninety  families  of  nine  children  or  more. 
This  year  twelve  thousand  families  applied  for 


278  France  and  Ourselves 

the  grant.  The  Academie  Francaise  is  also  tak- 
ing part  in  the  new  movement  to  stimulate  the 
birth-rate.  A  part  of  its  numerous  prix  de  vertu 
are  now  being  awarded  to  parents  who  have 
brought  up  large  families.  From  the  different 
foundations  twenty-one  families  received  in  1916 
prizes  of  from  1000  to  2000  francs.  The  average 
number  of  children  to  the  family  was  sixteen,  of 
whom  fourteen  were  living.  In  1917,  for  two  big 
prizes  of  10,000  francs  each,  there  were  four  hun- 
dred applications.  Thirty  of  the  families  had 
more  than  fifteen  children.  It  is  a  mistake  to 
think  that  patriarchal  life  has  entirely  disap- 
peared from  France. 

Have  I  not  said  enough  to  convince  my  readers 
that  the  problem  of  depopulation  is  not  hopeless 
of  solution  and  that  intelligent  efforts  are  being 
made  in  France  to  check  the  decreasing  birth- 
rate? 

In  her  finances,  France  is  suffering  from  a 
stupid  and  short-sighted  fiscal  policy  before  and 
during  the  war.  I  am  not  going  to  quote  figures 
as  I  did  in  illustrating  the  depopulation  problem. 


What  Confronts  France  279 

The  total  of  France's  indebtedness  is  not  a  mat- 
ter of  interest.  For  in  speaking  of  money,  fig- 
ures have  lost  all  meaning  since  1914.  We  have 
to  revise  our  ideas  of  the  seemingly  unlimited  pos- 
sibilities of  the  extension  of  credit.  No  banker 
or  economist  had  ever  dreamed  of  a  world  war 
in  which  the  belligerents  could  continue  to  bor- 
row from  one  another  and  from  their  own  na- 
tionals year  after  year  without  thought  of  how 
the  debts  were  piling  up  beyond  the  limit  of  in- 
terest payment,  let  alone  beyond  the  possibility  of 
liquidation. 

"There  isn't  so  much  money  in  the  world!" 
cried  Thiers,  when  Bismarck  demanded  six  bil- 
lion francs  as  a  war  indemnity  in  1871.  Bis- 
marck probably  thought  so,  too,  for  he  reduced 
the  amount  to  five  billions.  And  yet  to-day  we 
have  imposed  upon  Germany  twenty-five  times 
as  much  as  the  1871  indemnity  as  the  minimum 
she  must  pay.  France,  with  scarcely  more  popu- 
lation than  in  1871,  is  confronted  with  an  annual 
budget  of  from  eighteen  to  twenty-two  billion 
francs  per  annum.     The  discrepancy  of  four 


280  France  and  Ourselves 

billions  per  annum  in  the  budget  estimates  of 
experts  shows  how  far  we  have  traveled  since  the 
time  of  Thiers ! 

Few  Frenchmen  are  counting  upon  the  Ger- 
man war  indemnity  to  ease  the  financial  situation 
of  France.  If  the  Germans  pay  for  the  destruc- 
tion and  the  requisitions  during  the  period  of 
invasion  and  occupation,  we  shall  be  surprised. 
That  bill  mounts  up  beyond  the  financial  capacity 
of  Germany.  If  the  huge  additional  sum  for 
pensions  is  exacted,  the  hopes  of  the  most  opti- 
mistic Frenchmen  will  be  realized.  The  war 
debts,  with  the  appalling  annual  interest  exceed- 
ing the  total  revenue  of  France  before  the  war, 
remain  to  be  met.  We  are  told  that  France  has 
increased  her  revenue  from  five  billion  to  twelve 
billion  francs  since  1914.  But  let  us  not  be  de- 
ceived by  this  statement.  An  important  part  of 
the  increase  comes  from  taxing  war  profits,  and 
ceases  in  1920.  The  war-profits  tax  was  not 
revenue.  It  was  simply  a  compulsory  discount 
on  government  orders. 

When  we  examine  the  financial  situation  of 


What  Confronts  France  281 

France  with  the  question  in  mind  as  to  how 
France  is  to  make  both  ends  meet,  the  answer  is 
that  France  cannot  hope  to  pay  her  obligations, 
much  less  her  current  expenses.  Is  bankruptcy 
the  alternative?  That  depends  upon  what  we 
mean  by  bankruptcy.  It  would  be  bankruptcy 
if  France  were  to  default  interest  payment  on  the 
sums  borrowed  abroad  or  on  what  is  owed  abroad 
for  purchases  made  during  the  war.  We  may  be 
sure  that  this  will  never  happen.  Some  critics 
are  saying  that  because  France  is  already  seek- 
ing new  credits  in  America  for  payment  of  bills 
due  and  for  purchases  and  for  interest  due  our 
Government,  we  can  infer  that  France  is  insol- 
vent. The  inference  is  wrong.  These  new 
credits  are  being  sought  not  because  of  lack  of 
money  to  meet  obligations  but  because  of  unwill- 
ingness to  make  huge  payments  abroad  in  dollars 
when  the  franc  is  so  greatly  depreciated.  France 
can  now  honor  and  will  be  able  in  the  future  to 
honor  all  her  foreign  debts  both  as  to  interest 
and  principal.  But  she  asks  her  more  fortunate 
allies  to  wait  until  exchange  returns  to  normal, 


282  France  and  Ourselves 

and  to  help  her  stabilize  exchange  by  refraining 
from  compelling  her  to  buy  an  enormous  num- 
ber of  dollars  each  month. 

In  considering  the  payment  of  obligations  to 
her  own  citizens,  France  does  not  need  to  take 
the  same  attitude.  The  French  people  will  have 
to  realize  that  they  are  France  and  that  they  can- 
not be  creditors  and  debtors  at  the  same  time. 
More  than  ten  per  cent,  of  the  French  internal 
war  loans  is  water — in  one  of  the  loans  nearly 
thirty  per  cent.  The  men  who  managed  the 
treasury  of  France  during  the  war  were  not  as 
confident  of  the  patriotism  of  the  people  as  the 
men  who  managed  the  army.  None  hesitated  to 
call  upon  the  French  to  give  their  husbands  and 
sons.  When  it  came  to  money — well,  that  was 
another  matter!  High  interest  and  the  hope  of 
gain  by  issuing  the  loans  below  par  were  the 
inducements  held  out  to  thrifty  investors. 

Perhaps  during  the  war  no  other  policy  was 
possible.  Many  who  paid  the  price  of  blood 
would  have  refused  to  pay  the  price  of  gold. 
French  character  is  curious  and  incomprehensible 


What  Confronts  France  283 

when  it  comes  to  money  matters.  It  is  the  one 
place  where  the  French  lose  their  wonderful  sense 
of  proportion  and  where  they  are  incapable  of 
reasoning  things  out.  But  now  the  French  na- 
tion is  confronted  with  the  necessity  of  paying 
for  the  war.  France  has  not  been  impoverished 
by  the  war.  Far  from  it!  Outside  of  the  in- 
vaded regions  the  country  has  increased  in  pros- 
perity since  1914.  There  is  more  money  in  the 
savings  banks  and  in  other  forms  of  investment 
at  home  than  in  1914.  The  person  who  looks  on 
the  gloomy  side  of  French  finances  is  the  one 
who  refuses  to  study  the  actual  financial  condi- 
tion of  the  French  people.  There  is  plenty  of 
money  in  France:  it  has  only  changed  hands. 
The  Government  did  not  try  to  pay  for  the  war 
during  the  war.  Instead,  the  money  that  ought 
to  have  come  into  the  French  treasury  as  taxes, 
came  in  as  loans.  It  is  ridiculous  to  object  that 
the  French  could  not  have  stood  heavy  additional 
taxation.  What  they  put  into  the  war  loans  rep- 
resented money,  and  a  good  part  of  it  money 
earned  in  the  war  and  because  of  the  war. 


284  France  and  Ourselves 

The  financial  remedy  for  France  is  to  decrease 
her  internal  war  debts  by  drastic  measures.  The 
loans  are  widely  distributed  and  are  mostly  car- 
ried by  those  who  can  afford  to  forego  them.  For 
if  the  interest  and  principal  are  to  be  paid,  the 
money  must  come  from  those  who  hold  the  loan 
certificates.  Some  sort  of  veiled  repudiation  of 
the  internal  war  debt  will  have  to  be  devised. 
None  can  now  object  if  the  capital  is  fixed  at  the 
actual  sum  paid  in  by  the  subscriber.  This  will 
be  the  first  step.  Then  the  interest  rate  will  be 
cut.  Judicial  fiscal  legislation  will  be  able  to  re- 
duce the  indebtedness  of  the  Government  toward 
its  own  citizens  to  a  quarter  of  the  present  for- 
midable total  without  disorganizing  industry  or 
causing  undue  hardship  to  the  citizens  as  a  whole. 

In  great  crises  of  history  the  Government 
should  have  the  same  right  to  call  upon  capital 
as  it  has  to  call  upon  man-power.  For  the  com- 
mon weal  every  Frenchman  left  his  work  and  his 
family  and  spent  years  in  fighting.  A  million 
and  a  half  died  and  another  million  was  incapaci- 
tated.    There  was  no  distinction  of  class  in  mili- 


What  Confronts  France  285 

tary  service ;  but  the  sacrifice  was  far  greater  for 
the  common  workingman  who  had  nothing  but 
his  hands  than  for  the  man  who  could  fight  and 
die  with  the  comfortable  feeling  that  he  was  not 
leaving  his  family  penniless.  Now  that  the  war 
is  over,  the  portion  of  the  body  politic  which  has 
money  is  called  upon  in  turn  to  make  a  sacrifice 
essential  for  the  salvation  of  France. 

The  sacrifice  is  inevitable.  Otherwise  interest 
payments  will  demand  more  than  the  annual  rev- 
enue and  a  crash  will  follow  more  disastrous  to 
the  moneyed  classes  than  a  judicious  levy  on 
capital.  Despite  their  reluctance  to  pay  out 
money,  the  common  sense  of  the  French  nation  is 
bound  to  prevail.  The  French  will  not  let  the 
financial  question  drift  or  become  a  source  of 
class  antagonism.  In  the  next  Chamber  of  Dep- 
uties we  shall  undoubtedly  see  introduced  and 
put  into  effect  a  plan  for  reducing  the  internal 
debt  by  distributing  the  sacrifices  and  avoiding 
the  appearance  of  a  confiscatory  measure  dic- 
tated by  the  pressure  of  the  laboring  classes. 

Admiration  for  France?    We  have  always  had 


286  Prance  and  Ourselves 

that.  Sympathy  with  France?  We  have  never 
failed  to  show  that.  Confidence  in  France  ?  By 
her  own  deeds  France  herself  instilled  that  in  us. 
But  during  the  period  of  reconstruction  we  can- 
not afford  to  become  indifferent  or  cool  in  our 
attitude  toward  France.  France  has  the  right 
to  continue  to  look  to  us  for  the  whole-hearted, 
tangible,  practical  aid  we  gave  her  during  the 
period  of  our  military  intervention.  We  must 
not  be  unwilling  to  do  our  full  share  and  more 
than  our  share  in  international  police  work.  We 
must  help  with  the  exchange  problem.  We  must 
extend  further  credits.  We  must  favor  France 
in  tariff  schedules.  Honor  and  gratitude  and 
interest  alike  demand  that  we  should  not  forget 
our  war  cry,  "Vive  la  France!" 


THE  END 


*  t 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  50  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.00  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


APR     25  1934 


OCT  23  WW 


•  N  1  fi- 


SANTA  BARBARA 
INIbKUBRAKV   LOAN 


ONE  MONTH  AFTER  RECEIH 


FEB  1 2  1970 


3-1? 


LD  21-100m-7,'33 


/ 


-J 


y 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


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